

THE
METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1844.

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- ART. I.—1. *Lectures on Justification*. By J. H. NEWMAN, B. D., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Pp. 443. London: J. G. & F. Rivington. 1838.
2. *Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism*. By Rev. EDWARD B. PUSEY, D. D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, &c. (Oxford Tracts, No. 67.) Pp. 400. London: 1839. New-York: 1841.
3. *The Primitive Doctrine of Justification Investigated, &c.* By GEORGE STANLEY FABER, B. D. Pp. 514. London: Seely & Burnside. 1839.
4. *Oxford Divinity compared with that of the Romish and Anglican Churches, with a special View to the Illustration of the Doctrine of Justification by Faith, &c.* By the Right Rev. C. P. M'ILVAINE, Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Ohio. Pp. 546. Philadelphia: J. Whetham & Son. 1841.

"IN the whole range of divine truth," says a modern divine, "there is no subject of greater importance than the one here discussed. It is one of the most prominent doctrines of the New Testament, and affects both the present happiness and everlasting safety of every human being;" a sentiment and opinion in which none will hesitate to unite. To teach fallen man how he may be accepted of God is the purpose contemplated in giving him a revelation;—the matter of revelation is the instruction necessary to that end. The way of salvation is exclusively a matter of revelation, for human wisdom could neither make the original discovery of the way, nor, when discovered, could it add anything to the knowledge thus gained further than is therein expressly taught or evidently implied.

The Scriptural doctrine of justification is also the distinguishing feature of Protestantism, for the Reformation was only a return from following the traditions of men to the teachings of the Bible.

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Hence Luther speaks of this doctrine as *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*—the article of a standing or falling church; and Calvin asserts that “if this one head were yielded, safe and entire, it would not pay the cost to make any great quarrel in any other matters in controversy with Rome.” “The great question,” says Hooker, “that hangeth in controversy between us and Rome is about the matter of justifying righteousness. We disagree about the nature and essence of the medicine whereby Christ cureth our disease; about the manner of applying it; about the number and power of means which God requireth in us for the effectual applying thereof to our souls’ comfort.” Such is the Reformation in its doctrine, as stated by its most eminent ministers—justification by faith alone, in opposition to the Romish doctrine of justification by infused righteousness, attained by the use of real or fictitious sacraments.

The vital importance of the subject here discussed is our only apology for its introduction; the well-being of the church, relative to both theoretical and practical faith, is intimately implicated with orthodoxy on this point. Temporary circumstances seem too to call for its consideration just now: for the doctrines of the Reformation are again brought into question; not, however, by the open aggressions of Papal minions, but by the silent and stealthy movements of the learned dignitaries of the Anglican Church—the boasted bulwark of the Protestant faith. It would seem that the faith that sustained the martyrs of the sixteenth century, and defied the fires of Smithfield, is now counted so vile a thing by their degenerate sons, that it is voluntarily abjured and cordially detested by them. The religious and literary public need not to be informed of the recent development of a hybrid theology in the University of Oxford, generally known, from the place of its paternity, as “Oxford divinity;” which, while it disowns the name and condemns some of the accidents of Romanism, embraces, without material modification, its doctrine of justification—the soul of its heresies. This defection is doubtless extensively diffused, and has greatly corrupted the fountains of instruction in that ancient communion; but though many, perhaps most of the clergy of that Church, and of her American daughter, sympathize with these restorationists, a large and highly respectable body of the clergy, and the great body of the laity of these churches are still found steadfast in the faith once delivered to the saints—and when lost by defection, regained at a great expense by the martyrs and confessors of Christianity redeemed. Among the heresiarchs who lead the Oxfordists are Dr. Pusey and Rev. J. H. Newman,

whose works are named at the head of this article. On the other side prominent places are due to the writings of Mr. Faber and Bishop M'Ilvaine, whose works on justification are now before us.

Of such a controversy no enlightened Christian can be a mere spectator. It is a contest of the gospel of the New Testament against "another gospel," of Christ against antichrist. As Protestants, therefore, our sympathies are with the defenders of the Protestant faith; but we greatly regret that the defenders of that faith have so generally adopted a phraseology which may lead to practical harm, and which gives the doctrine of justification by faith an unscriptural and indefensible expression. We allude to the continual reference to the active obedience of Christ as a meritorious cause of our justification, assuming that his life, as well as his death, was vicarious and propitiatory. To us this appears to be not only an unscriptural position, but also the fruitful source of Antinomianism, and to cause the doctrine to which it is improperly appended to share its odium, and to be rejected as false. We object to the practice of designating any doctrine which is common to all Protestants by the name of some particular school. It is manifest injustice to such reformers as reject the peculiarities of the Genevese theology to designate the leading doctrines of the Reformation by the name of Calvinism; for that name should always distinguish those peculiarities in doctrine which were proper to the school of Geneva, and in which they differ from other schools of theology, especially from the followers of Arminius. These doctrines are those of divine decrees, irresistible grace, and unconditional election and reprobation; these constitute Calvinism proper, and should always be intended when the term is used. It is granted that most of the clergy of the Anglican and Anglo-American Churches, who are decidedly evangelical, are also more or less Calvinistic, whence some have hastily concluded that its peculiarities are inseparable from the evangelical doctrines of the Reformation. This would indeed have a semblance of truth amounting to probability, were there no considerable exceptions to this rule in Protestant Christendom; but it loses all its claims when there are found many illustrious examples, both of individuals and communities, who at once hold evangelical views, and reject the dogmas of Calvinism. The followers of Wesley, both in Europe and America, are strenuous advocates of the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and yet they unanimously reject the peculiarities of the Genevese theology, and glory in the name of Arminians. The evangelical Lutheran Church is another example in point.

It is curious to notice the discrepancies on points mutually granted to be fundamental, among the divines of a Church which boasts of its unity, and is presumptuously set forth as an asylum from schism and dissent. Respecting church polity, they embrace extremes. The present archbishop of Dublin bases ecclesiastical right upon "judgment, prudence, and discretion;" while the chaplains to the queen contend for episcopacy, *jure divino*, embracing all the peculiarities of their own Church, with a degree of assurance that might surprise an experienced Jesuit. In this country, the full extent of the Oxford heresy is indorsed by several members of the self-styled apostolic college, while the same doctrines are opposed by others of them with a zeal like that of Moses against the golden calf. One party teaches a way of justification by sacraments *ex opere operato*, the other of justification by faith, through the merits of Christ, without any intervening cause or instrumentality; both appeal to the authoritative teachings of their Church for confirmation of their views, and both profess to be exclusively Churchmen. There is doubtless some uncertainty in the voice of that Church as to justification. Now she seems, as the apostles to the trembling jailor, to say to the inquiring penitent, "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved;" then she points to the sacraments as necessary means of acceptance with God. The Oxfordists appear to be highly offended at the name of Protestants, in which sentiment they have many sympathizers on this side of the Atlantic; but it is well known that the early English reformers gloried in that name, and the feelings of the founders of the *Protestant* Episcopal Church in America are indicated by the name they chose for themselves. These discrepancies are not of recent origin, but are the same that have existed, and occasionally manifested themselves in various forms, since the Reformation. The fundamental Protestant article, justification by faith alone, has found a succession of advocates in the Church of England from Cranmer to the present time; while the Popish doctrine of justification has tinged the theology of that Church at all times, and at certain periods imparted its coloring to the whole teaching of her divines.

Justification, according to Romish and Oxford divinity, is identical with sanctification; the term is understood in its proper etymological sense—to render intrinsically just. The Council of Trent decreed that "man is justified before God, not by the extrinsic righteousness of Christ, but by an intrinsic righteousness, which really as much belongs to him as his soul or his body belongs to him, being inherently infused into him by God through

faith in Christ.—Justification is not merely the remission of sins, but also sanctification and renewal of the inward man by his voluntary reception of grace and gifts.—The only formal cause [of justification] is God's justice, not by which he himself is just, but by which he makes us just, wherewith, being endowed by him, we are renewed in the spirit of our minds, and are not only reputed, but are *made truly just*." Mr. Alexander Knox, the precursor of Oxfordism, whose works have received the indorsement of the British Critic, writes thus :—"In St. Paul's sense to be justified is not simply to be accounted righteous, but also, *and in the first instance*, to be made righteous by the implantation of a radical principle of righteousness. What I am impressed with is, that our being reckoned righteous before God, always and essentially implies a substance of righteousness *previously* implanted in us ; and that our reputative justification is the strict and inseparable *result* of this *previous* efficient *moral* justification. I mean, that the reckoning us righteous indispensably *presupposes* an inward reality of righteousness on which this reckoning is founded." Mr. Newman's views are in accordance with those of Mr. Knox, which, it will have been observed, are the same as those of the Tridentine doctors. His language is this :—

"Cleanness of heart and spirit, obedience by word and deed—this alone can constitute our justification.—The gift of righteousness [is] not an imputation, but an inward work.—Justification consists in God's inward presence.—Justification and sanctification are substantially the same thing."

These extracts, which might be multiplied indefinitely, at once show the identity of Oxfordism and Tridentine Romanism, and also teach the nature of justification according to their system ; that is, that it is acceptance with God, not as pardoned sinners, but as sanctified saints. Upon this point the learned authors, whose works are now before us, (Faber and M'Ilvaine,) join issue with their brethren at Oxford, and dispute their positions throughout. Mr. Faber's book was elicited in answer to the writings of Mr. Knox ; and against that writer's Romanism revived, he evokes the voice of the primitive church, disputing and disproving Milner's unwarranted concession, and Mr. Knox's assumption, that the idea of reputative justification was not known in the church from the end of the first century to the Reformation. He finds and shows that this idea, as distinguished from justification by inherent righteousness, is clearly, though not scholastically, set forth in every age, from Clement of Rome to St. Bernard, so that the cry of "novelty," so sneeringly raised by Mr. Newman and others, is

altogether unwarranted. Bishop M'Ilvaine opens the whole field of argument in favor of the Protestant notions of justification, adducing the testimony of Scripture, the fathers, and the authentic standards of the Reformed Anglican Church in proof of those views, in great abundance; so as evidently to make his a clear case, were there no cause to fear contradictory evidence from the two latter sources.

The subject in debate is of the highest possible importance, for it relates to the very being of vital, gospel truth. Whatever, therefore, may be the doctrine of the Anglican Church upon this point is comparatively a small matter; what the Bible teaches is all-important. Still it should not be forgotten that many of the noblest sons of that Church have borne faithful witness to the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and that her Articles strongly favor the same doctrine.

The great question turns upon the sense of the word "justify," and others of kindred import—whether they are to be received, when used in Scripture, in their primary and grammatical sense, or in a secondary and figurative sense. By Protestants generally, at least such as are commonly called orthodox, these terms are understood forensically, and signify, not an intrinsic substance of justice or righteousness, but a legal release from condemnation, and the legal relation appropriate to the unoffending: justification is acquittal and freedom from condemnation. Mr. Newman grants that this is the sense of the word as it occurs in the New Testament, and that "but one passage can be produced where it is used for 'making righteous,' and there the reading is doubtful." Such a concession would seem difficult to harmonize with his broad declaration, that "justification and sanctification are essentially the same;" but he does it so far as to deprive the concession of the power to invalidate his favorite theory. This he effects by supposing imputative justification to be an anticipation of a foreseen moral change in the justified person, which, when accomplished, will render him, in fact, what by anticipation he is declared to be, a righteous person. So a physician is said to heal the sick when he changes the patient from a diseased to a healthy state, and in the same manner God is said to justify the ungodly when he frees him at once from condemnation and moral impurity; and as the physician, knowing his power and purpose to cure the diseased, would from the beginning consider him, to all intents, cured, so God, anticipating his own work in the heart of man, imputes to him effects properly consequent upon that work which he then proceeds to accomplish. "In justification," says he, "the whole course of sanctification is anticipated, reckoned, or imputed

to us in its very beginning." Again, he says, "Imputed righteousness is the coming in of actual righteousness.—They whom God's sovereign voice pronounces just forthwith become just.—He declares a fact, and makes it a fact by declaring it."

These extracts sufficiently indicate the views of the author under review. With him justification and sanctification are identical in essence—the imputative character of the former consisting in an anticipation of its intrinsic character, and a legal process upon such anticipation. Its foundation is holiness in the soul justified. He indeed seems to find hard work with the Articles of his Church, and still more so with the Homilies, which appear to have been written when his views were only known to be opposed by the writers of them. But he apparently succeeds in satisfying himself that they mean just what he does; much in the same way that the advocates of a partial atonement make *all* mean a small part, and the world an inconsiderable fraction of the human family, whom God has chosen "out of the world," and who have, before God, renounced the world. That the English Church declares explicitly "we are justified by faith alone," nobody will deny who has read the Thirty-nine Articles; and by "faith alone" every unsophisticated mind will understand, *faith, and nothing else*, or, as is declared in the Homily on the Passion, that "faith is the only mean and instrument of justification." Mr. Newman, however, makes faith *alone* mean faith *accompanied* by, and acting in subserviency to, other "means and instrumentalities." The logic by which all this is accomplished we have yet to learn, and not being of the initiated, we cannot come at the mystery, and must, therefore, consent to "believe that we may understand," or else submit to remain ignorant. But we leave the reverend vicar to settle his war with the standards of his Church, with those to whom an appeal to them would be more authoritative than with us; "we have a more sure word of prophecy."

To us it seems to be very fully taught in Scripture that justification is wholly distinct in its nature from sanctification. The whole of its language seems to imply this, and very many particular texts plainly teach it. Only a few of them can now be noticed by us.

St. Paul declares that "Christ is made unto us *wisdom, righteousness, (justification,) sanctification, and redemption.*" Here we see justification as clearly distinguished from sanctification as either of them is from wisdom or redemption; and since, probably, no one would confound the whole of them, we see no cause why we should confound any two of them. The order in

which these several gifts of grace are enumerated is also worthy of notice ; for though order of nomination does not always agree with the actual succession of things named, still here that seems to be the case. All will perhaps acknowledge that the beginning of God's work in man's heart is the gift of *wisdom*, enlightening his understanding to perceive spiritual things ; and it is equally plain that the consummation of the work of grace is the *redemption* of the body from the grave, the soul from *hades*—the place of departed spirits—and their reunion in glory, to be no more separated and no more defiled. If, then, the extremes of the four terms under consideration occur in the enumeration of them in the order of time, that is strong presumptive evidence that the means are arranged in the same order. This text, then, proves both the distinction of the two works, and the precedence in order of justification. Again it is said, God "justifies the ungodly"—the obvious sense of which declaration would determine the question in our favor. But Mr. Newman considers this the declaration of a fact which becomes such by that declaration ; that is, in justifying the ungodly, God first renders him no longer ungodly, and then holds him guiltless in view of his new character. This may appear ingenious, but it is very far from being ingenuous. To what shifts will not a bad cause impel perverse ingenuity ! What relevancy would there be in the whole of the apostle's elaborate argument, according to this interpretation ? How would the first part of the fourth chapter of Romans read if for "ungodly" be substituted a term that would fairly express Mr. Newman's notion of the character of the person justified ? What would be the sense of the Epistle to the Galatians by such interpretations ? There justification by faith is at once set forth as God's method of salvation, and yet as opposed to justification by "the deeds of the law." By this latter expression must be understood a sentence of approval in view of the conformity of character of the person judged to the law by which judgment is measured. It is justification in view of righteousness inherent in the individual justified. Such justification no man can have ; justification of sinners is not compatible with it. In St. Paul's language the righteousness of faith is opposed to the righteousness of the law ; but the righteousness of the law is spiritual conformity to its nature—is holiness of heart ; therefore the righteousness of faith, which is distinctly said to be "without the deeds of the law," must consist in something different from inward holiness. If "justification and sanctification are substantially the same," the opposite sides of the apostle's argument are identical ; and he either, schoolmanlike, discriminates where

there is no difference, or, in mere logomachy, multiplies words without knowledge. The position sought to be established by Protestants is not opposed to inherent righteousness, but a rejection of this as a ground of our acceptance with God. That God requires a personal, inherent righteousness, in all who are his, is readily granted by the advocates of imputative justification; (except a few wrong-headed Antinomians;) so that the argument against that doctrine, drawn from the declarations of Scripture which speak of the justified as being always inwardly holy, is upon a false issue. The question is not whether the two gifts are ever separated in any individual, for all agree that they never are; but which of these have precedence in point of sequence—are we justified because we are sanctified? or are we sanctified because we are justified? This is the true issue. We, with all true Protestants, understand the Scriptures to maintain the latter; the Church of Rome and the Oxford divines the former. The Scriptures teach that “being justified by faith, we have peace with God,” and being reconciled to God, he hastens, by his Spirit, to “renew us in the image of him that created us, in righteousness and true holiness.” Nor can we separate these works of grace, as to the time of their execution. Through the abounding merits of Christ’s expiatory passion, imputed to us when by faith we ask it, we receive pardon for all our sins, actual and original, and are thus delivered from condemnation. Consistent in time, though subsequent in the order of events and consequent thereupon, God, by his Spirit, creates the heart anew, giving it an inceptive principle or real holiness, which will continue to grow and beautify as long as the life of faith is maintained. “The one,” says Wesley, “implies what God does for us through his Son, the other what he works in us by his Spirit.” The one delivers us from condemnation, the other renews us in righteousness; the one changes our relations to God’s law, the other changes our moral character into the likeness of God. But this intrinsic righteousness which God by his Spirit works in all his children is not the ground of inceptive, continued, or final acceptance with him. The holiest comes far short of the claims of God’s holiness, and in his sight shall no flesh be justified. Our continued and final acceptance with God is no less an act of pardoning grace than was our primary justification. It is the doctrine of inspiration not only that “by grace we are saved through faith,” but also that “the just shall live by faith,” and at length dying in faith shall receive a crown of life.

Having thus considered the nature of justification, according to

the views of Oxfordists and Protestants, we come next to inquire for the instrument or means by which we attain this grace. Here difference of opinion is to be expected among those who differ so widely as to the nature of the thing attained. The distinguishing doctrine of the Reformation is, that the sinner is justified through the instrumentality of faith alone, which is stoutly opposed by the adherents of Romanism. This it is well known was the leading point for which Luther and his associates contended with the Papists of their times, and which the Council of Trent anathematized as a damnable heresy. Protestants hold that justification comes to man only through the medium of faith—that whatever else the Scriptures may prescribe to him, or the church afford, are to be passed by in his approach to the mercy seat. Repentance, contrition, prayers, sacraments, and all other external and internal exercises, are either means for strengthening and confirming faith, or they are the fruits of faith produced in its progress toward full maturity. They allow nothing to stand between the sinner and his Saviour; but call the penitent to approach the mercy seat in all his sins, “to find mercy and grace to help in time of need.” The faith in which the sinner approaches and finds favor with God is none other than *a full persuasion of heart of the truth of God’s word and promises, and a personal appropriation of them, by embracing the terms of recovering mercy*. Whoever complies with this condition is thereupon accepted of God; and whoever fails in this particular, though all others are scrupulously observed, must fail of divine favor. This is justification by faith alone—the corner-stone of Protestantism.

On the contrary, the Romish doctors teach not only that justification is subsequent to regeneration, and based upon it, but also that faith is only remotely employed in its attainment. With them the sacraments are the means and channels of spiritual grace, and, consequently, of acceptance with God; so that whoever is baptized, is *de facto* regenerated, while all others remain unrenewed, and therefore under the curse.

Faith is included in this system only as it leads the subject to baptism, and though known by the common name, it is with them a very different thing from the faith of Protestants. It is simply an intellectual assent to the gospel history as true, and obedience to the commandment to be baptized. The faith of the Romanist brings him to the baptismal font; that of the Protestant to the mercy seat: it apprehends Christ on the cross, and God in Christ reconciling the world to himself. Here is seen the “great gulf fixed” between the two systems; the difference is funda-

mental, precluding all possibility of reconciliation, and arraying them in eternal warfare. But where shall we find the contending parties of the Anglican and Anglo-American Churches? Are they, as in relation to the nature of justification, divided between Romish heresy and gospel truth, or is the breach so wide as to allow the belligerents to spread their tents and marshal their hosts between the extremes of truth and error? The true position of those churches relative to baptismal regeneration is not clearly defined, not, however, for want of explicit declarations upon the subject, but by reason of the discordant character of such declarations. Most of their divines, however, confess, with Mr. Wesley, that "it is certain our Church supposes that all who are baptized in their infancy, are at the same time born again; and it is allowed that the whole office for the baptism of infants proceeds upon this supposition." Such, no doubt, is the necessary conclusion at which every unsophisticated reader of that office would arrive, but such a conclusion is utterly irreconcilable with the teachings of the Church elsewhere, as to the office of faith in justification. For if justification is by faith alone, regeneration must be posterior to it in the order of sequence, and baptism must depend for its efficacy, whatever that may be, upon the exercise of faith. To us, the two points of doctrine, (justification by faith alone, and baptismal regeneration,) taught by the national Church of England, appear to be wholly incompatible—the one can be maintained only at the expense of its opposite. All, therefore, that is said by that Church in favor of justification by faith alone, is to its whole extent, by necessary and obvious implication, against a justification based upon baptismal regeneration, or any other foundation than the grace of God received by faith. Her article on baptism (twenty-seventh) declares that "baptism is . . . a *sign* of regeneration, whereby they that receive baptism rightly are grafted into the Church." This sufficiently clearly discriminates between the outward sacrament of baptism and the spiritual grace of regeneration; a distinction acknowledged alike by Romanists, Oxfordists, and Protestants. The point of difference is in relation to the necessary coexistence of regeneration and consequent justification, with "baptism rightly received"—Romanists and Oxfordists affirming, and Protestants denying this. The former make baptism the *infallible*, the latter the *ostensible*, sign of spiritual grace; the former hold that all who are baptized are infallibly, immediately, and, by its certain instrumentality, born again; the latter, that faith is the only means of coming to God, and that without this baptism itself is of no avail. The language of the article quoted

above is indeed susceptible of the interpretation put upon it by the Oxford divines, though that sense is not necessarily, nor indeed obviously implied. And when the same article further says, that in baptism "the promises of the forgiveness of sins, and of adoption to be the sons of God, by the Holy Ghost, are visibly *signed and sealed, faith is confirmed and grace increased* by virtue of prayer to God," the Oxford interpretation is rendered very difficult and far-fetched. For it can hardly be supposed that the same sacrament is at once the visible sign and seal of the gospel promises, and the essential medium of those promised graces; and if, by it, "in answer to prayer to God, faith is *confirmed* and grace *increased*," faith and grace are necessary prerequisites for rightly receiving baptism, and then, of course, it cannot be the medium of this faith and grace. The article, therefore, may be set down as containing an expression of Protestant doctrine, though we confess there is a want of those full and explicit statements of evangelical truth which preclude misconstruction, and silence all cavils.

In the office for the baptism of infants, to which the foregoing extract from Wesley refers, the Church is taught that they "should not doubt that God will receive the infant to be baptized, and make him a partaker of his everlasting kingdom." All this, however, as well as the twenty-seventh article, is susceptible of an evangelical interpretation, since it is no doubt according to God's gracious purposes that in baptism the subject is brought nearer to him, and, by meeting him in his own ordinance, a larger share of spiritual influence is secured. We therefore should not doubt in baptism, just as we should not doubt in prayer, that God will fulfil on his part all that he has promised; and even more fully should we believe, as therein we not merely approach him with a general promise of favor, but with the condition of a covenant confirmed by the oath of the Almighty. So far the Church may be vindicated from heresy; but when, in the close of the same office, she is made to give thanks to God, "that it hath pleased thee to regenerate this child by thy Holy Spirit," such vindication is no longer available. This necessarily supposes that in all cases the baptized is at the same time regenerated; for otherwise the expression of thanks would be presumptuous mockery. Subsequently the baptized child is taught to speak of his baptism as that "wherein he was made a child of God."

The influence of these expressions, thrown back upon the somewhat doubtful language of the Articles, and other portions of the office for baptism, gives an air of consistency to the Oxford inter-

pretation above that of their opponents. A reference to the best-accredited works of the divines of that Church will not remove the difficulty. Two schools of theology have prevailed among them, from near the time of the Reformation to the present; each in turn appearing to predominate, and by turns so far coalescing as to give a mixed and doubtful character to their more popular teachings. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration is far from being foreign from the more evangelic portion of English Church divines; the Oxford Tractators, in their famous "*Catena Patrum*," have placed this in a strong light. At their call, even those old thorough-going reformers, Cranmer and Ridley, speak strongly on the same side, though, by Bishop M'Ilvaine's cross questioning, they favor what we hold incompatible with it, justification by faith alone. Whether these eminent men, and their worthy successors, are not somewhat inconsistent in what they teach, or, at least, in what they subscribe, and what they use in their formularies, as collated with their teachings, we leave for the decision of ecclesiastical judicatories; but we doubt not that at the bar of Scripture and common sense their foundation will be found both upon the rock and the sand.

Bishop M'Ilvaine opposes Dr. Pusey's notions of the efficacy of baptism, by quoting the fathers of the English Church in favor of justification by faith; but Dr. Pusey had already quoted them in favor of his own views. The bishop seems to think that whatever favors the one opposes the other: we agree with him, and yet we see that those venerated men held both. What can we do, then, but acknowledge that they teach contrarieties, and are involved in inextricable inconsistencies? The influence of a cherished creed, and cherished forms, is truly wonderful, so that it requires little short of a miracle to save one from it. None, perhaps, will question the soundness of Mr. Wesley's views of the Protestant doctrine of justification, and yet when he came to write of baptism he seemed to have forgotten all that he had so fully taught, and still to be in the leading strings of mother Church. "This regeneration," says he, "which our Church in so many places ascribes to baptism, is more than barely being admitted into the Church, though commonly connected therewith; being 'grafted into the body of Christ's church, we are made children of God by adoption and grace.' This is grounded upon the plain words of our Lord, 'Except a man be born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God,' John iii, 5. By water, then, as a means, by the water of baptism, we are regenerated and born again, whence it is called by the apostle 'the washing of re-

generation.' Our Church, therefore, ascribes no greater virtue to baptism than Christ himself has done. Nor does she ascribe it to the outward washing, but to the inward grace, which added thereto, makes it a sacrament. Herein a principle of grace is infused, which will not be wholly taken away, unless we quench the Holy Spirit of God, by long-continued wickedness."* The treatise from which the above is taken bears date 1756, some twenty years after the author had fully embraced the doctrine of justification by faith alone; whether he ever reviewed these early-conceived notions we are not informed, though in his sermon on the New Birth (from which we made an extract in another part of this article) he ascribes the same doctrine to his Church as to infants, but seems to make some exceptions as to adults, and leaves the whole matter in doubt as to his own views of the correctness of this point of the Church's doctrines. The date of this sermon is not given, and as there is nothing elsewhere in his published works upon the subject, this must stand as his recorded opinion upon this highly-important topic. It will have been seen that this statement is on the advance ground of Oxfordism; for Dr. Pusey goes no further than to teach that regeneration and justification, "by a principle of grace infused" in baptism, are always consequent upon the proper administration of that ordinance—that this is the one appointed means of saving grace, and consequently is essential to salvation. But Mr. Wesley's public preaching, and his other voluminous writings, inculcated a very different doctrine, though evidently he was long shackled by his Oxford prejudices. His history is an exemplification of the efficacy of a correct practical faith in rectifying the obliquities of early prejudices and a pernicious speculative creed. From an exclusive prelatist he was led, little by little, and in a way that he knew not, not only to enlarge the sphere of his charity, but at length to strike a blow which is now likely to prove fatal to the English hierarchy itself. From a believer in sacramental efficacy *ex opere operato*, he became a preacher of the righteousness of faith, and the sinner's privilege to approach the Saviour and the blood of the cross, by its simple instrumentality. According to his early-conceived notions and predilections he was a Churchman at whose feet Pusey, Newman, and Palmer might delight to sit; but by the lessons taught him by the Holy Ghost, through humble instrumentalities, he became a champion of the doctrines of the Reformation, and the leader of a new "sect." His followers, and those who bear

* Works, vol. vi, p. 15, American edition.

his name, both in Europe and America, are among the most strenuous supporters of evangelical doctrines, and as far as any from placing undue confidence in the sacraments. Mr. Watson, who is the best expounder of the doctrines of Wesleyan Methodism, so far from considering baptism and regeneration inseparable, denies to baptized, as well as unbaptized, infants a state of justification, which necessarily excludes them from a regenerate state. But to return.

The ancient church is appealed to with great apparent confidence to sustain the views now taught at Oxford, and evidently not without some good grounds for such expectations. Human authority is not wanting to establish that side of the question, though much has been written by persons equally eminent for piety and sound learning on the other side. The assumptions of the Oxfordists, both as respects the ancient church and the early English Church, are greater than are authorized by the state of the case. But it is a well-known rule among those who have first assumed that they enjoy a monopoly of God's mercies covenanted to mankind, to assume, also, despite of facts to the contrary, as unquestionable, and sustained by the unanimous voice of the church catholic, whatever they have adopted, either as a dogma in theology or a truth in history. In Mr. Faber's learned work the claims of these men to the undivided consent of the ancient church to their notions is successfully contested; though doubtless the "mystery of iniquity," which had begun to work in the days of the apostles, continued to spread until it possessed itself of the strong-holds of the Church, and corrupted the fountains of religious instruction.

Bishop M'Ilvaine labors hard to vindicate his Church from the charge of favoring sacramental justification, and succeeds so far as to show that many of her most eminent divines held another mode of justification; but it is not quite so certain, as he seems to suppose, that they are not somewhat inconsistent with themselves, in holding at once the two opposing doctrines. Respecting that regeneration of which the Church speaks in connection with baptism, there is a mistiness in the writings of the more evangelical of them, which is most painfully suspicious. They talk of a *mystical regeneration* in baptism, and having thus involved the subject in their own mystifications, they there leave it. By some the renewing grace is only spoken of as accompanying the baptism of infants, and all adult sinners are therefore considered backsliders, fallen from the grace to which they attained in baptism. That must, indeed, be a "mystical" regeneration which makes no

manifestation upon the renewed heart—a strange “being in Christ” in which old things have *not* passed away, nor anything become new—for all confess that the baptized infant manifests the same tokens of depravity and the indwelling of the carnal mind that others do. But to pass by these “mysteries,” let us consider the counterpart of this notion of the regeneration of infants in baptism. This part of the system has generally been treated by the friends of the doctrine much as the counterpart of the Augustinian doctrine of election—kept out of sight. If by baptism infants become personally interested in the atonement, so that by this they become partakers of the merits of Christ’s death, the unbaptized infant is, of necessity, damned. This conclusion is inevitable. The eternal welfare of every child, who dies in infancy, is thus placed, absolutely, and without reserve, at the disposal of those who have the control of that child. God, we are told, will save only by baptism, and the parent may, through ignorance, prejudice, or impiety, neglect to secure that favor for the helpless immortal; so that the murderous hand of the father may consign his helpless and unoffending offspring to perdition, despite of the provision of grace and the blood of the cross! The decree of unconditional reprobation was called by its greatest modern defender *a horrible decree*, but really it presents no feature so revolting as the eternal damnation of an unoffending infant—not because the Sovereign of the universe saw good so to determine, but because an ignorant or impious parent failed in one point of parental duty. In that case there is an intimation of a cause, fearful indeed, but still sublime; in this there is not even that poor excuse to plead, but the eternal overthrow of the millions of our race who die in infancy is suspended on the caprice or ignorance of ungodly parents. When these fearful consequences of this blasphemous faith are urged upon its supporters, we are told about “uncovenanted mercies”—words conveying no idea to the hearers, because they are the representatives of none in those of the speakers. If these terms meant anything, it would be, that the covenant of mercy to fallen man is so narrow that it neither reaches the wants of man nor answers the gracious purposes of God, and so God saves some despite of his own covenant! It is difficult to determine in this case whether the absurdity or the impiety is the more glaring.

A careful examination of the doctrine of the Reformed Church of England, in relation to the two particulars under consideration, strongly impresses us with the conviction that discordant elements are incorporated in her fundamental constitution. The spirit of the reformers prevailed so far as to introduce the gospel palladium

—the doctrine of justification by faith; but the influence of the Tudors succeeded in retaining enough of Papal error to cause confusion in the spiritual camp. Since then, Christ and Belial have been warring for the mastery within her. The Homilies, generally, breathe an excellent spirit, and inculcate sound doctrine, though with less clearness and warmth than might seem desirable; but much of her discipline is rather the cradle of carnal security than the school of Christian duties. The history of that Church confirms these statements. The spirit of inquiry was not wholly crushed, as in France, by persecutions and martyrdoms, but the growth of Protestantism was cramped by the forms placed upon it to give it the desired shape and dimensions. The iron bedstead was everywhere brought into requisition, and upon it some were stretched to its extent, and others cut off to bring them to the proper length. The consequence has been, that “dissent” has distinguished the English Church and nation, and a multitude of “sects” fill the land. Vast numbers of such as embody the greatest portion of the moral energy of the Church, the zealous and self-sacrificing, have been driven from the communion of the national Church on account of differences which, being purely matters of conscience, involving only the relations of man to his Maker, are not legitimate subjects of ecclesiastical discipline. English Protestantism has proved itself to be of too sturdy growth to be confined by the Procrustean shackles of the English hierarchy; but it has afforded another instance of the old prophetic parable, “The bed is shorter than that a man may stretch himself on it, and the covering narrower than that he can wrap himself in it.” Especially does the history of the past hundred years demonstrate the inherent perversity of that ecclesiastical constitution, and its incapacity for reformation. A little over one hundred years ago a great revival of religion occurred in Great Britain, the principal instruments of which were not only members of the established Church, but also warmly attached to its interests; so that in their zealous labors they purposed no less to advance the glory of the Church than to promote a better state of piety in the land. In their operations they violated no part of the fundamental law of the Church, nor were they found inveighing against either her doctrine or discipline, but in support of all they did and taught, they appealed to the voice of the Church as expressed in her authentic standards. But their spirit and zeal were a standing reproof upon the lives and conduct of those who held the high places, and were the repositories of ecclesiastical power; and by a continued course of vexatious treatment, they, or their children in the gospel, have

been compelled to place themselves beyond the pale of the established Church.

One body of Christians, patient to a fault, have, for a hundred years, suffered all manner of indignities—have been proscribed as enemies of the Church, though convicted of no infraction of its laws, and execrated as heretics, though teaching nothing which they do not prove from its Articles and Homilies—and still they have cherished their connection with that body, rallying to its support, when popular odium threatened its existence, and defending it against radical aggressions, until at last they find themselves compelled to array themselves against its evil advisers, or suffer themselves to be crushed. So discordant are its elements, that the full development of its parts is self-destruction: such the organic malconformation of its heart that the growth of its strength is its sure way to death; the more healthy portions must occasionally be cast off to prevent a degree of vital action which the diseased organs cannot endure. If dissent is an evil, the fault of the unparalleled amount of dissent from the Church of England is chargeable not upon those who, for the sake of the gospel, have been ejected, but upon the Church which has, like Jezebel, exerted her authority to “cut off the prophets of the Lord.” But while the hand of the hierarchy has been uplifted to suppress the full development of reformed Christianity, it has pointed the way to the embraces of “mother Church.” Her discipline and services have served as an Appian Way to myriads of returning pilgrims at every period since the Reformation; and so well has this way become cleared of the obstacles thrown into it in “an uncatholic age,” that the transition is very easy, and may be expected to be of frequent occurrence. But the fate of the younger James should be at once a consolation to the faithful, and a warning to the recreant. The English people are, as they have ever been since the days of Edward VI., a really Protestant people; and if, for their religion, they expelled their legitimate prince, let bishops and professors fear to do violence to their cherished sentiments.

But to return to the consideration of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, which seems to be an acknowledged point of doctrine in the Anglican, and, of course, in the Anglo-American Church. The recent movements at Oxford have had a particular reference to this subject; the official and private teachings of the dignitaries of the Church have been cited, and the ancient church has been drawn upon—nor are the Holy Scriptures left out of the account. In Dr. Pusey’s famous Tract on Baptism, now under review, the entire field of argument is laid open. But being aware

of his danger if he presumed to go beyond the ramparts of the strong-hold of tradition and Church authority in such an inquiry, he begins with an attempt to shield his cause from a most effective argument against the entire system that he and his coadjutors are laboring to revive. Knowing that men are accustomed to judge of the divine origin of a doctrine, and, consequently, of its truth, by its practical influences upon those who embrace it; and being well aware that by such a test his favorite notion must be condemned, he begins by offering an insult at once to the authority of the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the understanding of his readers, by formally protesting against such a rule of judgment. We give his own words :—

“Every pious and well-instructed member of our Church will, in the abstract, acknowledge, that in examining whether any doctrine be a portion of revealed truth, the one subject of inquiry must be, whether it be contained in the Holy Scriptures; and that in this investigation . . . he must lay aside all reference to the supposed influence of such doctrine; the supposed religious character of them that held it at any given time, and the like.”—P. 1.

By such an assumption, which is thrust out in the face of common sense, general sentiment, and the explicit teachings of the word of God, and which he does not attempt to prove, but asserts as matter of universal assent, he would cover his Popish heresy from its merited odium. But the web of sophistry is too thin, the impudence of the assumption too great an insult to common sense, to effect its purpose. How very different the instructions of our Lord when he warned his disciples against false prophets! Did he give them to understand that their “supposed (that is, apparent) religious characters” were to be left out of the account in judging of the truth of the doctrine taught by them? He said, “*By their fruits ye shall know them,*” by which we are taught not simply that we shall know them as men, but also, and especially, as prophets or teachers, or else, however true the declaration, it were altogether irrelevant to the case; and if we by their fruits, that is, their religious characters, know them as teachers, we, of course, by the same rule, are enabled to judge of the doctrine they teach. The position assumed is totally false, unless to be “pious and well instructed,” as a member of the Church of England, means something very different from what is generally and properly understood by these terms. Nor is it true, as is further asserted, that “to judge of doctrines by their supposed influence upon men’s hearts, would imply that we know much more of our nature than we do;” for this necessary knowledge is not only placed within

our reach, but every man is made responsible for its exercise. But this is not implicit faith, without which Oxford and Rome can gain no proselytes. The notorious moral degradation of all large communities where the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, *ex opere operato*, has prevailed, renders the use of our Lord's test fatal to that doctrine. To grant the fact, which is undeniable matter of historical record, is virtually to grant the conclusion, otherwise the inductive philosophy is of no real value, and the relation of cause and effect wholly unknown. It is well known that wherever the Romish doctrine, now under consideration, has been received by any church or community, that the morals of that community have become, or continued, in a low state; and as constant antecedence and consequence are all we know of the relation of cause and effect, we are compelled, no less by the rules of a sound philosophy, than by the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ, to make the latter in this case the effect of the former—Dr. Pusey's formal protest to the contrary notwithstanding.

Having thus corrected the false principle with which the Oxford doctor begins, and, in doing so, having shown not only the opposite rule to be the true one, but also that by this true rule of judging the doctrine of baptismal regeneration is condemned, we may now, from our present position, more advantageously examine the passages and expressions in Scripture by which it is attempted to be supported. It is an established rule of Biblical interpretation, that no passage of Scripture shall contradict another if it is susceptible of such a construction as to render the two mutually consistent. If, then, texts are found which, of themselves, would bear the Romish construction, if they can be made to bear another which shall harmonize with the general tenor of revelation, this, even if not the most obvious, must be received as the true interpretation. The Scriptures teach that the doctrines of the gospel may be tested by their practical influences; whatever, therefore, will not bear that test cannot be a gospel doctrine, which, we find, is the case with that which we are now considering. Another similar argument to the same purpose is found in the fact, that all the scripturally-designated fruits of the Spirit are sometimes found in the unbaptized, while others, though baptized, produce only the fruits of the flesh. Into what contradictions and perplexities do men plunge themselves when they attempt to reconcile the truth, that "the tree is known by its fruit," with the figment of baptismal regeneration! In the same way should we view this doctrine in its relation to the teachings of Scripture, as to justification, acceptance, renewal, &c.; for, as far as the Bible sustains the Soli-

fidian theory, it opposes the sacramental. This part of the argument has been already considered: it remains only to notice the texts of Scripture by which this doctrine is thought by its advocates to be supported, to see if they will *bear* a construction consistent with the analogy of faith. The first of these strong texts which we shall notice is the commission given by our Lord to his apostles, to "go teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." They interpret this text thus: The first part contains the command, designating the thing to be done, "to teach, make Christian, all nations;" the second part points out the process by which this is to be done, that is, by baptizing them. Now let us examine the text to see if it *cannot* be understood a little differently. The word rendered "teach" expresses both the *end* to be accomplished and the *means* by which that end may be attained; it signifies *to Christianize by instruction*. Baptism must, therefore, be considered as an appendage to the means of Christianization, rather than the means itself. So taught St. Paul, when he declared, "Christ sent me *not to baptize*, but to preach the gospel." This, then, places baptism in its true relation to the Christian dispensation, that of "an outward sign of the inward grace."

Another favorite passage is that found in 1 Pet. iii, 21, where, after speaking of the salvation of the family of Noah "by water," he adds, "The like figure whereunto even baptism doth now save us." This passage is better adapted to their purpose than the former, as it is somewhat obscure, and obscurity always favors pretended mysteries. However, we may allow them their own interpretation without danger to our cause. Grant that baptism does save us, does that concede the point of regeneration by baptism? An apostle has said, "We are saved by hope," but are we regenerated or justified by hope? Innumerable instrumentalities conspire to lead us to Christ *by faith*, each of which may be said, in the ordinary use of language, to save us. Thus it is said, "It pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe;" and, "By grace ye are saved, through faith;" and, again, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." Here we have hope, preaching, grace, and baptism, all set down as means of salvation; but faith is coupled with each of them, and elsewhere faith alone is spoken of as the condition of our acceptance, "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life." This passage, then, not only admits of a Protestant interpretation, but imperatively demands it.

Another text is found in Titus iii, 5, which reads thus: "Not

by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost." The assumption that this text proves the doctrine of regeneration, through the instrumentality of baptism, is perfectly gratuitous. Who knows that the apostle had any reference to baptism when he employed the expression, "washing of regeneration?" Such a meaning is not necessarily implied, for in the work of conversion there are both a cleansing process and a transforming operation, answering to the apostle's expressions, "washing" and "renewing." But suppose he had immediate reference to baptism, what then? Does the text necessarily teach the doctrine which is attempted to be supported by it? Baptism is the ostensible sign of spiritual regeneration, and, according to the universal use of men in speaking, it has taken its designation from that which it is intended to signify. It may be called "the washing of regeneration," because it is "the outward sign of that inward grace," though not inseparably connected with it.

We will examine but one text more, and that is one upon which the supporters of baptismal regeneration have rested the foundation of their faith; we mean the declaration of our Lord, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." This they understand to teach that there is such a thing as regeneration by water, and also that this is essential to salvation. If this text necessarily implied all this, we should be compelled to pass it by as a sealed portion of divine truth, not to be understood until God, by the Spirit of inspiration, should expound his own word. We may not rest an article of faith upon a single passage of Scripture, not certainly expressed therein, and especially an article which unchristianizes nearly the whole of Christendom, and excludes from the covenant of promise, and the hope of salvation, the entire human race, infant and adult, with an exceedingly small exception. We are, however, driven to no such extremity; the text is perfectly consistent with the general doctrine of the inspired volume. Baptism bears the same relation to the kingdom of heaven on earth (that is, the visible church) that regeneration does to the kingdom of heaven within us. Our Lord spake of both together, and therefore spake of the way of entrance into each; by water (in baptism) we are made members of the visible church; by the Spirit we enter into the spiritual household of God. The two are conjoined by our Lord, as it is his purpose that the outward sign shall always accompany the inward grace, that they who are his by spiritual regeneration shall

bear the outward sign of the work wrought in them by his Spirit. We therefore totally dissent from the opinion quoted from Wesley in another part of this article; and hold that the Church does not ascribe any other regeneration to baptism than "barely being admitted into the Church;" or else, in so doing, she ascribes to it "more than our Lord himself has done." Which of these alternatives we choose is sufficiently shown in what we have written.

According to the views we are opposing, the sign, (baptism,) and the thing signified, (spiritual regeneration,) are inseparable concomitants. "Being grafted into the body of Christ's church, (by baptism,) we are (thereby) made children of God by adoption and grace;" and as this is the only door to the heavenly fold, of course all who are not thus initiated, are not of Christ, but are without hope in the world. But will facts sustain this theory? Was Simon Magus, when thus "grafted into the body of Christ's church, made a child of God by adoption and grace?" And are the thousands of baptized practical infidels, who burden and curse the church, all of them children of God by spiritual regeneration? We need not wait an answer. On the other hand, had not those who were baptized on the day of Pentecost already received the grace signified by baptism? Had not Cornelius and his household received the Holy Ghost before the apostle commanded water to be brought, that they might be baptized? And does not the experience of every Christian minister teach him that men may be justified and regenerated before baptism, as well as after it? On this point Bishop M'Ilvaine proposes some pertinent questions to his Romanizing brethren. He supposes a case—such as is of every-day occurrence—of a person repenting, believing, and purposing to receive baptism, which must be deferred to some future time, more or less remote, according to circumstances; and then asks, "Does this delay, which is no fault of his own, cause him to be unjustified and unregenerate, when both are essential to peace with God?" Is it not frequently the case that seasons of baptism are so remote from each other that candidates may often die in the interim between repentance and baptism, and, of course, be eternally lost, because they could not obtain baptism? It will probably be a long time before these questions will be answered by those to whom they are addressed; and yet if baptism is the divinely-appointed channel of renewing grace, and if this grace is the ground of our acceptance with God, an answer is readily found, though one of fearful import. By this doctrine, the soul of the penitent is put wholly within the power of the priest; by delay he may keep him from the enjoyment of the grace of life,

and hold him still obnoxious to divine vengeance ; and by neglect of duty he may doom him to eternal perdition. To hesitate at this conclusion is to suppose that justification and regeneration may precede baptism, which is virtually abandoning the position that it is the only channel of divine grace to the unregenerate, and renders it possible, and probable too, that the spiritually regenerated are not the identical persons in every case who are grafted into Christ's church by baptism. And if the two (baptism and regeneration) can be disjoined in any case, they may be in any number of cases, that is, they are not necessarily connected together. Men may be in Christ and not be in the visible church of Christ, and they may be in the visible church and yet be far from Christ, and strangers to his saving grace.

We have given the more space to the consideration of this subject from a conviction of its great relative importance. In this place, the defenders of the Romish doctrine of justification entrench themselves, whence they are to be dislodged by the heavy artillery of gospel truth. In this controversy both parties agree in holding the totally lapsed estate of man—the absolute necessity of salvation from a source beyond himself. How shall he attain that help is the question at issue. He must either receive divine favor on account of something in himself, or by something procured or performed for him by another. Both parties acknowledge that the meritorious cause of the sinner's acceptance is the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ ; as to the manner of attaining that grace they are divided. We think the Protestant doctrine, that we are justified through the alone merits of our Lord Jesus Christ, received by faith, is amply sustained by the word of God. In opposition to this view, the only formidable scheme is that which we have just been considering. If man by nature is wholly without grace, he must, say our opponents, receive it from God before he can be intrinsically pleasing in his sight—he must be made holy in order that he may be accepted of God, and received as his child. In order to his receiving this necessary grace, a medium must be instituted—which medium is baptism. Herein, we are told, all original and actual sin is taken away, and the soul appears pure and intrinsically lovely in the sight of God. Condemnation is taken away, because God is well pleased to view his own image in the hearts of his creatures.

“ He looks, and loves his image there.”

Our reasons for opposing this doctrine have been briefly hinted at in the foregoing remarks, and such are our convictions of the

great importance of this point that we agree with Calvin in considering this the key, the Thermopylæ of Protestantism. Grant the claims of Romanists or Oxfordists in this particular, and they will take at pleasure whatever else may come within the range of their cupidity. If baptism is the key to the kingdom of heaven; if the reception of it "duly administered" is the appointed means of attaining divine favor, then indeed have they, to whom the right of administering that sacrament is committed, a tremendous power over the souls of men. Then is the ministerial office rendered not only glorious on account of its power to bless, but equally fearful on account of its power to curse. Nor would it be reasonable to suppose that when such a power was committed to men that it would not be guarded from the approach of the vulgar and uninitiated. Not only must all power be vested in the chosen vessels of grace, but it must be a monopoly with them, and those to whom they shall see good to communicate it. Hence, sacraments must be transformed into charms, ministers of the gospel into magicians, communicating grace or power as they see good; and an unbroken succession of the electric line of magic grace must appear, to prove the genuineness of pretension to a divine mission. All the power that the most towering ambition could desire, all that the most voracious avarice could ask, is thus secured to the pretended successors of the despised fishers of Galilee. He who would defy death in every fearful form, whom danger could not daunt, nor labor overcome, would succumb to the ghostly terrors of him who holds in his hands the destinies of eternity, and may, at pleasure, bind in perdition, or loose to all the felicities of heaven. On the other hand, if it is granted that we are justified by the alone instrumentality of *faith*, and that "faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of God," then whoever can procure and read the Bible may not only learn the way of salvation for himself, but may also "believe to the salvation of his soul." Power and responsibilities are thus devolved upon all, and the minister of the gospel appears in his true character of a teacher of the way of life; and the spiritual guide of those who inquire the way to Zion. From being ghostly fathers, armed with scorpion lashes, they become messengers of mercy, and servants of the church for Christ's sake. Sacraments appear as means of grace to strengthen faith, and aid us in our approach to the throne of grace, where alone "we may obtain mercy and find grace to help in time of need."

We have thus brought our subject through the mazes of controversy, where truth and error seem to be engaged in

interminable strife. There are, doubtless, two great schools of theology in the modern church, which may be denominated the Tridentine and the Reformed, contradistinguished by their notions of justification. Both have able representatives in the Anglican Church; and both systems are now pretty fully developed. On the one side is arrayed the entire Protestant church—*not including* the English Establishment—on the other, the whole nominally Christian world besides, while the nondescript Church of England is partly on one side and partly on the other. The conflict of the two systems within the sphere of influence of that Church is rapidly approaching a crisis, at which the fate of one or the other must be decided for a season. Protestantism has hitherto possessed the English Church much as Israel held Canaan before the days of David; the Canaanites still occupying the strong-holds. It may prove that the present sally, from their hiding places, of these unsubdued enemies of divine truth is caused by the straitness of the place where they are now confined, and that it is but a desperate effort of an expiring hope that nerves them to this doubtful struggle. It is unquestionable that evangelical principles have increased rapidly for the past hundred years, nor do we believe that now there is any considerable retrogradation. Alarm has seized the supporters of *jure divino* prelatists, as they well know that their craft is in danger, and hence a desperate attempt must be made to revive the exploded fable of a benighted age; hence men, who would rule at any rate, will resort to all the absurdities and contradictions of a false theology for support. In such a strife the friends of truth should be united, and therefore this one great fundamental point kept always in view. In defining what it is for which we contend, we should be careful to include no merely speculative, nor any doubtful points. The doctrines of the Reformation, impregnable as they are, may be rendered indefensible by uniting them with certain forms of expressions and doubtful points of divinity. In opposing the doctrine we would now defend, Mr. Newman directs his logic and his sarcasms principally against the language in which some Protestants have chosen to express it, and by showing that to disadvantage, seems to triumph over the doctrine itself. Mr. Faber has presented this whole subject in so fair a shape, and in such a clear light, that we think we cannot do better, in closing this article, than to lay his remarks before the reader. He thus states the doctrine of justification as held by Protestants:—

“In regard to the ground of our acceptance with God, we are justified through faith on account of the alone perfect righteousness

of Christ, and not in any wise on account of our own inherent righteousness or sanctification."

To this statement of the doctrine itself, he adds the following, which he terms the *rationalè*, or speculative principle of the doctrine:—

"In respect to the process of the divine Mind, our justification is effected not only forensically in general, but also in particular, by *the specifically forensic imputation* of Christ's perfect righteousness to the individual whom he justifies."

He then proceeds,—

"Now the *rationalè* before us may be well-founded, or it may be ill-founded; it may, as some think, be fairly deduced from Scripture, or, as others think, it is incapable of being substantiated by any such elaboration. But this is nothing to the real question. *The truth of the doctrine depends not on the correctness of the appended rationalè.* If the doctrine be the mind of the Holy Scripture, then that important fact will remain precisely the same, whether the idea of an imputation of Christ's righteousness to the justified believer be, or be not the correct *rationalè*, or true speculative principle of the mode wherein Christ's righteousness operates to man's justification. I think it highly probable that such is the correct *rationalè*; but this at least is certain, that *nowhere in Scripture* is Christ's righteousness explicitly said to be imputed to the believer.—Some great names in antiquity, as well as other great names in modern times, have maintained the *rationalè* before us; but it ought, I conceive, never to be laid down as an article of faith, inasmuch as all are not equally convinced that it can be established by a legitimate deduction from the language of Holy Scripture."—Pp. 25–27.

This we consider a highly-important statement, as it secures the doctrine of justification by faith from an implication with the difficulties, real or imaginary, of any particular school of theology. We dissent from the learned author's opinion as to the probability of the correctness of the *rationalè*, but agree with him most cordially as to the doctrine itself. We might, indeed, except to some of the language in which he states the doctrine, as not the most fitly chosen, but even that we may subscribe without mental reservation. Here, then, we have the broad Protestant platform upon which all who look for salvation "by grace through faith" may meet as on common ground. Each may cherish his own peculiar views of secondary points; in this we are agreed: we will trust only in God for salvation, to whom we will approach in the name of our only Mediator, "who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption."

Savannah, Ga., July, 1843.

ART. II.—*Third Article* of the Methodist Quarterly Review for July, 1843.

THE above article is a rejoinder to one which appeared a full year before it in this periodical. The present writer then intimated that it was "probable he would not resume the controversy." The extraordinary character of the paper now under notice justifies, he thinks, a brief return to the subject, and it is presumed that a candid hearing will justify it in the opinion of his readers, especially when they bear in mind that his opponents have already claimed their attention in three elaborate articles, while he has appeared before them but once.

It is quite clear, from its present aspect, that the subject will afford its disputants some considerable experimental, if not speculative, knowledge of its nature. Among our many faults, we do not like to acknowledge a squeamish temper; but we must confess ourselves a little pugnacious about this remarkable article. Evil moods, like some diseases, are infectious, and we are here so entirely enveloped in the contagion, that we must be more than mortal to escape its effects. Still we will endeavor to keep good-natured, though the singularity of the positions of our learned antagonist, as well as his misapprehensions of our own, may require criticisms which will give an air of asperity to the discussion, especially as our limits will not admit of circumlocution. If, too, we should be found a little splenetic, our provocations must be our apology. We are reminded, by this controversy, of the gouty old Spanish bishop, who, from some marvelous impression of the literary powers of his servant, stipulated with him to hear his sermons read from his stuffed arm-chair, with the understanding that the menial critic should frankly point out their faults. His silence or commendation was approved with great complacency; but on venturing the first time to mention a defect, the testy prelate lifted his spectacles, looked unutterable astonishment, and thrust him out of doors. Not very far from two years ago an article appeared in this Quarterly, propounding a "Theory of Temptation." We received a letter from its distinguished author, quite too complimentary to quote here, requesting us to criticise it frankly in the Herald and Journal. We did so; when, forthwith, the learned writer of the article now under notice, who was associated with the original author in an important public position, replied to these brief newspaper remarks in an elaborate paper, in the Quarterly, occupying twenty pages. We replied to him most

respectfully. We have seen no notice of the reply which condemned its spirit. What we have seen, particularly commended it in this respect. A whole year was then allowed to pass by in silence, with, we had thought, a mutual disposition to leave the subject to the public judgment; when, lo, we are called forth again, by our able friend, to bear the infliction of an article of twenty-five compact pages, in which we are treated as unceremoniously as was the unfortunate Spaniard. In his preceding article the reviewer showed us, we thought, sufficient coolness, but accorded us, at least, a disposition to learn the truth; but throughout the present, this even is denied us by frequent innuendoes, and the writer, by as frequent protestations, claims it for himself. We never denied it to him, and we do not now, though men skilled in human nature, we believe, consider anxious and emphatic claims to a virtue not denied, no small proof of its conscious deficiency.

It will seem very impolite for us to characterize his article, even in his *own terms*, and assure him that, in our humble judgment, it abounds in "distortions," "gross misrepresentations," "palpable absurdities," "partial quotations," "charges of heresy," "charges of sophistry," &c. Yet all these we shall be compelled to prove, however reluctantly. We made, we thought, a very modest reference to the acknowledged, unsatisfactory character of most metaphysical systems in their theological applications, whereupon we are sarcastically advised to "give the world a new one, since we feel ourselves qualified to condemn all others;" and hints are even given of relative positions, ages, &c. Now, though our learned friend has shown, throughout the controversy, a most manifest consciousness of ability to instruct us, and of condescension in doing so, he must permit us to remind him and ourselves, that, in the opinion of sensible men, such phraseology, in the discussion of religious subjects, by either party, is altogether irrelevant; that it is worse than irrelevant—and the more it is eschewed the better; that no true or vain consciousness of position or ability to instruct others will authorize either of us to speak *ex cathedra*; that the subject must be met with open and honest countenance; with argument, not cavil; with cordial good-nature, not spleen; and a generous construction of motives, and that the contrary spirit will be looked upon rather as an evidence of defeat than of triumph.

Thus much for the style of the article: and we regret even thus much; but the writer has given a personal character to the discussion, and for it he is responsible. He retires from the controversy, he says. We sincerely regret it is not with better temper.

He speaks of us as the "single writer" who has opposed the theory, evidently meaning that it was generally approved, for what else could be meant? It is not true. The theory was attacked in the leading organ of the church. It has been matter of no little colloquial discussion throughout the northern conferences. Whatever may be the opinion entertained of the other theory, incidentally quoted by ourselves, (and it is not essential in the controversy,) we have heard but one sentiment respecting this, except from sources closely connected with the writers, and we have heard this opinion extensively, and from some in the highest office of our ministry. Our friend singularly errs if he thinks we alone question his views.

He sadly misrepresents us as ascribing to the author of the theory the *results* which we deduce from it, and by which we attempt to show that it should be abandoned. He quotes language which we applied only to the certain phrases, in which we said that "if they meant not this, they meant nothing;" and this language he makes us use "in the statement of those doctrines" which we deduced from the theory, whereas we expressly declared the contrary, as he himself indicates. Nearly a whole page of protestation and advice follows, which, as this statement shows, is perfectly irrelevant to us, but entirely relevant to the author himself.

Again, we find the following note, which signifies more than it says,—

"We do not much admire the principle which could have led the reviewer of this theory, in commenting on this word [lust] as here used, to give preference to the definition of Webster over that of St. James, which is most obviously the sense of the theory. Nor do we any more admire the want of care which allowed him to select from the definitions of Webster the very *strongest* sense in which the word is ever used, when the lexicographer himself just below cites the passage from St. James as an example of its use in a *milder* sense."

We are attacked here both in regard to "principle" and "care." Respecting the first, we say that we did not "prefer Webster to St. James," but took them both, believing them to agree, and the writer well knows that we quoted, on another page, Wesley's note on St. James's passage, in which he fully sustains our quotation from Webster, by pronouncing the "lust" referred to, "*sinful*." In respect to the second charge, we remark, that we have looked through all the editions of Webster within our reach, and are unable to find the citation referred to. The only editions of Webster in common use are duodecimo and octavo; from these we quoted with all honesty; in neither of these have we been able to find it. An early edition in two volumes, quarto, was issued,

which is out of print, and to be found only in learned institutions, or among higher scholars : in this it may be found ; but the charge of carelessness (and it certainly implies more than this) comes with little pertinency under such circumstances.

Let us now turn to the more important positions of the reviewer. Following his example, we shall transpose them for our convenience. He accuses us of a "gross misrepresentation" of the theory of the original writer. We accused him of maintaining it at some length, and of then modifying it into something else. After a statement of the case the reader can judge who is right. The reviewer presents a "partial quotation" of the theory. He gives the *statement* of it without the *illustrations* or *applications* ; from the latter we must judge of the sense of the former. The following is a condensed statement presented in our preceding article :—

"Temptation is a sensible impulse or solicitation to do some evil act.—Each internal power in our constitution has its corresponding external object which God has appointed as its natural excitant, and which has power to excite it, *independent of the will*. These susceptibilities are the appetites and the passions. *Simply considered as powers existing*, they are neither vicious nor virtuous. Nor do their external excitants, so considered, partake of the nature of virtue or vice. When, under proper conditions, the external exciting object is presented, its corresponding appetite or passion is *necessarily excited* and *tends* to gratification. This involuntary and necessary excitement, which tends to gratification, is called *lust* ; and properly constitutes temptation. The existence of it, and the consciousness of its tendency to seek gratification, *is not sin*, nor of the nature of sin.—There are two other sources of temptation which depend upon this *principal, original* source :—

1. *Reflection* upon ideas and images which have been previously introduced into the mind, by which the imagination is excited ; and by this means the appetites and passions are aroused : in this case the excitement is of the same nature as that produced by the presence of the external object, and tends to seek gratification.
2. *Satanic suggestion*. Satan has the power to recall to our minds those ideas and images which we have received from external temptation, and thus to awaken our passions and excite our appetites, which state of excitement, as has been already noted, constitutes temptation. And it ought to be distinctly remembered that *he has no other means of tempting us*. From this theory is explained,—1. 'How a Christian, after conversion, may be subject to the natural excitement of the passions and appetites, *as he was before conversion*. Young and inexperienced Christians should

carefully understand this ; for many have fallen into doubts, and cast away their confidence, upon finding, shortly after their conversion, that their passions and their appetites were as naturally susceptible of excitement as before.' 2. How our first parents came to fall—they having our natural *appetites and passions*, and being subject to the influence of external objects. 3. How Christ could be tempted, for he had a *perfect human nature*, 'including our natural *appetites and passions*,' which were 'as naturally capable of excitement by their appropriate objects, as in us.'"

With the theory thus before us, we are prepared to proceed with the discussion. The reviewer charges our view of it with a fallacy which we confess excites our astonishment, for, if it is such, he alone is responsible for it. He charges us with

"an elaborate argument to show that the theory's excitement of the appetites and passions may extend to the whole class of sensibilities, (that is, emotions and desires,) the instincts, appetites, propensities, and affections, with how little fairness, the reader can judge after a very simple statement. The theory comprehends the sensibilities under 'two classes—the *appetites*, which have their origin in the flesh ; and the *passions*, which originate in the mind itself.' The reviewer, [ourself,] in opposition to all the principles of fair argumentation, attempts to force upon it another meaning, by introducing other definitions from foreign sources. As here defined, each appetite and passion must embrace both the *motive* stage and the *desire*, while the theory contains not one remark which authorizes the conclusion that the necessary excitement of temptation ever extends beyond the former."

On the same page he charges us with thus perverting the sense of the theory by "substituting the definitions of Lord Kames and others for its own." Now, how does this matter stand? The reader will bear in mind that in our original newspaper "strictures" we *denied* that the theory's "excitement of the appetites and passions" (not their "*necessary and natural* excitement," but what the theory *called such*) could be "*without sin*." The reviewer, now under notice, replied that it must be, for there can be no temptation without it, because there can be no temptation without access to the *will*, and no access from the *intellect* or *perception* to the *will* but "*through*" the intermediate region of the "*motives and desires*," or, as he elsewhere comprehensively calls them, "the sensibilities." And now what does he include in this region of the "emotions and desires," or "sensibilities?" Why, the very "*instincts, appetites, propensities, and affections*" which he accuses us of wrongfully ascribing to the theory. *We actually quoted the words from the author himself.* In supporting his

psychological argument he quotes Professor Upham. After assuring us that he will refer to him "*only so far as he considers the professor's doctrine beyond controversy defensible*," he thus proceeds:—

"He [Upham] considers the mental states under the three general divisions: the intellect, the sensibilities, and the will. The *natural* sensibilities are considered under the heads, emotions and desires; and the moral sensibilities under the heads, moral emotions, and feelings of moral obligation. *When we add, that the desires embrace the instincts, the appetites, the propensities, and the affections*, we have an outline of the entire mental action before us. Nor is the *order* of the mind's action left by him in obscurity, or in doubt. It commences with the intellect, and passes on to the will, through the medium of the emotions and desires on the one hand, and of the moral emotions and feelings of obligation on the other. This is not represented as the occasional, or even the *usual* order; but as the *only* way in which the will can be addressed.—We shall feel at liberty to refer to this as the true theory of the mind's action."

We have italicised above the phrase to which the author objects. We repeat, it is his own, and the single sentence, from Lord Kames, we quoted from the context of the same work which he refers to as "presenting the true theory of the mind's action." The reader then perceives the state of the case. We denied the theory's excitement of the appetites and passions; the reviewer reaffirmed it on the ground that there can be no temptation unless the excitement passes through this region of *appetite* and *passion*, or of "the sensibilities"—asserting, at the same time, that *in* this region are included "the instincts, the appetites, the propensities, and the affections." We then took his own terms as explanatory of the theory, when, lo, we are turned upon with the charge of "misstating" it, and acting "contrary to the principles of fair argumentation!"

But we must still persist, notwithstanding the reviewer, in believing this the *only* rational interpretation of the theory, according to either the popular or scientific use of its terms. When the theory contends for the "excitement of the *appetites* and *passions*," for any one to tell us that the *appetites* do not include "the instincts, the propensities," that the *passions* do not include these and the "affections," even in an intense state, appears to us as great an "absurdity" as any of those which our learned friend so freely imputes to us. When it speaks of the "excitement of *appetite* and *passion*," which (as we fully showed in our former article) are compounded of *emotion* and *desire*, as used both in scientific and popular language; when it designates this excitement by the

term "*lust*," which invariably means *desire*, and, almost as invariably, *eager* desire, to tell us that "the theory contains not a word which authorizes the conclusion that the necessary excitement of temptation ever embraced" the "*desire*;" or, as he subsequently says, that "it does not imply a *disposition* to indulgence of any kind, nor does it necessarily imply a state of *desire*;" or to tell us, as he afterward does, that it means "only the *nascent* desire," strikes us as equally "absurd." An *appetite* "no *disposition* to indulgence of any kind," a *passion* "only a *nascent* desire!" Enough of this here.

Again. Nearly two pages of "rhetorical interrogatory," quotation, and solemn remonstrance, are used in charging us with "partial quotations," "half sentences," &c. We beg the reader to look at this case a moment: it is a specimen. We quoted from the original theory this phrase, viz.: "There is no sin unless we consent." The reviewer represents us as saying that the author meant, "there was no sin unless we consent—to the evil to which we are tempted." Now this italicised and qualifying phrase is added by the reviewer. It was never used by us—we quoted merely the language of the original author; we used it in precisely the sense in which he used it, and *in precisely the sense in which this writer here says he used it*, that is, of consent to the existence of the excitement, as well as to the evil to which we are tempted. And yet, after qualifying our language with a phrase of his own, and making of it a misrepresentation which we never dreamed of, he turns and accosts the public with the phrase, "We cannot avoid the conclusion that the theory is in this respect most grossly misrepresented." In all sooth it is, but by whom? Had we the sensitiveness of the reviewer, we should perhaps say something about "the love of truth," and make some ado here; but the case, especially in view of the castigation we receive, has no other effect on us than that of the ludicrous. All the arguments and observations of the reviewer, founded upon this sad blunder, fall then at once.

Another case; and it is that upon which the great stress of the article depends. We denied that the desires, &c., could be excited toward evil, in a sanctified man, without sin. The reviewer replied that they can and must be. He quoted the philosophical system of mental action, above mentioned, to prove it, viz.: 1. The intellect or perception; 2. The emotions; 3. The desires; 4. The will. He then affirmed that there could be no temptation without danger, and no danger without access to the will, and that, therefore, temptation must have access to the will; and as there could be no access to the will from the intellect except through the interme-

diate stages, therefore the temptation must pass "*through*" the *emotions* and *desires*. This was his argument. We examined it and denied it, at some length, affirming that the mind acted as a unit in its every function, and that this system reduced it to the principles of mere mechanism. After this denial we proceeded as follows :—

"If the reviewer, by his '*only* order of the mind's action,' means merely that the mind is composed of successive departments, so mechanically arranged that there is no passage from the first to the last but through the interjacent ones—that the will, occupying the last, is perfectly inert, asleep at its post, until some messenger can enter and awaken it—and that, when it is awakened, it has a spontaneous power of directing its action, independent of the character of that messenger, then does not our theory of temptation still meet his demands? We have admitted that temptations to *unlawful indulgence* may be presented to the *intellect*—we have admitted that they may produce excitement, intense excitement, yet not an excitement like that of the reviewer's, tending *toward*, flowing in the *direction* of, the unlawful object, but an excitement of abhorrence *against* it—not an excitement which must be resisted, but *consented* to as altogether holy. This is the very excitement which the learned defender of the theory includes among the sensibilities under the name of '*feelings of moral obligation*,' and places '*in direct contact with the voluntary power*.'—If the will needs merely to be aroused, then, *however we may doubt his theory* of the mind, we certainly need not quarrel with our esteemed friend, for our own hypothesis meets his conditions."*

Now this "*sergeant if*" (as Mr. Fletcher calls it in his controversial writings) occupies a very important post here, at the very head of the paragraph, and in no less than eight other places in it. We had *denied* this theory; at the end of the above paragraph we repeated our disapproval, and, in the very first sentence of the next one, we declare that our view of it "*would doubtless be unsatisfactory to the reviewer*." And yet, after all our denials of it, and all the above-mentioned qualifying terms, merely because we attempted to show that, absurd as it may be, we might, merely by its absurdity, meet its terms, the reviewer proceeds through a number of pages to represent us as actually adopting and arguing upon this theory! He represents us as asserting that this *is* the mode in which temptation operates, and taking this "*palpable absurdity*" (to use one of his own phrases) for granted, he pro-

* We do not object to Dr. Upham's system as the usual process of the mind's action, but to the reviewer's rigid application of it.

ceeds to apply it to our argument on the first temptation. Here are his words :—

“ If this admission be extended to the original transgression, instead of mending the matter, it but makes it worse ; for that which before did not amount to a temptation, now actually becomes a powerful impulse in the contrary direction ; for he says explicitly of this excitement, ‘ Instead of its tending to ‘unlawful indulgence,’ &c., it has precisely the opposite tendency.’ This temptation, which takes the direction of the *moral sensibilities*, is such, we feel assured, as no metaphysical writer ever yet suggested to the world.”

In several other arguments this preposterous misrepresentation is pursued ; it forms, indeed, the force of his article, until he tells us, at last, that he “ forbears all further comment, lest he should fall below the dignity of the subject !” Alas for its dignity under these circumstances ! We should certainly be justified here in reciprocating some of the reviewer’s epithets, but we will not. He assuredly denies us common sense ; but we absolutely believe we have it, and have the vanity to vindicate the claim.

We have, indeed, subsequently enumerated this agitation of mind with “ heaviness, depression, dejection,” &c., among the temptations of a sanctified man, and our author himself admits it, and says the theory admits it, it is analagous to the trials of Job, who is called a “ perfect man,” but the theory which the author ascribes to us we have amply denied. We did not refer to it in our remarks on the original temptation. Even the agitation of mind alluded to, we did not, and do not suppose to have existed there. With Mr. Wesley, we believe the first temptation primarily consisted in *deception*, and its first sinful stage in *unbelief*, and that the reviewer’s excitement of the “ *appetites and propensities*” came afterward, and were sinful. With Mr. Wesley we believe too that the woman “ never would have chosen evil, knowing it to be such,” that *deception* was necessary, and is the only answer to the question *unde malum*. We shall refer to his views directly.

We solicit particular attention to the next position of the reviewer. The reader, by turning to the original theory, (in the Quarterly for October, 1841,) or to our statements of it at the beginning of this article, will observe, that besides the “ *external exciting objects*,” there are included in the theory *two other* means of “ exciting the appetites and passions,” viz. :—

“ 1. *Reflection* upon ideas and images which have been previously introduced into the mind, by which the imagination is excited, and by this means the appetites and passions are aroused. In this case the excitement is of the same nature as that produced

by the presence of the external object, and tends to seek gratification. This is as really a state of temptation as any we have discussed. 2. *Satanic suggestion*. Satan has the power to recall to our minds ideas and images which we have received from external temptation, and thus to awaken our passions and excite the appetites, which state of excitement, as has already been noted, constitutes temptation. And it ought to be distinctly remembered that he has no other means of tempting us. It is probable he has a dreadful power of prolonging the agitation of the mind by constraining it to continue its reflections and imaginings. But however horrible, or offensive, or impure they may be, however violent the excitement, *yet there is no sin unless we consent.*" The italics are his own.

We venture the assertion that no evangelical theological writer extant describes "*horrible, offensive, impure reflections, and imaginings,*" accompanied with "*violent excitement,*" as "*without sin,*" however they may be produced. If they are not accompanied with *actual sin*, yet all such writers describe them as the result of the operation of temptation on our *natural depravity*, and therefore as depraved, for, as stated in our former article,—

"Natural depravity is an involuntary and original infection of our nature, pervading not only the *will* but the *appetites* and *passions*, so that when, by the aid of the divine Spirit, we *will* to do right, still we cannot till the appetites and passions are, to some degree, purified. St. Paul asserts this: 'For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwells no good thing; for *to will is present* with me, but how to *perform* that which is good I find not.'"

From this view of the subject we asserted that this state of excitement, of which the writer declares, in italics, "*there is no sin unless we consent,*" is sinful, though we consent not, and that, therefore, the theory resulted in a *denial of natural depravity*. And, further, forasmuch as it was written with the design of "explaining, or rather *limiting*, the doctrine of Christian perfection," (for thus its authors inform us,) and forasmuch as the Wesleyan doctrine of perfection teaches the *extinction* of natural depravity, therefore the theory, in allowing the above excitement, &c., in a sanctified state, virtually *denied the doctrine of Christian perfection*. The theory is not expressly applied to the sanctified man, but it is applied to the *original state* and to *Christ*, and is therefore, of course, not too low a standard for the perfect Christian, and, as above said, it was written in special reference to his case.

These were our two capital charges against it. How does the reviewer meet them? Why, by directly denying that the excite-

ment of the appetites and passions, &c., above described, as produced by *Satanic influence*, was designed by the writer of the theory as a part of his theory, in the sense in which he speaks of "the excitement of the appetites and passions" by other causes. He asserts that "these obviously refer to *two matters* entirely distinct from each other." He says that the excitement which arises from the other causes we

"uniformly confound with the 'violent excitement' subsequently referred to—predicating the same kind of innocence of the one as of the other, making them *equally* 'essential to temptation,' and equally independent of natural depravity. For this there is not a shadow of authority in the theory itself. The former was all that had been mentioned when the theory was applied to explain the temptations of our first parents, and of our Saviour; and when the latter is subsequently introduced, the reader is left to judge for himself whether or not this can ever be felt at all by the sanctified man; and, if so, whether it can ever be in his case 'involuntary and necessary.' If it ever is, then, and not otherwise, the theory pronounces it not even 'of the nature of sin.' The subject of depravity or of Christian perfection not being then under discussion, the theory makes no allusion to these questions."

The point then at issue between us here is whether or not the excitement ascribed to *objects recalled by Satanic influence* is included in the theory, under the same general views, as is the excitement ascribed to other causes? Before meeting this question it may be well to dispose of a few incidental points. The last sentence of the above quotation strikes us as remarkable: "The subject of depravity or perfection not being under discussion, the theory makes no allusion to these questions." No allusion to them! It is a philosophical fact, that were it not for resistance, a stone, thrown into space, would go on for ever in a straight line; but what would be said of the sanity of the man, who, on throwing his missiles into the air, and finding them return, in parabolas, upon the heads of his neighbors, should apologize by saying that the subjects of gravitation and atmospheric resistance not being under experiment, were not taken into consideration? Was the theory an abstraction merely for speculative amusement, or founded upon, and applicable to, the actual state of man? The fact is, the *main feature* of the theory is its discrimination between *temptation* and *sin*, showing how far the *former* can go without involving the *latter*, and thus constantly implying the subjects of depravity and perfection. Another passing remark. The reviewer, in the context, and elsewhere, reiterates the assertion that the only excitement allowed by the theory is that which is "*natural and necessary*," and that if there is no sin in this there is

no sin allowed by the theory. He must excuse us if we promptly dispatch this frequent assertion as a *petitio principii*. It is assuming the very point at issue. The theory indeed calls its "excitement" "natural and necessary;" but words are nothing without meaning. It defines its meaning by telling us that it is an "excitement of the appetites and passions" tending "to unlawful indulgence," "a sensible impulse or solicitation to do some evil act," "lust," &c. We deny that this is a "necessary and natural" excitement of an unfallen being. We deny that it is natural in any other sense than that of natural depravity, and therefore its application to Christ or the original state is wrong. The dispute, then, is not whether the "natural and necessary excitement of the appetites and passions" can exist in a perfect state, but whether what the theory calls such can? Let us now return to the main question.

Is, then, this passage on *Satanic influence* an exception to the interpretation of the rest of the theory? We argue that it is not:

1. Because there is *not the slightest* intimation that it is, and there is no possible reason for its being so considered, but the fact that the reviewer finds its terms prove his own construction of the theory false. We think no impartial reader of the theory would ever suppose such a distinction, and we shall show directly that the reviewer himself never supposed it till we showed its hostility to his views.

2. The position and language of the passage prove the contrary. The original writer states a theory of temptation, the great principle of which is, that temptation is an "excitement of the appetites and passions tending to seek unlawful gratification," this excitement being produced by "external" "natural excitants." He finds, however, *two* cases in which there are no "external excitants," and lest these should be considered exceptions, he proceeds to show that they are not. One of these is *reflection* on ideas and images of the mind. This he shows to accord with the theory, because these ideas and images were *originally* produced by "external excitants." The other is the *influence of Satan*, who, he says, "has no other means of tempting us" than "by recalling ideas and images received from external temptation," and therefore this also comes within the theory. Hence, when he predicates innocency of these in the *same terms* as he does the others, we understand him to do it in the *same sense* also. This we conceive to be the common-sense construction of the passage. What else can its own terms mean? If this last case is an exception to the general doctrines of the theory, of course the other

must be also, for they both form one class, and are in juxta-position; but of the former he says, "In this case the excitement is of the *same nature* as that produced by the presence of external objects," and "is as really a state of temptation as any we have discussed;" and of the second he says, that "its excitement, *as has been already noted*, constitutes temptation." The same terms respecting the non-sinful character of the other temptations are repeated, even with emphasis here. Of the first case he declares, "there is no sin" "unless we consent to this excitement, or consent to prolong it;" and of the second (which the reviewer would make the exception) he says, with increased emphasis, that "however horrible, or offensive, or impure its reflections and imaginings, however violent its excitement, yet *there is no sin unless we consent*." Here, then, are two apparent exceptions which the theory proves not to be such, the first of which the reviewer cannot presume to call an exception; (for in all the *other* cases, where the external object is present, it must operate like *this*, through reflection on mental images;) and yet the second, in the same classification, and in juxta-position with the first, equally characterized with the first or any other in the theory as *without sin*, and with not one word intimating a difference, is considered by the reviewer as an exception, because its terms are not pliable enough to suit the construction which he would put upon the theory.

3. The above might suffice; but we present one more consideration, a striking example of the *argumentum ad hominem*. The reviewer seems never to have had an idea of his present anomalous view of the passage in dispute, until we showed that it conflicted with his opinion of the theory. Nay, in his former article he asserts our view of it precisely; in discussing this very passage he uses these words, *italics* and all:—

"In regard to these [Satanic suggestions] we remark, that in common with those of which we have more particularly spoken, they are 'involuntary and necessary,' that is, unavoidable; yet, unlike them, these are excited in the appetites and passions, not *directly* by the 'objects which God has appointed as their natural excitants'—though these objects are generally made the medium of the suggestion. In this respect alone they differ; but not in their *nature*, when once formed, nor in their *moral character*. The general doctrines of the theory are therefore strictly applicable to these, as he [the original author] himself has affirmed. Such as these were the temptations of our Saviour, and are many of those by which the good man is assaulted."

We put the question to the candid reader, How does *this* compare with the preceding quotation made from his present article?

In his present article he tells us that this case of *Satanic influence* "obviously refers" to a matter "entirely distinct" from the theory's general definition of temptation. Yet in his preceding article he declared that "the general doctrines of the theory are *strictly* applicable to *this*, as *its author himself has affirmed*." Now he reproves us for "confounding the violent excitement" of the temptation by Satanic suggestion with the excitement of the other temptations, and of "predicating the same kind of innocence of the one as of the other, making them equally essential to temptation, and equally independent of natural depravity, for which there is not a shadow of authority in the theory itself;" then he declared that "they differed *alone*" in their origin, (the one being produced by "external objects," the other by Satan *recalling* those objects,) "but not in their *nature*, when once formed, nor in their *moral character*." The italics are his own. Now he would prove the difference by declaring that the former excitement "was all that had been mentioned when the theory was applied to explain the temptations of our first parents and of our Saviour," meaning, of course, that, owing to the alledged difference, the other was not applicable, but then he declared that "*such as these* [Satanic suggestions] were the temptations of our Saviour, and many of those by which the good man is assaulted."

We insist, then, that ours is the just construction of this passage, the only reasonable one, and the one that the reviewer himself maintained until he found that it sustained our objections to the theory. We insist that when the writer of the theory said of this "violent excitement," with its "horrible, offensive, impure images and reflections," "*there is no sin unless we consent*," he meant what he said, that he meant what he did when he spoke thus of the other forms of temptation. Let it be remembered, however, that we do not base on this passage alone our charges against the theory, but on the great principle, everywhere asserted in it, that the "*appetites and passions*" can be "excited" to *evil*, that a disposition to "unlawful indulgence," that "lust" can exist in a holy mind, *without sin*.

One remark more. The reader will notice the assertion of the reviewer that the theory had been "applied to explain the temptations of our first parents and of our Saviour," before this disputed passage was introduced. This was merely a matter of convenience, as the most casual reader must perceive. The original writer stated a theory of temptation, he then showed its applications, and afterward referred to apparent exceptions, identifying them with the theory, among which came this passage. This,

therefore, was a natural arrangement of the subject. This sentence of the reviewer is an example of those "partial" statements which he is so ready to ascribe to us. In reply to our charge that the theory denied the doctrine of natural depravity, he asserts that the theory had been applied to "*our first parents and our Saviour*" before this passage occurred, and that as they had no natural depravity, therefore the excitement, which it contends for at this stage, was without natural depravity, and therefore to predicate innocence of it was not to deny natural depravity. But was there no other application of the theory at this stage besides the two mentioned? Yes; there is another which fully determines the point, but which the reviewer has omitted, though it is placed in the *same paragraph*, is *numerated* with the others, and occurs *first* in the list. By referring to our statement of the theory on page 35 the reader will find it applied to the *young Christian* as well as "*our first parents and our Saviour*." All evangelical theologians admit that "natural depravity" remains more or less in him, and that, before sanctification, his appetites and passions are subject to the same kind of unholy excitement as before justification. Yet the theory consoles him with the assurance that it is "*natural and necessary*," and places him, in respect to it, in the same category with our first parents and Christ. And though the reviewer omits the fact *here*, in his former article he fully sustained the theory in this singular error, by asserting of the *young Christian* that "when he has resisted successfully, and overcome these impulses, he will be conscious of a feeling, not of *gratitude* that he has escaped, but of *innocence*, and not only innocence, but of *approbation* and *desert of reward*." Novel terms these, found unqualified in no evangelical work extant. The justified Christian *does* rejoice with "*gratitude*" that he thus "*escapes*," and learns from these temptations his depravity, and deplors it before God. This feeling of "*approbation and desert of reward*" is unknown to him if he have Scriptural views of himself. We will not follow the example of the reviewer, and comment upon his motive in omitting this case, notwithstanding he was fully aware of it; for he refers to it elsewhere, and we had reminded him of it; it is sufficient for us to show that it is there, and that it entirely invalidates his argument, and even this is unnecessary after the above.

The reviewer attempting, in his former article, to prove that the desires may be excited without sin in temptation, referred to the first temptation, and represented that there was "the excitement of both an *appetite* and of a *propensity*," and that it was "the

desire of the flesh, the desire of the eye, the pride of life ;" all this without sin—for this was the point to be proved. We denied it, and asserted that, according to the Scriptures, and all orthodox commentators, these lusts are depraved, and that when the first temptation reached this stage, it involved depravity ; that its innocent stage consisted in its perception, as it was suggested by the tempter, and presented in the tree. The temptation included the perception of the qualities or attractions of the tree, &c. Our very words were, "When the woman *saw* that the tree was *good for food,*" &c. Now, how does the reviewer represent us here ? Read these strange words which he substitutes for our own, italics and all : "It was the *sight of the forbidden tree*, unaccompanied by the perception that it was *good for food,*" &c. Here is a direct contradiction of our words. Nor did we say that the temptation ended as above, but that its *innocent* stage ended there. The reviewer further comments thus :—

" 'The woman saw the tree that it was pleasant to the eyes'—this is so explained that the *seeing of the tree* was innocent, while the accompanying perception that it *was pleasant to the eyes* was sinful, and proved that she had already fallen. The temptation, then, by which Eden was lost commenced and ended with *the sight of the forbidden tree*—all that followed being but the consequence and the evidence of the apostasy."

And the paragraph is ended and pointed with the italicised exclamation, "*The sight of the tree !*" Our friend must excuse us if we say of this remarkable misrepresentation, in the language used by himself respecting one which he charges on us, "It is too palpably absurd to merit refutation." As seen above, it *directly* contradicts our language. We allowed the full perception of the temptation, not merely of the *tree*, but of its qualities. We did not say of the perception that "*it was pleasant to the eyes,*" that "*it was good for food,*" &c., "*was sinful,*" but that the *desire* for it which followed this perception, the "excitement of the appetite and propensity," in the language of the reviewer, was guilty. He seems to take it for granted that excitement is essential to the perception, notwithstanding he has given us a system of mental philosophy which asserts the distinction between the intellect, or *perception*, and the *sensibilities*, and notwithstanding common sense asserts the distinction. Cannot the gourmand, who has ate to loathing satiety at his table, go into his garden, and, in the absence of all desire, *perceive* that the delicious fruits around him are "*good for food ?*" Cannot the sick man who has lost all appetite *perceive* the attractions of a sumptuous table without feeling them ?

Why, then, cannot a holy man *perceive* the attractions of a temptation when he does not *feel* them?

In dismissing this reference to the fall of man, we may remark, that Mr. Wesley is far from concurring with the reviewer in considering the original temptation primarily an "excitement of the appetites and passions," but enumerates this excitement among its accompanying and sinful effects. He describes it as primarily consisting in an attempt of Satan to "deceive" the woman; in which Benson also concurs. She, of course, was not responsible for perceiving the attempt, she could not but perceive it, but she was responsible for the "deception" or "unbelief," which followed, and which Wesley, in the context, says "tainted her;" for she had sufficient knowledge to protect her against it. Here, then, commenced her guilt. "She then," says Wesley, "lay open to the whole temptation, 'to the desire of the flesh,' for the 'tree was good for food;' to the 'pride of life,' for 'it was to be desired to make one wise,' &c., so unbelief begot pride," &c. Thus Wesley describes those "appetites and propensities" which the reviewer declares to have been excited in an *innocent* stage of the temptation, as subsequent to that stage—one of them he calls "pride," which he elsewhere asserts to be "the very essence of sin." He remarks on this temptation, that

"Indeed it has been doubted, whether man could then choose evil, knowing it to be such. But it cannot be doubted, he might mistake evil for good. He was not infallible; therefore, not impeccable. And this unravels the whole difficulty of the grand question, *Unde malum?* 'How came evil into the world?'—Indeed some have (not improbably) supposed, that the serpent was then endued with reason and speech. Had not Eve known he was so, would she have admitted any parley with him? Would she not have been frightened rather than deceived? (as the apostle observes she was.) To deceive her, Satan mingled truth with falsehood: 'Hath God said, Ye may not eat of every tree in the garden?' and soon after persuaded her to disbelieve God, to suppose his threatening should not be fulfilled."*

The Calvinistic doctrine of the obligation, but universal non-attainment of perfection, has been discussed more by the author of these pages than by any other Methodist editor of the union, and yet the reviewer gravely informs us what it is, and that we entertain it. In saying that the superior grace of a sanctified man prepared him to perceive the moral character of influences on their first approach, (a proposition certainly true in general,) we paused

* See Sermon on the End of Christ's Coming.

not to say, that this perception was not infallible, because it would have been unnecessary and absurd to say so. Yet the writer proceeds at length to charge us with believing the infallible moral judgments of perfect Christians! Six pages are thus written, and we must thus briefly dispatch them.

Though we are not logically obliged to supply, in this discussion, a theory of temptation, but merely to show that the reviewer's is not the correct one, yet we will again state our views on the subject as the best means of dispatching many of his remaining misstatements, and in order to contrast with them the theories of the original writer and the reviewer, for we insist they are not the same. We deny nothing more or less than that "the appetites and passions" can be excited in *favor* of "unlawful indulgence" "*without sin.*" We do not deny that the *natural* and *necessary* excitement of the appetites and passions may exist in a perfectly holy man, but that the theory's "*lust*"—its "excitement" or "*sensible* impulse" to "*unlawful indulgence,*" to "evil acts," can. We do not deny that this "*lust*" exists in the temptations of common or merely justified Christians; that it even exists in most, if not all their temptations, but affirm, that in them it arises from the remains of natural depravity, and that the sanctified man, being delivered from all natural depravity, does not involuntarily feel it. We have not even denied the excitement of the emotions in temptation, so far as they do not, by *combining with desire*, take a definite direction *toward* the forbidden object. According to the philosophical system adopted by the reviewer, the *emotions* are distinct from the *desires*—they precede them—they are not desirive, but excitive; the feeling of the sublime, of surprise, wonder, astonishment, &c., are, for example, emotions, and they may be excited alike by objects remarkably bad or remarkably good. As soon, however, as the emotion takes a definite direction in favor of the object which excites it, it is no longer a simple emotion, but becomes desire. Thus the man who sees vast and glittering masses of treasures may at first behold them only with that feeling of interest or *surprise* which we call emotion. This feeling has yet no moral character, but soon it may combine with desire; it then becomes *avarice* or *covetousness*, and is sin. The same emotion may at first exist in respect to an example of public honor or popular applause. The spectator may add his voice to the acclamations without a momentary thought of ever receiving such himself; but let this thought be suggested in the excitement of the scene, and assume the form of *desire*, it is then no longer *emotion*, but *propensity*, or *passion*, it is a form of ambition or

vanity. Though, in the general language of our former article, we denied that temptation could enter, without sin, into the sensibilities, yet it was, of course, understood, and repeatedly asserted, that we meant only that they could not be excited in *favor of the evil*. When we spoke of temptation as merely *intellectual*, it was, of course, in contradistinction to a favorable excitement of the sensibilities. This we were careful to assert in that part of the article which states definitely our views of temptation, as the following extracts show :—

“We do not say that he feels no excitement, but *no such* excitement as the theory teaches, no excitement of the appetites and passions that is impure, that tends to *evil acts*, to *unlawful indulgence*. When we say, therefore, that the sanctified person is tempted *intellectually*, not sensitively, it is, of course, understood that we mean by the latter phrase, that his sensibilities are not excited *favorably* toward the temptation. The difference between the temptations of the sanctified and the justified states may be illustrated thus :—Two Christians, one sanctified, the other not, perceive an opportunity of becoming wealthy by the use of improper means. The sanctified person *perceives* the opportunity—nothing but imbecility could keep him from the perception—but it has no exciting influence upon his passions; he may intellectually dwell upon the circumstances, and wonder at the facilities they afford to an evil mind; but, at the same time, not only feel no excitement to the evil, but abhor it, and exultingly thank God for his exemption from it. On the other hand, the unsanctified Christian may feel the cravings of avarice, he may go the whole day in sore conflict with these cravings, beating them down, and yet feeling them.”

This qualification was certainly sufficiently definite; yet the reviewer represents us as denying “ALL excitement,” notwithstanding we admitted, among others, that of the “moral sensibilities,” and he argues at length on the admission. The question respects not the existence, but the *nature* of the excitement; the theory’s excitement we deny, but there are other kinds. We expressly mention above the *emotion of wonder* (one of the strongest) in the temptation of the perfect man, and no other *simple natural emotion* can have a *moral* character different from this, for, in themselves, the *natural emotions* have no moral character.* We repeat, then, that we deny only the excitement of the appetites and passions toward evil, the excitement which the theory alledges to be essential to temptation. This view of temptation is perfectly

* Upham’s Ment. Phil., vol. ii, chap. 1.

Wesleyan. In his Plain Account, &c., Wesley, as we showed in our last, has given it himself in detail :—

“One commends me. Here is a temptation to pride. But instantly my soul is humbled before God. And I feel no pride; of which I am as sure, as that pride is not humility.

“A man strikes me. Here is a temptation to anger. But my heart overflows with love. And I feel no anger at all; of which I can be as sure, as that love and anger are not the same.

“A woman solicits me. Here is a temptation to lust. But in the instant I shrink back. And I feel no desire or lust at all; of which I can be as sure, as that my hand is cold or hot.

“Thus it is, if I am tempted by a present object; and it is just the same if, when it is absent, the devil recalls a commendation, an injury, or a woman, to my mind. In the instant the soul repels the temptation, and remains filled with pure love.”

We do not say that a sanctified man never feels this wrong excitement, for he is not impeccable, but that he never feels it without *moral defect*, and this defect is in proportion to the degree of it which he feels. If, on the infinitesimal principle of our learned friend, he has but the “nascent or incipient desire,” then he has “nascent or incipient guilt,” and the one is as appreciable as the other. There are few sanctified Christians who have not at times felt this momentary and comparatively slight lapse. Their recovery may be almost as instantaneous, by a sudden effort of faith; still there is a proportionable moral defect. Their only rule is to live by the moment; their only question is in respect to present rectitude, Have I now the great blessing? not, Had I it during a particular moment of the preceding hour or not?

The temptations of a perfect state are never *primarily* this “*excitement of the appetites and passions*,” as Wesley says above, “A woman solicits me—here is a temptation to lust: but I feel no desire or lust *at all*; of which I can be as sure, as that my hand is cold or hot.” And again he speaks of perfection as “gentleness without *any touch* of anger, *even the moment* we are provoked,” as “excluding *all* envy, *all* jealousy;” and “anger, *however soon* it is over, want of instantly forgiving one another, may destroy it.”* Again, “They are freed from evil thoughts, [that is, as we showed in our former article, thoughts accompanied by the theory’s ‘excitement’ to ‘evil acts,’] so that they cannot enter into them, no, *not for a moment*, [a direct contradiction of the theory.] Aforetime, when an evil thought came in, they looked up and it vanished away; [precisely the doctrine of the theory;]

* Sermon on Christian Perfection.

but now it does not come in, there being no room for this in a heart that is full of the love of God,"* [precisely contrary to the theory.]

This excitement of the passions, then, we repeat, does not, according to Wesley, *primarily* belong to the temptations of a sanctified state. In this consists its difference from the justified state, and this difference is nothing more or less than the non-existence in the one case, and the existence in the other, of natural depravity, from which the excitement arises. Such excitement can be produced in the perfect state only in a *secondary* manner, that is, by the success of some previous stage of the temptation, as shown in Wesley's view of the first temptation, where "deception" and "unbelief" preceded the passions. So a perfect man may be tempted by an appeal to his "infirmities," (for these remain, though depravity does not;) he may be tormented like Job, or "buffeted" like Paul, tempted by persecution, and suffering for his faith, by depression, heaviness, agonizing mental states, listlessness, dullness, speculative doubts, intellectual suggestions, reiterated for hours or days, till they haunt the soul like spectres, and accompanied with unutterable perplexity, sorrow, and anguish, not merely that excitement of the moral sensibilities, at which our friend is so much perplexed, but a hundred other trials. If these shake his steadfastness, or abate his vigilance, then the passions enter, he sins—the Philistines are upon him, and unless his strength is immediately restored, he is led captive.

This view of the subject fully answers the reviewer's frequent queries after the "fiery trials," "tests of character," &c., allowed by our theory, and his frequent reasoning about the excitement of the "moral sensibilities," "horror," &c., entering into temptation. This he admits to be one effect of temptation. We did so too; but he selects and discusses it as the *only* one we allowed, and asks what temptation the perfect feel if it is only a horror against evil, notwithstanding we had mentioned most of the above, and said there were "a hundred others."

And these, notwithstanding the reviewer, we contend are Scriptural temptations. Satan would thus not merely *solicit* but *drive* the man to evil. And they are, as we have said, *indirect* appeals to his appetites and passions. By anguish, he would lead him to seek forbidden happiness; by the destruction of Job's resources and health, would he excite him to seek relief in cursing God. Such, indeed, are the most common temptations mentioned in the Scriptures. The book of Job is entirely an illustration of

* Sermon on Wandering Thoughts.

them in their application to "a perfect man." It was thus Abraham is said to have been tempted in the offering of Isaac. Such was "the messenger of Satan to buffet" Paul. Such, according to Wesley, and other commentators, are those of the man whom James pronounces "blessed," and exhorts "to count it all joy when he falls into divers temptations." Such are the "fiery trials" of Peter, so often referred to by the reviewer, as excluded from our theory. Such are precisely those quoted by the reviewer from St. Paul and Fletcher, and reiterated and italicised by him as requiring us to "*resist* unto blood, striving *against sin*." Such make up the illustrations and examples of Wesley's Sermon on Temptation. Such, and *such alone*, are those referred to in the paragraph quoted against us by the reviewer from Wesley on "Heaviness through manifold Temptations." We request the reader to turn to that Sermon, and the one in juxta-position with it, on the "Wilderness State." The former is confined to temptations in the sanctified state, the latter to those of the justified man. In the former, all that we have admitted are mentioned, but none of the reviewer's excitement of the appetites and passions, while, in the latter, this excitement has the pre-eminence. We need nothing more than a comparison of these sermons to demonstrate that the reviewer's doctrines are anti-Wesleyan, and, so far as Wesley is authority, anti-Scriptural.

In concluding this exposition of our views we say again, we deny nothing but the theory's "excitement of the appetites and passions" toward "evil," and this we deny only in reference to the perfect state. All the other forms of temptation we admit. Here, then, at once, fall all the arguments of our friend, founded upon the charge that our system affords no "fiery trials," or test of Christian character, no inducement to sin, no reason for the fall, and allows only an "excitement of horror against the temptation."

The above we consider Wesley's theory of temptation. Place, now, in contrast with it the theory in dispute. We have showed, that it teaches, as *essential* to temptation, and *not of the nature of sin*, an "excitement of the *appetites and passions*," which tends to "*unlawful indulgence*," a "*sensible* impulse or solicitation to do some *evil act*," "*lust*," such as the "young convert" or merely justified person often feels, a "*violent excitement*," "accompanied with images and reflections, *horrible, offensive, impure*." As shown in our former article, the appetites and passions, both in popular and scientific language, are states of *desire*. Professor Upham, the authority of the reviewer, asserts it, and who can

doubt it? What is appetite but *desire* superadded to *emotion*? And what is *passion* but *emotion* and *desire* combined, and in an intense state? The theory uses these terms, too, *without a single word* to intimate that they were applied in a special sense not implied in their popular or scientific applications, and there is no such special sense imaginable. In the "appetites and passions" are included, according to our quotation from the reviewer, (see p. 7,) and according to all metaphysicians and all common sense, the *instincts, propensities, and affections*. These the theory teaches may be excited, and excited to *any extent short of the will* "without *sin*." Again and again is the assertion made, "*there is no sin unless we consent*," that is, consent either to the evil or to prolong the excitement, and this excitement is applied to the young Christian, our first parents, Christ, and was written in reference to Christian perfection. Now how does this accord with St. Paul's doctrine of sinning when he "*would not*;" with the universal evangelical opinion, that such excitement is the result of natural depravity; with Wesley, who declares the extinction of natural depravity in perfect love; with the preceding quotations from him, in which he says of "temptation to anger," "I feel no anger at all; of which I am as sure, as that anger and love are not the same:" of "temptation to lust," "that I feel no desire or lust at all; of which I am as sure, as that my hand is cold or hot:" and with those quotations from him, so abundant in our former article, which declare that perfect love "*excludes every kind and degree of envy*," expels "*all anger*," "*casteth out all jealousy, pride, desire*," that "*anger, even the moment we are provoked, and however soon it is over*," is sinful; that "*evil thoughts [such as we have described] cannot enter, no, not for a moment*." We showed in our former quotations, that he asserts that this excitement of natural depravity, in the justified Christian, is, even when "*resisted*" by the will, "*guilt*," "*sin*," "*enmity toward God*," "*corruption*," "*worthy of death*," and "*deserving only the damnation of hell*," though he is accepted through the atonement. This, too, is the opinion of the evangelical world. Yet the theory pronounces it when resisted "*neither sin, nor of the nature of sin*." The theory, and also the reviewer, explain by this excitement Christ's temptations; he had our "*appetites and passions*," &c. Wesley expressly denies it here again. He declares Christ's temptation to have been purely *intellectual*, reaching only the "*thoughts*," as "*a man thinks of a murder which another has committed*," "*and even so*," he says, "*is every one that is perfect*."*

* Sermon on Wandering Thoughts.

The theory, then, is anti-Wesleyan. It strikes us as full of grave defects. Note some of them.

1. It describes a "*natural* and *necessary* excitement of the appetites and passions" produced by the objects which *God has appointed* to be their "*natural* excitants," as temptation, that is, a "*solicitation or impulse to evil.*" We cannot so designate any *natural* and *necessary function* without reference to depravity within us, or some extraneous or superadded agency.

2. It predicates guilt only of the *will*—the very germ of the New-Haven theology.

3. It asserts that state of the appetites and passions which the church believes to arise from original sin, to be "*neither sin, nor of the nature of sin,*" and ascribes it to Christ and the original pair, and thus virtually *denies the doctrine of natural depravity.*

4. It implies that what *the church* recognizes as depravity exists in the sanctified state, and thus virtually *denies the Wesleyan doctrine of Christian perfection.*

What next is *the theory of the reviewer?* for he must excuse us if we affirm that it is different from the one which he undertook to defend. In his present article he says, that in the case of "*the perfect Christian, the desire does not become fully formed, or, in other words, only the incipient or nascent desire is felt.*" We may be obtuse, but this looks to us very much like hair-splitting. We remark that,—

1. It contradicts the original theory. The reviewer is careful to limit the above excitement to the "*perfect man,*" but that of the theory is applied alike to Christ and the *young or merely justified Christian,* and where is there one who does not feel that his desires to evil are something more than "*nascent?*" The original theory speaks of the "*appetites and passions:*" the distinguishing element of these we have shown to be *desire.* It asserts that they are "*excited,*" that they "*are aroused,*" that this excitement may be "*violent,*" and accompanied by "*ideas and images, horrible, or offensive, or impure;*" that it is "*lust,*" that the "*agitation*" of mind may "*be prolonged,*" &c. Now how does this compare with the reviewer's "*incipient or nascent desire,*" that is, "*incipient or nascent*" "*appetite or passion?*" Was a "*nascent desire*" ever before called a *passion?* Is an "*aroused*" appetite but "*incipient?*" And "*lust,*" which generally signifies *strong* desire, does it mean in the theory an unborn desire, contrary to all usage, and without a single qualifying word by the author? We submit it to the reader whether he could ever put such a construction upon these

terms unless he had a theory to defend, and was desperately determined to defend it.

2. It contradicts Wesley. See the quotations on the preceding pages; they deny *any degree* of the theory's excitement.

3. It contradicts the reviewer's former defense of the theory. In his former article he told us that the *will must* be reached in temptation, and that it cannot be reached merely through the *emotions*, but "through the desires;" now he informs us that the temptation only "*tends* to excite the desires," that the desire does "not become fully formed," that it is "*nascent*." In his former article he opposed our view, because, as he said, (erroneously we have shown,) it allowed *no test*, *no conflict* in the mind. He has supplied this *sine qua non*; but now the mighty conflict is reduced to what?—the agitation of a "*nascent desire*," a desire neither born nor unborn. Then he located "*the great moral battle-ground*" of this *conflict* as follows:—

"Here, then, precisely—in the immediate region of the *will*—is found this great moral battle-ground; where the sole combatants—though excited and urged on by the *emotions*—are the *desires* on the one hand, and the *feelings of obligation* on the other; and where the prize to be lost or won is the *human soul*."

And now these "*sole combatants on the one hand*"—"the *desires*"—are "not fully formed," but nascent, (for be it remembered that the natural *emotions*, though they are excited, have, themselves, *no moral* character, and, therefore, *no conflict* with the "*feelings of moral obligation*,") and these combatants never are more developed in the sanctified man, though "*the conflict continues at times during the man's whole probation, the contest never being entirely abandoned, nor the scene of the conflict changed!*" Surely these embryo combatants are not the Titans, and after all this is not the war of the giants. Before he explained the first temptation by the theory's excitement, and said there "*an appetite and a propensity*" were excited, even "*the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eye, and the pride of life*." Now all this is but an incipient desire. Then he told us that the theory's excitement was St. James's "*lust*," which Wesley (*in loco*) says was itself sin, though it also produced sin, and now *lust* itself only signifies *nascent* desire. We charged our learned friend with contradicting himself in his former article, by saying (after asserting excitement of the *desires*, as we have shown) that "*this excitement does not imply a disposition to indulgence of any kind, nor a state of desire*;" he now denies that it was a contradiction, and says he meant that "*only the incipient or nascent desire is felt*." But this

does not mend the matter, as we have just seen, it only makes it worse, for we are then to understand the "*nascent*" "disposition" "to be *no kind*" of a disposition, "the *incipient state* of desire" to be "*no state* of desire." We are not to interpret the motives of the reviewer; but certainly any one, determined to maintain a theory irreconcilable with acknowledged standards, could take only this intangible position between the two, where the desires are neither born nor unborn, but being born, and where he could say with his theory, they *are*, and with his standards, they *are not*. It is the peculiar and unfortunate felicity of the metaphysician that he can shrink into dimensions like those of Satan at the ear of the sleeping Eve, and which even the touch of Ithuriel's spear cannot transform. Our friend must excuse us, but we really feel that he has summoned us here into that region of metaphysical intangibilities which has so frequently and so justly excited the contempt of sensible men against metaphysics.

4. This theory we think impracticable—not capable of application to Christian experience. Such a subtilty cannot be appreciated by the popular mind. A common Christian can easily understand whether he does or does not feel an *appetite* or *passion*, but how can he tell when it is *nascent*, or when at the next conceivable stage, where, according to the reviewer, it is guilty. If it *must* be excited to a degree scarcely definable, and cannot go a jot further without sin, how can the Christian assure himself of his innocence or guilt? Not certainly by the "feelings of moral obligation," for these depend upon his power of discrimination.

A word may be necessary here to save a plausible, but fallacious reply. We have shown that the original theory contradicts Wesley, and that the reviewer contradicts both Wesley and the theory. It may be asked whether we do not thus contradict ourselves—whether two negatives do not make an affirmative? Two writers may contradict a common standard, and yet contradict each other. Two persons may assert of a supposed object, the one that it was a hundred feet long; the other, that it was but the hundredth part of an inch, and thus very materially contradict each other; while a third may step forth, and say it was an illusion of the sight, that there was no object at all. It is thus that Wesley and these writers contradict each other.

Our charges against this theory are, then, grave; but are they not valid? Does it agree with the original theory, with Wesley, with itself, with the common notions of Christian men?

But one position of the reviewer remains, which we deem it necessary to consider, as the force of all our quotations from Wes-

ley depends upon it. These quotations, as has been seen, deny "any kind or degree" of the theory's excitement of "the appetites and passions" toward evil, in the sanctified state. How does the reviewer dispose of them? In two ways; he says,—

1. "A large proportion of these quotations prove nothing but that all evil, worldly and sensual desires, are excluded. These are excluded by the original theory, since it allows nothing but what is 'involuntary,' 'and these are on all hands allowed to be under the control of the will.'"

We briefly reply to this, that it is a false view of the subject. "These are" *not* "admitted on all hands to be under the control of the will." As we have shown, and will again directly, Wesley teaches them to be both *voluntary* and *involuntary*: voluntary in the sanctified man, involuntary in the justified, but "*of the nature of sin*" in *both*; whereas the theory predicates its *involuntary* excitement of *both*, and also predicates *innocence* of both. The remark of the reviewer that "the theory allows nothing but what is involuntary," is again a *petitio principii*, the very point we have had in dispute. The theory does indeed call its excitement "natural, necessary, involuntary," but it has *defined* it as we have shown, and as thus defined we deny that it is always such. It applies it indiscriminately to the justified and perfect states. We deny that in the latter it is "involuntary," and have shown that Wesley denies it. We acknowledge with the theory that it may be *involuntary* in the justified state, but here again we deny that it is "*not of the nature of sin.*"

2. The second attempt to sweep away these quotations is still more remarkable. After all the singular features which we have been compelled to point out in the article of our learned friend, we regret that we must refer to this, as it betrays a striking misapplication of an argument founded on his professional science, a contradiction of Wesley's declarations, and of the common usages of language. The following is his argument:—

"But the objector will say, that we allow an *involuntary* impulse of the desires, which we hold to be innocent; while Wesley says the sanctified man, on being tempted to pride, 'feels no pride;' on being tempted to anger, 'feels no anger at all;' and on being tempted to lust, 'feels no desire at all:' and in another place defends Paul against even 'the inward stirrings of pride, anger, or lust.' And Fletcher says, that 'sin may arise from the momentary perversion of our tempers.' Before the days of Wesley, we believe, ethical writers had never so clearly distinguished between the voluntary and involuntary stages of desire, as to make the use of the term 'desires' ambiguous. When he speaks of 'anger,' or 'pride,' or 'lust,' or of the desires in general, we

believe he *always* refers to what we now call their *voluntary* stage; and this, because he always calls them 'sins;' while in his Plain Account of Christian Perfection, he expressly tells us, that he does not call the *involuntary* transgressions of a divine law *sins*, but says,—'I believe a person filled with the love of God is still liable to these involuntary transgressions.'

Before proving our charges against this position, we refer for a moment to the incidental remark, that Wesley calls only "*voluntary* transgressions of the law" "*sins*." Did not Wesley write a book on "*Original Sin*," and also a sermon with the same title, and is original sin voluntary? We reminded our friend of this in our former article. He does indeed, in common with us all, habitually use the above phrase, but *always* in reference to actual sin. And if the reader will examine his "Plain Account," &c., where the last phrase in the above quotation appears, he will find that the "*involuntary transgressions*" of "a person filled with the love of God" include nothing like the theory's excitement of the passions, but merely those "*mistakes and infirmities*" discussed in our last article, which form the difference between Christian and Adamic perfection. We challenge any student of Wesley's Works to find in any of his numerous discussions of Christian perfection a single admission of the reviewer's "*excitement of the appetites and passions*." If the supposed one he gives us from a little biographical notice were such, would it be a proof of ambiguity in all his sermons and essays, or would not these rather be proof of ambiguity in the notice? But it is no such admission. It does not speak of vehement *anger*, *impatience*, or *self-will*, but of vehement *temptations* to these, and temptation is the subject in dispute. If "*vehement temptation*" to "*anger*" means vehement, but "*involuntary*," excitement of *anger*, then, of course, the "*vehement temptation*" to "*follow her own will*" means vehement but *involuntary* excitement of the "*will*," a contradiction of Wesley's "*involuntary transgressions*," because a contradiction of terms. But to return to the main position of the reviewer, we alledge,—

1. That it is a mistaken application of the metaphysical defect referred to. What was this defect of the old "ethical writers?" It was not that they did not "*so clearly distinguish between the voluntary and involuntary*" desires or affections, but that they did not distinguish between the *desires* and the *will*. The affections were considered acts of the *will*. This was Edwards's doctrine.*

* "That Edwards makes but two faculties of the mind, the *understanding* and the *will*, as well as identifies the *will* and the *passions*, is fully settled."—Tappan on Edwards, p. 20; Edwards on the Affections, part i; Edwards on Revivals of Religion, &c., part i.

The defect, then, was that they allowed *no involuntary affections*. Now what is the argument of the reviewer? He is contending for certain "innocent" "*involuntary*" states of the affections. We deny them in respect to the sanctified man, and say that Wesley denied them. He replies that Wesley referred to only "voluntary" affections, but admitted his "*involuntary*" ones, and this because Wesley concurred with the metaphysicians of his day in the above position, that is, he admitted "*involuntary*" affections, *because he denied them*. We submit this remarkable case to the reader without further comment than to remark, that Wesley nowhere, to our knowledge, affirms this philosophical opinion, though he speaks of it as common. He was familiar with, and highly approved, Locke's Essay, which refuted it.

2. The reviewer's argument conflicts with Wesley's express declarations. His argument, as above seen, is, that Wesley condemns "pride," "anger," "love of the world," as sinful, only because they are "voluntary." But Wesley* represents these passions as "of the nature of sin" in the justified state, even "when by the Spirit we mortify the deeds of the body, and *resist and conquer* inward and outward sin." But not so in sanctification, for in the same paragraph he says, "When it pleases our Lord to speak to our hearts *again*, [that is, in sanctification,] to speak a second time, Be clean, then only the leprosy is cleansed; then only the evil root, the carnal mind, is destroyed; and inbred sin subsists no more. But if there be no such second change, then we must be content to remain full of sin till death." And, by referring to our former article, the reader will find abundant quotations showing that, in a justified man, sin may "*exist*," though not "allowed," and though "he is *fighting against* all sin," that "the lust of the flesh, having no more dominion over" the will, is still "the corruption of nature," "enmity with God," "sin."

3. We alledge that the reviewer's view of Wesley's language is contrary to the authorized construction of language. Wesley uses these terms alike in popular and scientific works, without any such qualification. Popular experience could never discriminate such a qualification. Christians, with the common knowledge of theology, would understand these passions and appetites as wrong without reference to the *will*, intrinsically unholy, though "*resisted and conquered*." How could they apply the process of discrimination if it is as subtil as the reviewer demands? His qualification, inserted in Wesley's outline of temptation, (p. 23,) would strike us as ludicrous. When Wesley says, "I feel *no* lust at *all*,

* Sermon on Repentance in Believers.

of which I am as sure as that my hand is cold or hot," he should have added, "Yet I feel *some* lust, that is, 'involuntary' lust;" "I feel *no* anger at *all*; of which I am as sure, as that anger is not love," "yet I feel *some* anger, that is, 'involuntary' anger." Remember, too, that if this lust or anger goes the smallest conceivable degree beyond its "incipient" state it becomes voluntary and *sinful*, and yet the Christian can be "as sure" that it does not pass over this subtil line "as that his hand is cold or hot!"

Our conclusion is, then, that we have rightly interpreted Wesley. Here we are compelled to submit the question to the public without remaining space or disposition to retaliate the concluding allusions of our friend, but tendering to him all the courtesies due from a fellow-student of the truth and a fellow-Christian. S.

Boston, 1843.

ART. III.—A Review of Edwards' "*Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will*." Containing, 1. *Statement of Edwards' System*; 2. *The legitimate Consequences of this System*; 3. *An Examination of the Arguments against a self-determining Will*. By HENRY PHILIP TAPPAN. 12mo., pp. 300. New-York: John S. Taylor. 1839.

THE will of man has been the *crux philosophorum* in all ages. Far back as we can trace the history of philosophy, we find the same problems presented and the same variety of solutions offered. We discover them in the mysterious remains of Oriental speculation which have come down to us as the earliest efforts of human thought: from the depths of that primeval world we hear the voice of man calling for an explanation of his origin and his destiny. We can gather, too, that among the mighty people who bordered the river of Egypt with palaces, and temples, and sepulchres, and who looked down upon the ancient Greeks as children, these same perplexing questions arose. Among the Greeks themselves, of course, there was no lack of dispute in regard to the great problems of God, man, and the world; and then, as now, there were fatalists, who bound all the universe in the iron chain of necessity; pantheists, who represented it as one sole, imperishable being; atheists, who left it without Author or Ruler; and skeptics, who denied that man could believe aught concerning it. At a later period, among the fathers of the Christian church, there were a few who considered man merely as the tool of God; while

others declared that man's own agency makes his acts moral or immoral. In the schools of Arabia we find the same opposing parties. The vexed question found its place among the problems of the schoolmen, and has since retained it among the topics of the metaphysicians.

Must not such a spectacle convince us of the inutility of philosophical inquiries, and justify us in condemning them as barren and unprofitable? By no means; for, after all, there is a science of mind, and men should strive to master it. Or, if there be not, and we must either be Spinozists or skeptics; if metaphysics be impossible, we should labor on until the limit of our capacity is known; until we learn the precise position of that wall of adamant which bounds our human reason. We are inclined, indeed, to believe, with Jouffroy, that "if the same questions have made their appearance at every epoch, it is because they contain, under its different aspects, the problem of life, and because man can be interested only in things that concern him. If the same solutions have always been reproduced, it is because they are the genuine elements of the complete solution, and because human intelligence cannot depart from the circle of reality. If these solutions have always been contradicted, it is because all, having different elements of truth, have recommended themselves on the same grounds to common sense, and because, as no one represents the entire truth, no one could be accepted in its place." With regard, then, simply, to the progress of human thought, we regard all attempts at philosophy with pleasure.

But the particular question of the freedom of the will is intimately connected with practical life and with theology. Would it not be better to let the abstract question rest; to rely upon the revealed will of God, and obey the dictates of conscience, without these constant efforts to probe our consciousness to the bottom, perplexing us continually with metaphysical difficulties? So far as the practice of life is concerned, perhaps we might; for here, in general, whatever speculative notions men may entertain, they *act* as if they were free. In ordinary matters, Hobbes was as little of a necessitarian as Cudworth, and Jonathan Edwards as Samuel Clarke. Perhaps the mass of mankind never feel the pressure of this question, or, if they do, are forced by the wants of daily life to shut it out, and be satisfied. But there are others who cannot rest so; for whom these are *the* questions of life, and they *must* investigate them. Perhaps, too, we have gone too far in saying that "so far as the practice of life is concerned," these questions might be laid aside. If they had never arisen, it might be so; but

the history of mankind will show that any philosophical theory in regard to them, that attains general prevalence, must have its influence even upon the lives of the mass. Who can doubt, but that, as Cudworth says, "the fatal necessity of all actions and events, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintained, will serve the design of atheism, and undermine Christianity and all religion, as taking away all guilt and blame, and plainly rendering a day of judgment ridiculous?" Were not the Antinomian excesses of the Independents the natural result of that doctrine of necessity which they held as strongly as the most licentious followers of Hobbes in the court of Charles II.? And is not the degradation of the modern Mohammedans sufficiently explained by their thorough belief in predestination, and their consistent action upon its principles, so far as human nature can act upon them?

The relation of philosophy to theology, also, has been the subject of much dispute. Many utterly oppose the blending of philosophy with religion in any way. And we agree in this opposition, so far as it is directed against the attempt to place philosophy above religion, and to make the doctrines of Christianity conform to any preconceived metaphysical theory. We hold fully, with Lord Bacon, that "out of the contemplation of nature or ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith is not safe—which the heathens themselves concluded in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: 'That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.'" But yet, we are inclined to believe that the most vehement denunciations of philosophizing in religion, and the most positive assertions of reliance upon the *ipsissima verba* of Scripture, are made, in these latter days, by a class of theologians who first adopt a metaphysical system at variance with the doctrines of the Bible, and then, finding the chasm between them to be bridgeless, would fain have them kept as far apart as possible. So far, indeed, as interpretation goes, we have little need of metaphysics in studying the Bible. But we cannot believe that it is of no moment what a man's metaphysics may be in regard to his theology. The one will affect the other, whether he will or no. Dr. Marsh says strongly, and we believe truly, that it is impossible to find, since the age of the apostles, "a single system of theology, a single volume on the Christian religion, in which the author's views are not modified by the metaphysical opinions of the age or of the individual." As it can hardly be doubted that the earliest

heresies in the Christian church arose from the unconscious operation, in the minds of theologians, of the philosophical opinions of preceding ages, so we can hardly fail to trace, in the theological systems of the present day, the various forms which the philosophy of the mind has assumed in latter times. In the nature of things it cannot be otherwise.

But, on the other hand, the theology will react upon the philosophy. If it part with something, it will not be satisfied without a return. In proportion to the accordance of the theology with the pure word of God, will be its power in purifying and elevating the metaphysics. And although one age may not suffice for any great results of such reaction to be developed, it will show itself in the course of time. In individual cases, there will arise restlessness under the pressure of the false system, and a disposition to question its authority. Here and there, after awhile, one will rise above the system, or, at least, modify it. The leaven will work silently among other minds, less vigorous and less daring, until finally it will pervade the mass. Some such process as this, we think, has been going on for years past among a certain class of divines in this country. The doctrine of philosophical necessity, as taught by Jonathan Edwards, was once universally received among them. "The time was" (we quote from a Calvinistic writer in a contemporary journal*) "when an inquisition existed in theological philosophy, and Edwards' book on the freedom of the will was put at the head of it. Every man's opinions must be imprisoned, or he himself must be branded as a heretic, whose mind did not come to the same conclusions with that great, good, and powerful thinker." But although this Procrustes' bed still retains its place in some of the Calvinistic schools of theology, the time has passed, we hope for ever, when every man's theological reputation must be guaged by it. The day of this intellectual bondage we hope is over. The free doctrines of the Bible have had room to work in many honest hearts, and the fruit of their reaction is before us, in the efforts of many honest Calvinists to rid themselves of the despotic authority of Edwards.

In a former number of this journal,† we remarked, that "Edwards' metaphysics are the basis of the theology of Calvinism. The man who attacks the former is an assailant of the latter; and he who embraces the doctrine of a free-will, not half-heartedly, or by way of manœuvre; not admitting and nullifying it within the compass of the same volume, as Professor Upham has done in his 'Treatise on the Will;' but honestly, thoroughly, and with all his

* American Biblical Repository.

† April, 1840, p. 214.

heart, is on the threshold of Arminianism." In observing the course of this controversy among our neighbors since that period, we have seen no reason to change this opinion; indeed, we find it confirmed by a voice from the very inner temple of old Calvinism. Thus speaks a writer in the Princeton Review:* "It seems too plain indeed to be questioned, that if it be essential to moral agency that it be a property of the will to choose either way in spite of all opposing power, . . . then there can be no proof or evidence that anything which God does, or forbears to do through all eternity, is the reason or cause, positive or privative, why moral beings act as they do act. Of course the doctrine of decrees is subverted.—An end is made of efficacious grace. With this doctrine, as all know, divine sovereignty and the orthodox view of election stand or fall." We agree fully in this opinion, and are willing to join issue upon the question, whether the will is self-determined or not, as the "hinge on which the chief theological differences that agitate our Zion turn." Well might Turretin say of free-will and its defenders, "*Hæc est Helena, pro qua, tanquam pro aris et focus, decertare non dubitant.*"†

Before proceeding to examine Mr. Tappan's book, it may not be amiss to give a brief view of the history of opinion upon the will before the time of Edwards. Passing over the earlier fathers, most of whom held the doctrine of freedom, though with no great distinctness of view, let us begin with Augustine. In his controversy with the Manicheans, he doubtless held to free-will as essential to responsibility. Subsequently, in the heat of his controversy with Pelagius, finding himself hard pressed with the arguments of that acute heretic, he clearly discerned that freedom is inconsistent with predestination, and he utterly disavowed it. The slavery of the will was one of his fundamental doctrines. In this he was followed by the Catholic predestinarians in general, and by Calvin. Arminius, on the other hand, and those who followed him, strenuously contended for man's complete free-agency, under the covenant of grace; and the self-determining power of the will was also generally admitted in the English Church. In 1654 Hobbes gave to the world his "Treatise on Liberty and Necessity;" and from his writings, as Dugald Stewart observes, "the modern necessitarians have borrowed most of those weapons with which they have combated the doctrine of moral liberty." The opinions of Hobbes were widely diffused, even in the church, and a host of opponents endeavored to check their

* October, 1840, p. 547.

† Institutio Theologiæ, loc. x, quæst. 1.

destructive progress. At a later period ensued the celebrated controversy between Leibnitz and Clarke, in which the former, consistently with his doctrine of *pre-established harmony*, advocated the theory of necessity, and the latter as strenuously contended for the doctrine of freedom. The controversy was continued in England between Dr. Clarke and Anthony Collins, a very acute Deist, who took precisely the view of freedom subsequently advocated by Edwards. Collins was the terror of the theologians of his time, and few of them, whether Calvinists or not, had the boldness to avow his theory of philosophical necessity. Before this time, however, the gigantic intellect of John Howe, in struggling to reconcile God's prescience with the sincerity of his exhortations and commands to sinners, had found no other way to do it but by admitting the contingency of many human actions. Dr. Isaac Watts contended for the self-determining power of the will, as the only possible ground of moral agency. Doddridge, also, Calvinist as he was, maintained the freedom of the will, in its fullest Arminian extent, asserting expressly, that "the will is neither determined by the last dictate of the understanding, nor the greatest apparent good, nor a prevailing uneasiness." Of course the Arminian writers generally took the same side.

One of the most remarkable books in the history of the controversy is Lord Kames' Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, in which he argued for the doctrine of necessity, and yet frankly confessed that if the practice of men were regulated by this belief, the business of life could not go on, and that therefore men are endowed with a *delusive sense of liberty*. The Turks have been illustrating the first part of this position, to some extent, for centuries past, their delusion in regard to liberty being a very partial one.

The use made of the doctrine of necessity by Deistical writers caused its abandonment, as we have seen, even by many distinguished Calvinists. But others saw that to yield here was to yield all; and none were more clear-sighted in regard to the tendency of the current of opinion than JONATHAN EDWARDS, who felt the necessity of stemming the tide, before it should sweep away the fabric of doctrine which he admired as the very architecture of God. Accordingly, he set himself to the task, and in 1753 published his "Inquiry, &c., respecting that Freedom of the Will which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency," &c. He brought to his task a mind of singular acuteness, extensive knowledge of theology, remarkable skill in logic, and a thorough conviction of the truth of his views. The work is that of a master. Its sophistries

are concealed with wonderful art. Receive his definitions, adopt his premises, and, in general, he carries you with almost irresistible power to his conclusions. He impresses you everywhere with reverence for his piety. The law of God is his delight. You see that he was writing, at least as he thought, for the glory of God. His book was successful, perhaps beyond his own expectations, in fixing the minds of Calvinists upon this great question. For many years they believed it almost as firmly as the Bible. Young minds that could not at first receive so revolting a doctrine with implicit faith, were yet induced, by the universal confidence of their elders, to quell their doubts, and believe, if they could not be convinced. The schools of the latter part of the eighteenth century revered Edwards as the schoolmen did Aristotle. They pronounced him unanswerable, and their students were trained to believe it.

Now, notwithstanding our belief that the fundamental positions of Edwards were refuted by Clarke's argument against Collins, and by various writers since that time, we must accord the praise of great boldness to the man who can so rise above the prejudices of a school as to make an assault on Edwards from the citadel of Calvinism itself. And although the way was prepared for Professor Tappan, by the symptoms of revolt in various quarters alluded to in the beginning of this article, and even by many partial attacks upon the "frowning fortress" of the Edwardean metaphysics from the more daring rebels, still, for him to undertake a regular siege was no ordinary proof of courage. We admire him for it. And we rejoice that there is magnanimity enough among many strong Calvinists, to allow of their admiration, too, both of the boldness and the ability of Professor Tappan's attempt. An instance to the contrary has come under our notice, in which a writer, who is endeavoring to lay some of the "black spirits and white," which cause our neighbors so much trouble, takes it in his way to say of Mr. Tappan, that he "was bold to combat Edwards on the will, . . . and failed of success in this enterprise, not so much from any moral as from a purely natural and physical inability."* The wit of this passage is poor enough, but the sneer which it implies is contemptible. Yet nothing is more common among the defenders of Edwards than this kind of sneer. They are perpetually charging their opponents with "misunderstanding" their oracle, or with "vaunting airs of new light and discovery in religion," or with "wild sciolism" and "transcendent transcendentalism," and many more characteristics of folly and stupidity. To

* Princeton Review, January, 1843, p. 47.

listen to the cant of these men about the wonderful profoundness of Edwards, and the deep thought necessary to comprehend him, and then to see how clearly and thoroughly *they* understand, not only Edwards, but the human will, and the human mind, and the purposes of God, one would think, indeed, that they "are the people, and wisdom will die with them."

Professor Tappan has done his work with a skill and judgment equal to the boldness of the undertaking. He has evidently thought for himself, as well as acquainted himself with the labors of others in the same department. As for the spirit in which he has labored, we think that even an enemy could scarcely question its fairness and candor. He evidently writes for the truth, as a philosopher, and not as a partizan. His style is generally clear and perspicuous, while it is more attractive than that of most writers on these topics. And, on the whole, though we cannot agree with all his views, and think that he might have accomplished his great purpose better from a different stand-point in theology, we believe his review of Edwards to be the best refutation of that writer that has appeared in a complete form.

There are three volumes of Mr. Tappan's works on the will: the first is given to an examination of Edwards; the second presents his own view of the doctrine of the will; and the third contains an application of this doctrine to moral agency and accountability. Our limits in this article will allow us to treat of only the first of these at any length; the others can be but incidentally noticed.

Our author's reasons for commencing with a review of Edwards are given in the following passage of his preface:—

"It is out of respect to these old associations and prejudices, and from the wish to avoid all unnecessary strangeness of manner in handling an old subject, and more than all, to meet what are regarded by many as the weightiest and most conclusive reasonings on this subject, that I open this discussion with a review of 'Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will.' There is no work of higher authority among those who deny the self-determining power of the will; and none which on this subject has called forth more general admiration for acuteness of thought and logical subtilty. I believe there is a prevailing impression that Edwards must be fairly met in order to make any advance in an opposite argument. I propose no less than this attempt, presumptuous though it may seem, yet honest, and made for truth's sake. Truth is greater and more venerable than the names of great and venerable men, or of great and venerable sects: and I cannot believe that I seek truth with a proper love and veneration, unless I seek her, confiding in herself alone, neither asking the autho-

rity of men in her support, nor fearing a collision with them, however great their authority may be. It is my interest to think and believe aright, no less than to act aright; and as right action is meritorious, not when compelled and accidental, but when free and made under the perception and conviction of right principles; so also right thinking and believing are meritorious, either in an intellectual or moral point of view, when thinking and believing are something more than gulping down dogmas, because Austin, or Calvin, or Arminius, presents the cup."—Pp. xi, xii.

We think he has done wisely. In developing his own views on the will, our author has endeavored to proceed rigidly on psychological principles, believing that the doctrine itself should be exhibited independently of theological views. Facts are first to be established; and the procedure must, of course, be strictly psychological, for at this stage of the investigation neither revelation nor logic could be of any use. But in following Edwards it was necessary to enter at some length into the logical argument, as it is upon ingenious deductions from admitted or assumed principles that he, as well as most other necessitarians, takes his stand. This division of the work is divided into three parts; first, a statement of Edwards' system, in which an abstract of *Part I*, of the Inquiry is given, following the order of the author, and employing, as much as possible, his own words; secondly, the legitimate consequences of Edwards' system; and, thirdly, an examination of the arguments against a self-determining will. Although this method is philosophical, and presents some advantages in point of clearness and condensation, we do not think it the best that could have been adopted, with reference to this particular work. The attempt to *state* Edwards' system has been made, we are sure, with great impartiality; but from the nature of the case, no such attempt, involving the use of any "explanatory words or passages," such as Professor Tappan has found it necessary to employ, could fail to make him liable to charges of misrepresentation, or at least of misconception. Accordingly, we find that the book has incurred this charge. Perhaps the author expected it, as the defenders of Edwards are very fond of resorting to this cry of "misconception," "misunderstanding;" as if Edwards were as mystical a writer as Jacob Behmen, and themselves only possessed the gift of unraveling his riddles; but yet we think he has laid himself more open to charges of the sort than he would have done if he had examined Edwards chapter by chapter, and section by section, from beginning to end. We are aware, that it is not advisable, in general, to follow the precise

order of an opponent, as he will of course make such an arrangement of his arguments as will present them most plausibly ; but here the connection between the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* and the false conclusions ought to be traced out, from the first glimpse of it in the definitions, through all its winding labyrinths of sophistry, to the end of the treatise. And, besides, such is the reverence for Edwards' authority in many minds, that if his great errors are selected and refuted with the utmost clearness, they will yet think there is some definition forgotten, some explanation omitted, that must clear it all up ; and by recurring to the book, they will perhaps find that the oracle expressed himself in regard to the very points discussed, with a "cautious hesitancy"—with a "perhaps," or a "somehow," or a "sometimes I use the word so and sometimes so;" by means of which very convenient ambiguities they are able to rescue both him and themselves. For these and other reasons, we should have preferred a different arrangement from that which our author has adopted ; remarking, at the same time, that he has carried out his own plan well. We shall notice a few of the points in which he has been charged with misconception.

It is, first, clearly made out by the reviewer, from Edwards' own statements, that he identifies *will* and *desire*. This is confirmed, though there is an apparent inconsistency in Edwards' language, by his subsequent remarks on moral inability, which he expressly states to be a want of *inclination*, or "want of will" itself. The reader should keep this distinctly in view.

It is next shown that Edwards makes motive the cause of volition. The will is determined by the strongest motive ; the strongest motive is the "greatest apparent good in the view of the mind;" and the greatest apparent good is that which "appears most agreeable." Edwards prefers to express this last thus: "The will is as what appears most agreeable is;" because "an appearing most agreeable," and "the mind's preferring or choosing, seem *hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct*." Here again he seems to identify desire and will.

It is of great importance to have it distinctly understood, that by the *determination of volition*, Edwards means the *cause of volition*. He himself illustrates it by the determination of motion, in which we mean "causing the motion of the body to be in such a direction rather than another." On this Professor Tappan remarks,—

"The causation of choice and the determination of the will are here intended to be distinguished, no more than the causation of motion and

the determination of the moving body. The cause setting a body in motion, likewise gives it a direction; and when there are several causes, a composition of the forces takes place, and determines both the extent and direction of the motion."—Pp. 20, 21.

A recent reviewer of Mr. Tappan's book* remarks, that in this passage it is argued "that in the instance of motion there is only one cause, which both produces the motion and determines the direction;" and proceeds, very sagaciously, to prove that the *fact* and *direction* of motion are always regarded as distinct effects, produced by distinct causes; e. g., that "the motion of a planet was derived from Omnipotence, its elliptical direction from gravitation." Does this writer believe that gravitation produces an elliptical motion? We always thought it produced motion in a direction somewhat rectilinear. Professor Tappan does not say that "in the instance of motion there is but one cause;" except in case there be but *one* cause impelling the body. But if we were to allow all that this writer demands, and even nullify the parallelogram of forces itself, it would not avail to relieve Edwards of making motive the cause of volition. He expressly says that motive "determines the act of the will to be thus, and not otherwise;" and it is this, and nothing else, which *is* volition. We shall recur to this point again.

Our author gives a clear statement of Edwards' definitions of necessity, impossibility, contingency, &c., in section iii, of the Inquiry, and then proceeds to exhibit the distinction of natural and moral necessity, as presented in section iv. It is plainly made out that Edwards' moral necessity is an absolute necessity of cause and effect, and that too in his own language; but our author unfortunately allows himself to put into Edwards' mouth an illustration which he did not use.

"It is as necessary as the falling of a stone which is thrown into the air; as the freezing or boiling of water at given temperatures; as sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste, and feeling, when the organs of sense, and the objects of sense, are brought together."—P. 51.

This is unfortunate, we say; for although Edwards' necessity is in reality physical, he does not say so, and much of his successful sophistry depends on keeping this point concealed. But as the defenders of Edwards, except the infidel ones, generally insist that his *moral* necessity is justly distinguished from *natural* or *physical*, it may not be amiss to examine the point a little more in detail.

Is the moral necessity of Edwards identical, according to his

* American Biblical Repository, January, 1843.

own system, with physical necessity? We affirm that it is, and will now try to prove it.

1. Edwards defines moral necessity to be that "necessity of connection and consequence which arises from such *moral causes*, as the strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions." He defines natural necessity to be "such necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements:" e. g., "they feel pain when their bodies are wounded." One would think these definitions were enough. We have a *cause*, wound; an *effect*, pain; we have a *cause*, motive; an *effect*, volition. In neither case does the necessity exist in the cause or in the effect, but in the connection between the two. But this is not all:

2. "The effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause." This is a step further: the connection of moral cause and effect is perfect, and the *necessity* lies in the connection.

3. "When I use this distinction of moral and natural necessity, I would not be understood to suppose that if anything comes to pass by the former kind of necessity, the *nature* of things is not concerned in it as well as in the latter. I do not mean to determine that when a moral habit or motive is so strong, that the act of the will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the nature of things. But these are the names that these two kinds of necessity have usually been called by; and they must be distinguished by some names or other; for there is a distinction or difference between them that is very important in its consequences; which difference does not lie so much in the nature of the *connection* as in the two terms *connected*." Here is a distinct avowal of all that we contend for. The point in dispute is not whether the *terms* differ, but whether they are *connected by the same bond of necessity*; not whether gravitation is like a moral motive, or the fall of a heavy body like volition, but whether the volition follows the motive by the same law of connection as that by which the heavy body obeys gravitation. Now Edwards admits that the difference is *not so much in the connection as in the terms*. It is admitted by the defenders of Edwards that this is an unfortunate passage, thrown into the scale of fatalism; and one of the writers before referred to has the hardihood to affirm that it is inconsistent with Edwards' own views. But Dr. Day says that Edwards "takes it for granted that he knows *his own meaning* of the prin-

cial terms which occur in his work, and that he has a right to state in what sense he proposes to use them."* We hope so reasonable a liberty will certainly be allowed him; and take it for granted that, in this instance at least, he knows his own meaning, and means precisely what he says. The identity of this connection was essential to his system, and he knew it. Take it away, and the rest of his metaphysics is good for nothing to prove necessity. There is room for ambiguity in some of his remarks in this connection; and it serves him a good turn in the theological application of his principles; but in the passages above quoted there is none. It is to be observed, moreover, that Edwards expressly disclaims saying that moral necessity is *not* owing to "the nature of things;" and argues that *nature* is distinguished in men's minds from *choice*, as to the influence of law, only because the law is more apparent in the objects of the physical world than in choice. That is, undoubtedly, according to his view, the *law of physical necessity* is more readily discerned in nature than in choice; but just as when events in the physical world do not "discernibly and obviously come to pass according to any settled course, men do not call the manner of the event by the name of nature, but by such names as accident, chance, contingency, &c.; so men make a distinction between nature and choice, as though they were completely and universally distinct.—Names being commonly given to things according to what is most obvious, and is suggested by what appears to the senses without reflection and research." He might have gone on in the same strain, and argued that as men err in calling those events in the physical world, whose laws are not clearly discernible, *accidental*, so they err, for the want of "reflection and research," in making any distinction between nature and choice. So true it is that, according to Edwards, man's immortal SPIRIT is only one of the links of the great chain of effects which men call NATURE.

4. Again: natural and moral necessity are thus distinguished by Edwards: "No opposition, or contrary will and endeavor, is supposable in the case of moral necessity, which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself;" while in natural necessity, as applied to men, such opposition is possible. The distinction, thus limited, is plausible, and great use has been made of it, in helping out the invention of natural and moral inability, a platform ingeniously contrived by cunning men, whereon the divine Being may play at fast and loose with human responsibility. But this attempted distinction serves only more clearly to identify the two

* Examination of Edwards, p. 108.

necessities. Let us try it. A man, standing at the top of a high tower, throws a stone from his hand, but loses his own balance and falls. The man and the stone come to the ground alike of *natural* necessity; though the man makes voluntary ineffectual opposition, the stone does not. Now is there any difference between the natural necessity as applied to the stone, and Edwards' moral necessity as applied to volition? If it be absurd to predicate voluntary opposition of the stone, it is equally so, according to his view, to predicate it of volition—indeed, he considers it absurd. The volition of brutes, in obedience to their instincts, where voluntary ineffectual opposition cannot be supposed, is a fair case of the moral necessity of Edwards. Is not his moral necessity, then, *more* mechanical even than his natural necessity as applied to man? The whole value of this sophistical distinction, for his purpose, consists in his confining the operation of natural necessity to *man*, where voluntary opposition is supposable; but so soon as we extend it to inanimate objects, we find it identical with *moral* necessity, as applied to mind.*

Such is Edwards' doctrine of necessity—throughout the Inquiry—except where it is necessary to qualify it, for a special purpose; and then an ingenious evasion is always at hand.

Our author next exhibits the view of natural and moral inability as presented in the Inquiry. Edwards defines moral inability to consist "either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view to induce and excite an act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination." On this Professor Tappan remarks,—

"The inability in this case does not relate to the connection between volition and its consequents and effects; *but to the production of the volition itself*. Now the inability to the production of a volition cannot be affirmed of the volition, because it is not yet supposed to exist, and as an effect cannot be conceived of as producing itself. The inability, therefore, must belong to the causes of volition, or to the motive."
—P. 53.

The writer before referred to† finds fault with this, as improperly representing motive to be, according to Edwards' philosophy, the

* See this view ably presented by Rev. S. N. Spear, in *Biblical Repository* for January, 1843, article x. Mr. Spear's articles on this subject are among the best and clearest that have fallen under our notice.

† *American Biblical Repository*, January, 1843, p. 43.

producing cause of volition; not a mere circumstance, or condition, or reason, of the existence of choice, but its *producing* cause. He proceeds to affirm, most positively, that "Edwards used the word cause, in its application to the antecedent of volition in particular, to signify that which has '*no productive influence*,' but is a mere occasion;" and considers this the grand and fundamental principle of his philosophy. It seems to be given up, indeed, by most modern expositors of Edwards, that if motive be the efficient cause of volition, there is no escape from fatalism; and they, therefore, endeavor to interpret Edwards as admitting the mind to be the cause of the act of choice, while motive is the occasion of it. The Inquiry itself holds no such doctrine. As this is admitted to be a vital point, we may be excused for attempting, at some length, to answer the question, "*Does Edwards make motive the producing cause of volition?*" Let it be distinctly recollected, that the question is not, What causes the will to act at all, but what causes it to act *thus and not otherwise*? Whatever, alone, does this, is the producing cause of volition. Keeping this in view, then, we answer our question in the affirmative, because,

1. Edwards defines motive to be "the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly." Now does not this, of itself, settle the whole question as to his view of the cause of volition? But he says also, "It is that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will;" and by *determining* the will, be it remembered, he means "causing that the act of will or choice should be thus and not otherwise." That is, motive causes volition, and is the whole cause.

2. Edwards' whole argument against a self-determining will is directed to show that the soul, in the act of willing, does not "*itself determine all the free acts of the will*;" and in doing this, it attempts to prove "that the dependence of volitions may be traced back, through successive steps, till it is found to extend to something *exterior* to the will or mind of the agent." That there might be no cavil about this, we have put it in President Day's own language. Edwards argues further, (part ii, sec. 2,) that "if the particular act or exertion of will, which comes into existence, be anything properly determined at all, then it has some cause of its existing, and of its existing in such a particular determinate manner, and not another; some cause, whose influence *decides the matter*; which cause is distinct from the effect, and prior to it. But to say, that the will or mind orders, influences,

and determines itself to exert such an act as it does, by the very exertion itself, is to make the exertion both cause and effect; or the exerting such an act, to be a cause of the exertion of such an act." Here is long-drawn argument to prove the *absurdity* of the mind's causing volition; and all upon the supposition of "producing" cause. But, to make assurance doubly sure, in his section on "volition not without a cause," he attempts to show that the notion that the "activity of the nature of the soul" can *produce* volition, is a gross absurdity.

3. Again, (part ii, sec. 8,) arguing against "supposed liberty of the will as opposite to all necessity," he expresses himself thus:—"To say the event is not dependent on its cause, is absurd; it is the same thing as to say, it is not its cause, nor the event the effect of it: *for dependence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect.* If there is no such relation between one thing and another, consisting in the connection and dependence of one thing on the influence of another, then it is certain there is no such relation between them as is signified by the terms *cause* and *effect*. So far as an event is dependent on a cause, and is connected with it, so much causality is there in the case, and no more. *The cause does, or brings to pass, no more in any event, than is dependent on it.*" Again, refuting the notion that a cause may sometimes be followed by its effect and sometimes not, he avers that when it is so followed, the effect is "not owing to the influence of the cause, but must come to pass in some other way. For it was proved before, that the influence of the cause was not sufficient to *produce* the effect. And if it was not sufficient to *produce* it, then the *production* of it could not be owing to that influence, but must be owing to something else, or owing to nothing. And if *the effect be not owing to the influence of the cause, then it is not the cause.*" We have italicised, in these last extracts, the words which show what Edwards' idea of cause was, and that too with reference to the acts of the will, for the very aim of his argument was to show that because every effect must have a necessary connection with its cause, no event can be contingent in the manner that Arminians suppose the free acts of the will to be contingent. And yet, in the face of passages and arguments like these, scattered all through the Inquiry, we are to be told that Edwards used the word cause "in its application to the antecedent of volition in particular," in the sense of that which has "*no positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing!*" How Edwards himself would have resented such an imputation upon his logic, we may easily imagine.

4. In his section on "No Event without a Cause," he affirms, most justly, that "nothing ever comes to pass without a cause: what is self-existent, must be from eternity, and must be unchangeable; but as to all things that *begin to be*, they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation of their existence without themselves." This he declares to be the grand dictate of common sense. Now what is the dictate of common sense, in regard to the law of cause and effect, if it be not that "no event can come to pass without a *producing* cause?" If this be *not* the sense in which Edwards uses the word here and elsewhere when he appeals to the dictate of common sense, he is guilty of the grossest sophistry in appealing to it at all.

5. In a word, his entire argument goes to prove, that either *motive* is the cause of volition, or there is *no* cause of it. All his reasonings in part ii, sections 3-5, amount to nothing if this be not admitted, for this is the hinge on which they all turn; and his constant effort is to reduce his antagonist to the absurdity of denying the axiom that "every event must have a cause." His reasoning is, volition is an effect, but every effect must have a cause, therefore volition must have a cause. But motive must be the cause of volition or else there is no cause, which is absurd, because every event must have a cause. In the major premise the word cause must be used in the sense of *producing* cause, or it is not the axiom of common sense which all men admit; it must, therefore, be so used in the conclusion, which is, that *motive is the cause of volition*.

Now it can be of little avail to direct us to the famous passage in which Edwards explains the different uses of the word cause, for a settlement of the question which we have tried to answer. We quote this passage, however, which, from its singular ambiguity in the connection in which it is employed, is the only one in Edwards which has the slightest semblance of dishonesty:—"Therefore I sometimes use the word cause, in this Inquiry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that event is true, whether it has any positive influence or not. And in an agreeableness to this, I sometimes use the word effect for the consequence of another thing, which is, perhaps, rather an occasion than

a cause, most properly speaking. I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I may cut off occasion from any that might seek occasion to cavil and object against some things that I may say concerning the dependence of all things which come to pass on some cause, and their connection with their cause."—*Inquiry*, part ii, sec. 3.

We say that this is the only passage that has the semblance of dishonesty; but we cannot suspect Edwards of any, even the slightest dishonesty. In any writer of less rigid virtue and less pure religion, we should hardly hesitate what to call it. Let the reader review the passages quoted and italicised in our paragraph 3, above, and decide whether he uses the word cause in the sense of that which has "positive influence or not." This "wide sense" of the word cause, as defined in the "controlling passage," just quoted, has been a convenient but most unworthy refuge of the defenders of Edwards when pushed with the argument of fatalism. It is in vain. Adopt Edwards' law of motive and you adopt fatalism—of *necessity*. We trust we have sufficiently vindicated our author from misrepresenting Edwards in regard to the producing cause of volition.

In regard to the distinction between moral and natural inability, there is one point where Professor Tappan has been charged justly, we think, by the fore-mentioned reviewer,* with mistaking the meaning of Edwards, namely, the inability to which it is not just to ascribe the non-performance of a volition. If we understand the *Inquiry* correctly, it brings up the case of a man supposed to have the natural ability, that is, the natural capacities requisite for performing an action, but who does not perform it for want of will; and Edwards says it is not just to ascribe the non-performance to the want of ability, because the thing wanting is not a being *able*, but a being *willing*. Obviously he here means natural and not moral inability, as Professor Tappan seems to suppose. In view of responsibility, it is, to be sure, as flatly unjust to condemn a man for the want of moral ability as of natural ability; but this is a matter to be argued out, and not involved in a statement of Edwards' system proper. In general, this part of the *Inquiry* is represented with our author's usual fairness.

But we must hasten on. At the close of his statement of Edwards' views in the order of the *Inquiry*, our author gives a compend of Edwards' psychological system derived from the work at large, which is drawn up remarkably well and justly.

* American Biblical Repository, January, 1843.

We cannot see that in any material point he has misunderstood the system.

In the second part of the book, Professor Tappan *presents the legitimate consequences of Edwards system*. It is indeed an appalling array. But dreadful as it is, those who believe in the fundamental doctrines of Edwards cannot evade it. If they take the system they must take its fearful consequences. Among these are the following: that there is no self-determining power of will; that the world is governed by absolute unconditional necessity; that, of course, evil is necessary, and has its origin in infinite Wisdom; that man cannot be blamable for evil; that all exhortations to men are absurd; that the sense of guilt and shame is a prejudice; that punishment is only a system accommodated to the opinions of society; and that the system leads to fatalism, pantheism, and atheism. It must certainly appear, as our author remarks, that

“if these deductions be legitimate, then, to the largest class of readers the doctrine of necessity is overthrown: it is overthrown by its consequences, and my argument has the force of a *reductio ad absurdum*. If a self-determined will appear an absurdity, still it cannot be so absurd as the contrary doctrine, if this doctrine involve the consequences above given. At least, practical wisdom will claim that doctrine which leaves to the world a God, and to man a moral and responsible nature.”—P. 147.

The modern necessitarians may be divided into two classes—the one not merely holding the doctrine itself, but with a bold consistency following it out to its logical consequences, deny human freedom and responsibility, and become atheists, pantheists, and fatalists; the other, holding to the doctrine with equal tenacity, but shrinking from its consequences, and even endeavoring to make it the basis of man's responsibility for his actions. The former class is perhaps at this day the most numerous, at least in Europe. Dugald Stewart has presented some of their doctrines and statements in the Appendix to his *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man*, from which we quote the following extract of a letter from Diderot:—

“I am now, my dear friend, going to quit the tone of a preacher, to take, if I can, that of a philosopher. Examine it narrowly, and you see that the word liberty is a word devoid of meaning; that there are not, and that there cannot be, free beings; that we are only what accords with the general order, with our organization, our education, and the chain of events. These dispose of us

invincibly. We can no more conceive a being acting without a motive than we can one of the arms of a balance acting without a weight. The motive is always exterior and foreign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves. What deceives us is the prodigious variety of our actions, joined to the habit which we catch at our birth, of confounding the voluntary and the free. We have been so often praised and blamed, and have so often praised and blamed others, that we contract an inveterate prejudice of believing that we and they will and act freely. But if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue; nothing that ought to be rewarded or punished. What, then, is the distinction among men? The doing of good and the doing of ill! The doer of ill is one who must be destroyed or punished. The doer of good is lucky, not virtuous. But though neither the doer of good or of ill be free, man is, nevertheless, a being to be modified; it is for this reason the doer of ill should be destroyed upon the scaffold. From thence the good effects of education, of pleasure, of grief, of grandeur, of poverty, &c.; from thence a philosophy full of pity, strongly attached to the good, nor more angry with the wicked than the whirlwind which fills one's eyes with dust. Strictly speaking, there is but one sort of causes, that is, physical causes. There is but one sort of necessity, which is the same for all beings. This is what reconciles me to human kind; it is for this reason I exhort you to philanthropy. Adopt these principles if you think them good, or show me that they are bad. If you adopt them, they will reconcile you, too, with others, and with yourself; you will neither be pleased nor angry with yourself for being what you are. Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom. Besides this all is prejudice and false philosophy."

Stewart also quotes Belsham as saying, that "remorse is the exquisitely painful feeling which arises from the belief, that in circumstances precisely the same, we might have chosen and acted differently. This *fallacious* feeling is superseded by the doctrine of necessity. Remorse supposes free-will. It is of little or no use in moral discipline. In a degree it is even pernicious." To the same purpose Dr. Priestley has expressed himself: "A man when he reproaches himself for any particular action in his past conduct, may fancy that, if he was in the same situation again, he would have acted differently. But this is a mere deception; and if he examines himself strictly, and takes in all circumstances, he may be satisfied that, with the same inward disposition of mind,

and with precisely the same views of things that he had then, and exclusive of all others that he has acquired by reflection since, he could not have acted otherwise than he did." How closely does this correspond with Edwards' view of human volition! Again, Stewart remarks, "Whatever may have been the doctrines of some of the ancient atheists about man's free agency, it will not be denied that, in the history of modern philosophy, the schemes of atheism and necessity have been hitherto always connected together. Not that I would by any means be understood to say, that every necessitarian must be, *ipso facto*, an atheist, or that even any presumption is afforded, by a man's attachment to the former sect, of his having the slightest bias in favor of the latter; but only that every modern atheist I have heard of has been a necessitarian."

But, as we have said, there is a large class of necessitarians who stop short of these results. Their problem, then, is, to reconcile the necessity of all actions and events with man's free agency and responsibility—and to free it from the imputation of making fate rule both God and man, or of making God the only agent in the universe, which is pantheism, or of merging God into necessary substance and attributes, thus destroying his personality, which is atheism. We think it abundantly capable of demonstration that their effort to do this is futile—and our author has successfully shown it to be so. Strange is it, indeed, but true, that the philosophy of fate, pantheism, and atheism should be taken as the philosophy of religion.

The *third* part of Professor Tappan's review is taken up with an examination of the arguments against a self-determining will. The first of these is the famous argument of *the infinite series*, which is generally considered by the followers of Edwards to be unanswerable. The argument is, that if the will determines all its own free acts in the exercise of a power of willing, it determines its own acts by choosing its own acts. Of course every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act; and this is an act determined still by a preceding act of the will, choosing that; "which brings us directly to a contradiction, for it supposes an act of the will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest; or a free act of the will before the first free act of the will." Throughout this argument, and all that follows in Edwards' answers to supposed evasions of his reasoning, it is *assumed* that the causative act by which the soul causes volitions must itself be a volition;

that an active being can bring no effects to pass by his activity but what are consequent upon his acting. Upon this assumption—taken for granted, not proved—the whole validity of his reasoning turns. It can be shown to be unfounded by the following arguments:—

1. If the assumption be valid, it is fatal to all causality. It applies to every causative act as well as to the causative acts of the will. It shuts out all causes from the universe. God himself cannot cause his own volitions, without first acting to cause them, which involves the absurdity of an infinite series of acts—hence God is no cause. It effectually cuts off Edwards and his defenders from making *mind* the efficient cause of volition, and motive the occasion; for if mind be the efficient cause, then it is liable to the absurdity of the infinite series. And if motive be the cause, the same absurdity is reached. From this reasoning there is no escape. The only attempt to evade it, is by stating that the question is not, why the mind acts at all, but why it acts thus, rather than otherwise, and therefore volition is a peculiar kind of effect. In exposing this evasion our author does not write with his usual clearness, though he evidently seizes upon the real point of evasion, which consists in separating the act of the will from the act of volition, when in fact they are one and the same thing. If the will act at all, it *acts thus and not otherwise*, and this is the very thing for which cause is sought. Edwards says that motive is the cause: his opponents say that will is itself the cause. Between them there is more than a mere verbal distinction: even the great gulf which separates fatalism from freedom. Professor Tappan rightly states that “particular determination and direction are inseparable from every volition”—that is, that for the will to act at all, is for it to act in one way and not another, so that in seeking the cause of volition we seek the cause of the entire phenomenon, and have nothing further to ask. He introduces the operation of fire selecting combustibles as an illustration; but a want of perspicuity in his language leaves it doubtful whether he uses it as an illustration of his own or of Edwards' view of volition. What he means is very clearly stated, however, elsewhere:—

“The particular determination is accounted for in the very quality or attribute of the cause. In the case of a physical cause, the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which quality is to be necessarily correlated to the object. In the case of will, the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which quality is to have the power to make the particular determination without being necessarily correlated to the

object. A physical cause is a cause fixed, determined, and necessitated. The will is a cause contingent and free."—P. 222.

2. This assumption of Edwards implies that we can understand the *quo modo* of cause. If we say that the will causes its own acts, he turns upon us, and inquires, "How the will causes its own acts?" The truth is, we can tell as much how any other cause acts as how the will acts, and that is just nothing at all.

3. This assumption is opposed by consciousness. Cause is the ground of phenomena, itself no phenomenon. We conceive of it as producing phenomena by an effort, or, as our author calls it for the sake of distinctness, a *nisus*, which cannot be observed except in self-conscious causes. The will is self-conscious; the will perceives this *nisus*, which, by its very conception, admits of no antecedent.

"There is no conception to oppose to this, but that of every cause having its first movement determined by some other cause out of itself—a conception which runs back in endless retrogression without arriving at a first cause, and is, indeed, the annihilation of all cause."—P. 193.

By this reasoning we think Edwards' assumption is itself annihilated.

Our author proceeds to notice Edwards' arguments against *contingent* self-determining power, and shows,—1. That he mistakes the question by assuming that contingency is identical with chance or no cause; 2. That he begs the question by affirming all cause to be necessary; and, 3. That contingency, as the *opposite of necessity*, and not as the *absence of cause*, is both a possible and rational conception. Bating a few inaccuracies of expression, this part of the work is admirably well done.

After some remarks upon the question of the indifferency of the will, Mr. Tappan goes on, in the last place, to examine Edwards' arguments founded upon the foreknowledge of God. We do not believe that this class of arguments is fairly applicable to the subject, one way or the other. The manner of the divine foreknowledge is beyond the reach of our faculties, indubitably. Why not as well expect the operations of the other attributes of God to be brought within the limits of our understanding, as his omniscience? Yet the argument from the prescience of the Deity, so much depended on by Edwards, Priestley, Belsham, and most of the advocates of necessity, proceeds upon the almost blasphemous ground that God *cannot* know any events but necessary events; that such events would be without evidence, and that God cannot

know without evidence! Even granting that the coexistence of God's foreknowledge with human freedom cannot be brought within the scope of the human understanding, it does not follow that human freedom must be given up. On the same principle we must give up much of our most valuable knowledge. "Do we know, or can we conceive, how God knows the secrets of men's hearts? Can we conceive how God made this world without any pre-existent matter? All the ancient philosophers believe this to be impossible; and for what reason but this, that they could not conceive how it could be done? Can we give any better reason for believing that the actions of men cannot be certainly foreseen?"* The advocates of necessity, however, must construct a theory, not merely so that God may be able to foresee human actions, but also so that "they may be able to understand *how* he foresees them." They undertake to prove that it is impossible for God to foresee actions which are not necessary. But in this daring attempt they reckon without their host.

Their entire argument confounds contingency with chance, and certainty with necessity. These ideas are perfectly distinct, and have often been shown to be so. Our author presents the matter remarkably well:—

"Certainty of the mere *fact* of existence does not imply the necessity by which anything comes to exist.—Contingency is not opposed to cause, but to necessity.—Of God we do not affirm merely the power of calculating future contingent events upon known data, but a positive prescience of all events. He sees from the beginning how contingent causes, or wills, will act. He sees with absolute infallibility and certainty—and the events to him are infallible and certain. But still they are not necessary, because the causes which produce them are not determined and necessitated by anything preceding. They are causes contingent and free, and conscious of power not to do what they are actually engaged in doing."—P. 278.

But we must bring our remarks to a close. We have followed our author through his first volume with great pleasure, and should be glad, did our limits allow, to extend the notice to the second and third. Perhaps we may take them up hereafter, in a separate article. Professor Tappan has undoubtedly made a contribution to our knowledge of the human will. In this review, he has done good service by his clear and able refutation of the fundamental errors of Edwards; especially of the *argument of the infinite series*, and of the assertion that *contingency implies no cause*, which he has fully met, and, in our judgment, satisfactorily

* Reid on the Active Powers, Essay iv, sec. 10.

set aside. And these are Edwards' pillars. His edifice crumbles with them. They are to him what axioms are to the geometer, the connecting links of all his arguments. He labors, with wonderful industry and skill, to establish them, and interweaves them, with equal adroitness, into the whole texture of his consummate logic. Take them away, and the cunning fabric falls to pieces.

The science of psychology is not what it was in the time of Edwards. Well said President Day, however ironically,—that if Edwards “were now living, he would meet with those who could teach him, that he was far from having exhausted the science of mind.”* Undoubtedly he would. Does President Day seriously think that he had exhausted it? He did not, indeed, “anticipate the higher metaphysics of our times;” but the metaphysics are none the worse for that. Man's *spiritual* being is somewhat more thought of now than formerly. It is easy enough to rail at all rational psychology as transcendentalism; of which said transcendentalism many good men have no other notion than that it is something terribly wicked, because certain crazy people in the country christen their ravings by the name. But the time is coming, and we think with rapidity, when these things will be better understood, in spite of the multitude of thinkers and no-thinkers who would have everything proceed after the old *mumpsimus*. And in the light of a more just psychology, we trust men will learn, that from the “so called universal law of nature, governed by necessity, it is not possible to derive its very antithesis—a law of freedom.”

November 1, 1843.

ART. IV.—*Rural Cemeteries*. North American Review, vol. liii, Article iv.

“BUT whence have they,” (the voluptuous,) inquires the pious Saint Pierre, “derived this sentiment of funereal melancholy, in the very midst of pleasure? Must it not have been from the persuasion that something still subsists after we are gone? Did a tomb suggest to their imagination only the idea of what it is designed to contain, that is, a corpse merely, the sight of it would shock rather than please them. How afraid are most of them at the

* Examination of Edwards, p. 94.

thought of death ! To this physical idea, then, some moral sentiment must undoubtedly be united. The voluptuous melancholy resulting from it arises, like every other attractive sensation, from the harmony of the two opposite principles ; from the sentiment of our fleeting existence, and that of our immortality ; which unite on beholding the last habitation of mankind. A tomb is a monument erected on the confines of the two worlds.”*

What the author of the “*Studies of Nature*” here says of the “voluptuous,” may with equal propriety be said of the whole human race. Whether the answer given by him to the question raised by himself is precisely correct or not, there would probably be some difference of opinion ; but all will admit it contains much truth. Though, as we believe, the state of the departed spirit is in no way affected, either for good or evil, by the situation in which the “clay tenement” it has recently occupied may remain, we apprehend much of the interest which we feel in attending upon the funeral obsequies of the departed, and providing suitable monuments to their memories, arises from the conviction that the vital principle is not extinct, but only absent ; that the separation, though long protracted, is not to be eternal.

Indeed, regard for the proper disposition of the remains of those who have died may be considered as a characteristic of man, which has manifested itself among all nations in every age of the world. “To man alone, of all animals,” says Pliny, “is given ambition, avarice, strong desire of living, superstition, the care of sepulture, and regard for the future after death.”† By superstition Pliny no doubt meant all regard for religious observances ; and with this he considers “care of sepulture” as closely associated ; both, it would seem, having their origin in, or being intimately related to, that “longing for immortality” which writers on this subject consider natural to the human heart. Indeed, we know the opinion prevailed among the ancients that the soul could not be admitted into the Elysian shades until the body had received the rites of sepulture ; or, if these were denied, it must wander desolate and alone one hundred years. Hence, to die under such circumstances as to preclude the possibility of a proper interment, was considered one of the greatest calamities ; and death by shipwreck, as the body would be liable to be entirely lost in the deep, was particularly

* *Studies of Nature*, by James Henry Bernardine de Saint Pierre, translated from the French, by Henry Hunter, D. D., vol. ii, page 68.

† *Uni [homini] animantium luctus est datus . . . uni ambitio, uni avaritia, uni immensa vivendi cupido, uni superstitione, uni sepulturae cura, atque etiam post se de futuro.*—*Nat. Hist.*, lib. vii, 1.

dreaded. Thus Ovid, though he considers death would be to him a blessing, prays to be saved from shipwreck.

Demite naufragium, mors mihi munus erit.

“Death would my soul from anxious troubles ease,
But that I fear to perish by the seas.”

By a law of Athens, a person finding a dead body was compelled to give it a decent interment. If he was in haste, it would suffice to throw soft earth or sand upon it three times.

Persons killed by lightning, suicides, and enemies of the state, were not entitled to the rites of sepulture.

In Egypt, the city nearest which a dead body was found, was obliged to embalm it and give it the ordinary funeral rites. Indeed, in no other country was ever such attention paid to the lifeless remains of the departed, in embalming them, and providing for them proper repositories, as in Egypt. For this purpose were those immense structures, the pyramids,* erected, which remain to this day as wonderful monuments of the enterprise and mechanical skill of an unknown people; for this were the catacombs, those labyrinthine, subterranean cities, excavated.

The Scriptures everywhere recognize the obligation of the living to perform the proper funeral rites for the dead. In Gen. xv, 15, it is predicted of Abraham that he shall go to his fathers in peace, and be buried in a good old age; and on the death of Sarah, his wife, he purchased of Ephron a “field in Machpelah, which was before Mamre,” (Gen. xxiii, 17,) for a burial place, where he was afterward buried, (Gen. xxv, 9,) and also Isaac, and Jacob, and others of their families. Gen. xlix, 2-32; 1, 13. Joseph died in Egypt, where his body was embalmed; (Gen. l, 25;) and when his descendants departed from the country they took his bones with them, as he had before directed, and buried them in Shechem, in a field which his father had purchased of the children of Hamor. Gen. xxiii, 19, 20; Josh. xxiv, 32. Moses was buried in a field in the plain of Moab, but the precise spot never was known; (Deut. xxiv, 6;) and Eleazar, the son and successor of Aaron, on Mount Ephraim. Josh. xxiv, 33. Near the same place was Joshua also buried. Josh. xxiv, 30. David, and Solomon, and most of the kings of Judah, were buried in the sepulchres of the kings at Jerusalem, but Manasseh and Amon, for some reason, in the garden of Uzza.

* This is denied by Faber in his work on the Mysteries of the Cabiri, vol. ii, p. 385; by Dr. Bryant, and others: but if there ever was ground for doubt on the subject, recent discoveries have entirely removed it.

To be deprived of the rites of sepulture, the Jews, as well as the Greeks and Romans alluded to above, considered a calamity, as is evident from the fact that this was not unfrequently threatened them as a punishment for their sins. Jer. vii, 1, 2; Ezek. vi, 5: see, also, Eccles. vi, 3. The body of our Saviour was deposited in a tomb "hewn from a rock," "wherein was never man laid;" and Lazarus was buried in a cave.

But apart from any religious or superstitious notions that may have prevailed in ancient or modern times, the appropriate interment of the dead must always, on many accounts, be a subject of deep interest. In the language of the writer, whose article we have made the basis of these remarks, "it is forced upon us by considerations which are absolutely imperative. The strong law of necessity leaves us little choice in the matter. The great destroyer is ever busy. A generation of men passes away in less than half the 'threescore years and ten' allotted to man. Thrice in a century all the generations of the dwellers on the earth are changed by death." Nature has so ordered it that the sight of the dead openly exposed is disgusting; and humanity, and a proper regard to the health and happiness of the living, equally require that they should be removed from our view.

The most common methods of disposing of the dead have been by "inhumation," or burial, and "cremation," or burning upon the funeral pile. The former method appears to have been the most ancient, and was probably much the most practiced, even before the introduction of Christianity. But burning was very common in ancient Greece and Rome, as well as other less civilized countries. Nor were the Jews strangers to it, as we learn from the fact that the bodies of Saul and his sons were burned by the men of Jabesh-Gilead, after they had been rescued by them from the Philistines. 1 Sam. xxxi, 12. Their bones were then buried under a tree in Jabesh. When David heard of this exploit of the men of Jabesh-Gilead, he commended them highly; (2 Sam. ii, 5;) and afterward removed the bones of Saul and Jonathan from Jabesh to the sepulchre of their fathers in Zelah. 2 Sam. xxi, 14. Asa, too, appears to have been burnt "in a bed which was filled with sweet odors and divers kinds of spices," though there has been some difference of opinion with regard to it. 2 Chron. xvi, 14. In cases of burning, the remaining bones and ashes were usually collected with great care and preserved in urns.

Other methods, it will occur to every one, have prevailed in particular nations. The Egyptians, as is well known, practiced embalming; and the carbonized remains of millions, thus prepared

three thousand years ago, are still preserved. They were unquestionably led to adopt this custom by their belief in the doctrine of metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls. The ancient Scythians were accustomed to suspend the dead bodies of their friends in the air to putrefy; and the same usage has prevailed among some tribes of savages in modern times. The inhabitants of Thibet have a dread against committing the remains of their friends to the earth, but choose rather to allow them to be devoured by wild beasts and birds of prey!

Among Christian nations, it is believed, inhumation, and this alone, has ever been practiced. Cremation was, indeed, common when Christianity was introduced; but the early Christians seem never to have adopted it, considering it contrary to the spirit of their religion. It is very natural to suppose their feelings may have been excited against it by witnessing so many of their number suffer martyrdom by burning at the stake. The introduction of Christianity produced in other respects considerable change in the ordinary modes of interment. Previous to this time coffins were not in general use, though it is well known expensive sarcophagi were often prepared for the rich and the great. Joseph, as we have seen, was embalmed and put in a coffin in Egypt; but it has been very properly remarked,* that mention probably is made of the fact because of its being something unusual, and to show the honors that were paid him. The body of our Saviour, it would seem, was not placed in a coffin, nor was that of Elisha, which was *touched* by the corpse that was let down into the sepulchre, (2 Kings xiii, 21,) nor that of Lazarus.

But we may not add to these desultory remarks on ancient usages. It is well known that great importance has been attached to this subject by all nations in past ages, as well ancient as modern; and recently it has excited a new interest in this country, as has been evinced by the construction of several rural cemeteries, at considerable expense, in the vicinity of some of our most populous cities. The article in the *North American Review*, the title of which we have used above, contains much important information concerning this new movement, as well as many judicious remarks on the "appropriate rites and modes of burial," of which it is our purpose to avail ourselves.

The first movement in this country toward the construction of a public rural cemetery appears to have been made in Boston, in 1825, but nothing decisive was done. The writer above referred to says:—

* Harmer's Observations, chap. i, Ob. 19.

"In 1830 the subject was revived; and Mount Auburn, a spot of surpassing loveliness, having been secured, the project was at once adopted by the public with special favor, and carried forward with energy to its completion."

This refers exclusively, of course, to the public feeling in and around Boston; but a corresponding feeling was excited in other places, which has since manifested itself in a manner hereafter to be described. Before this time considerable had been done in many places in laying out and inclosing small cemeteries or grave-yards, (as they have been more generally called,) usually adjacent to the churches. Mount Auburn Cemetery was consecrated Sept. 26, 1831, by prayers and an address from Judge Story of the United States Supreme Court; and received, as its "first tenant," the remains of the distinguished authoress, Mrs. Hannah Adams. Since that time, according to this writer, there have been established the Worcester Rural Cemetery, near Worcester, Mass.; the Green Mount Cemetery, near Baltimore, Md.; Harmony Grove Cemetery, in the vicinity of Salem, Mass.; Greenwood Cemetery, near Brooklyn, N. Y., and Laurel Hill Cemetery, near Philadelphia, Pa.; besides others of less note, and others still for which preparation has been made.

The expense attending the construction and proper embellishment of such cemeteries as those named above, must, as a matter of course, be considerable; but in every case where the attempt has been made, it is believed, it has been defrayed by the sale of the "lots" into which they have been divided.* Still it is not to be expected that in every place extensive grounds can be laid out for this purpose, and embellished by art, as in the above instances. Nor is this desirable. We rejoice to witness the great improvement in the public taste and spirit in regard to this subject; and while the whole country may take a just pride in the cemeteries of Mount Auburn, Green Mount, and Laurel Hill, which have been established by the rich and populous cities near which they are situated, every village and town may have its "rural cemetery," less imposing, indeed, in appearance, and less known, perhaps, but not therefore possessing less intrinsic interest to those living in the vicinity, and actively concerned in its management. Nothing, in our opinion, more favorably impresses the mind of a stranger on approaching a country village, than to observe, in some retired spot in

* The whole expense of Mount Auburn Cemetery, which contains one hundred and ten and a half acres of land, had been \$37,066 20, at the close of the year 1840, while the sales of lots in the same time amounted to \$60,842.—*North American Review*, vol. liii, p. 391.

the vicinity, the little cemetery, properly inclosed, and tastefully laid out and adorned by art, as the circumstances of the proprietors justify; as he invariably finds it a sure indication of intelligence, refinement, and a high-toned moral feeling in the village community.

One obvious advantage of public rural cemeteries, which in a country like ours we regard as of some consequence, is, the obliteration of lines of division, whether of party or sect, which is occasioned by them. Though we must be divided during life in matters of opinion and perhaps practice, it is pleasant to reflect that we are brethren still, and that this truth shall be manifested, if nowhere else, at least in our last resting place.

“There the dark slave sleeps sweetly as his master,
Nor dreams the maniac of the chains that gall’d him;
There too the wretched, worn by want and wasted,
Forgets his sorrows.”

The Roman Catholics, in this as in other things, will in all probability continue their exclusive practice—and this furnishes another evidence of the unsuitableness of their system to our republican government—but all other denominations, it is believed, can cordially unite in such an enterprise; and as for divisions originating in other relations, it is not supposed any of them will in the least interfere with the object. The distinctions of wealth must of course be seen in the public cemetery, as elsewhere in the world; but, as suggested by another, to prevent the entire exclusion of any, we would have in every cemetery a suitable number of lots reserved for the poor and for the stranger.

The practice of laying out burial grounds in the vicinity of churches originated very early, and certainly has some considerations to commend it to our favor. The reason anciently alledged for the practice, that the relatives and friends of the departed might more conveniently offer up prayers for their souls, can, of course, find no favor with Protestants; but the mind is led so naturally from the contemplations appropriate to the house of God, to recur to the “house appointed for all the living,” that there seems to be a great propriety in having them situated near each other. But the disadvantage of admitting sectarian distinctions must ever attend the practice, as most churches must, of necessity, belong to some one particular denomination of Christians.

Another disadvantage of having burial places connected with church edifices arises from the obvious fact that they require very great diversity of situation. A church should always be situated,

if possible, in the midst of the population that is expected to attend upon the sacred ministrations within it. This has, indeed, in years past been too frequently forgotten or neglected, and we have often seen the village church, not in the village, as if to invite within it those who labor literally, and the heavy laden, but on some eminence at a distance, as though the chief object was to exhibit it to advantage, or to intimate to the villagers that its privileges are not to be enjoyed but at the expense of some effort! But more correct notions are beginning to prevail, and churches are now usually located with reference to the convenience of attendance by the population for whom they are designed. But this very circumstance almost always must render the location of a church unsuitable for that of a public cemetery, which should be in as quiet and retired a situation as possible. So thought the author of the address delivered at the consecration of the Worcester Rural Cemetery, as the following extract will show:—

“Standing here in your midst, with all the preparation of the plan before you, it needs not that I point you to its picturesque beauties, or mark how art has improved, or taste embellished, the loveliness of nature. The broad avenue and the winding path are before you. The open plain, the gently-rising hill, the easy-sloping declivity, the natural rivulet, and the miniature lake of artificial creation, are among the diversified objects of this attractive spot. Here are the deep shade of the evergreen tree, and the pure cold water of the perennial fountain, to soothe and refresh the weary and disconsolate. Even solitude’s self may here find retirement, and melancholy her chosen food for meditation. In the capaciousness and diversity of the grounds, and the order of their arrangement, the requirement of every taste will be satisfied. The head of the humble may be laid low in the glen, and the green moss gather the dampness of the grave-stone, or the ashes of the world’s favored ones be mingled with the dust of the hillock, and the sculptured marble upon the mound proclaim the end of earth’s greatness. Sympathies and feelings will select the spot where congenial associations cluster, and that spot will become sacred to affection and the love of virtue. Religion will find here a temple in every green grave, and prayer an altar on every mound. The throng of the idle multitude shall not obtrude within these walks, nor the din of the world’s cares disturb the quiet of these shades, nor the footsteps of business cross the pathway to the tomb, nor the swift heel of pleasure press the bosom of the fresh tenant of the grave.”*

The ancient Christians, following in this respect the customs of the Greeks and Romans, were accustomed to form their burial

* An Address delivered on the consecration of the Worcester Rural Cemetery, September 8th, 1839. By *Levi Lincoln*. Quoted in the *North American Review*, vol. liii, p. 392.

places without the walls of the cities in which they lived, frequently by the side of some public road. The tomb in which the body of our Saviour was laid was without the walls of the ancient city of Jerusalem, though it is within those of the modern city. John xix, 20, 41.

The particular decorations and embellishments that may be considered appropriate for a "rural cemetery" it would be difficult to point out. Indeed, much latitude may here be allowed. While all that is absolutely necessary is a durable fence of some kind to inclose it, with something to mark the lots into which it is divided, we would by no means object to the beautiful gateway of Egyptian architecture at the Mount Auburn Cemetery, nor that of Gothic style at the Green Mountain Cemetery, near Baltimore. We would, however, in this, as in everything else, be careful to avoid falling into that spirit of extravagance which has recently been the curse of our country. The introduction of trees and shrubbery has ever been considered appropriate in ordinary places of burial, and it must be especially so in large public cemeteries, where art and nature are made to unite to give beauty and attractiveness to the scene. But we much doubt the propriety of making such a place "a complete Arboretum Americanum," though this would of itself certainly be "delightful to the lover of nature, and useful in a high degree to the student of natural history."* The utility of an "Arboretum Americanum" we most certainly have no desire to call in question, but we should strongly object to have a public cemetery literally converted into one.

But what shall we say to the plan of resorting to popular novels for interesting scenes from which to draw the material for suitable embellishments for the burial places of our friends! Says our author,—

"It (Laurel Hill Cemetery) is a place of many rural charms, and is furnished, in addition to the receiving tomb usual in such places, with a mansion, chapel, superintendent's cottage, green-house, gardener's and porter's lodges, and shrubbery. It is also ornamented with statues of 'Old Mortality' and his pony, and of Sir Walter Scott, cut from a quarry in New-Jersey, by the celebrated Thom. The description of 'Old Mortality' in the 'Tales of my Landlord' is faithfully and felicitously realized in stone, and should furnish to all subsequent proprietors a hint to keep the place in perpetual repair. The figure of Sir Walter is one of the two full-length statues of the great author extant in stone, and is pronounced an excellent likeness."—P. 398.

* Address of D. A. White, Esq., at the consecration of the Harmony Grove Cemetery, near Salem, Mass.

At the risk of being pronounced destitute of taste, and of failing properly to appreciate works of art, we cannot hesitate to say that, in our opinion, to place such a group in such a situation, savors quite too little of Christianity to be considered appropriate. We say nothing here of the moral character of the great "author of Waverley," nor of his personages, whether real or imaginary, "Old Mortality and his pony" included; it is sufficient that the associations likely to be called up by such a view would accord little with the feelings of the pious and contemplative mind, when entering the place where lie the remains of those loved ones who have gone before us to their reward. Though the writings of this great man everywhere display his masterly power and skill, and cannot be read but with astonishment at his genius, yet the painful truth must ever be present that his great talents were used, not to reform mankind and improve their condition, but by pandering to a depraved appetite for fiction, to secure to himself the applause of the world, and a munificent share of its goods. Now, to us it would seem that the statue of Alexander or Napoleon would be as appropriate in such a place as that of Sir Walter; and any one, or all of them, would be highly improper, as tending to inspire no sentiment in accordance with the sublime hopes and aspirations of Christianity.

But though we are obliged to dissent from our author on some points, on the whole we find much more to approve in his article than to condemn. The following remarks on "the appropriate rites and modes of burial" seem to us to require a little modification.

"And first, the funeral should, in our opinion, be brief, and as private as the circumstances of the case will allow. The religious exercises should be condensed, comprehensive, and strictly in keeping with the person, place, and occasion. None but the immediate relatives and near friends, and those who really mourn, should be present at the service. The house of the mourners should be kept as quiet and free from the intrusion of strangers as possible, for they need to be alone who are attempting to gather up their religious resources, and reconcile their hearts, by degrees, to the now remediless blank that is left in the circle of their affections. Let it not become a sort of temporary bazar, where undertakers, and tailors, and mantua-makers, and milliners, *et id genus omne*, do congregate, to consult upon the last fashion that the "mockery of wo" has assumed. Let not the house, as we have before intimated, if funerals *must* be solemnized there, be disturbed in all its interior arrangements, to make room for a vacant crowd, who come as to an exciting spectacle. Let the funeral itself be simple, disfigured with no dark pomp and parade, nor long procession of nodding plumes; and let the shocking mummery of hired mourners, whether bipeds or

quadrupeds, be shunned as an abomination. In a word, let all things be done simply, fitly, quietly, reverently, and with an utter rejection of all idle show and empty pageantry."—P. 400.

Before remarking upon the recommendations contained in this extract, we would inquire what the writer means by a person's "gathering up his religious resources" in a time of affliction! Does he consider religion as a kind of appendage, which is to be "gathered up," and used only on special occasions?

That funeral services should be in a sense private, we are not disposed to dispute; that is, no means should be adopted to induce a general attendance; but it seems to us that all should be freely admitted who are disposed thus to show their respect for the dead, and their sympathy for the living. True, we would have none there who "do not really mourn;" but we would not say by our practice that none could "really mourn," except those whom the customs of society require to put on the habiliments of mourning.

To our author's remarks on the propriety of having everything done "simply" and "quietly," we give our most hearty assent; and we wish he had expressed a direct opinion upon the practice that prevails in many parts of the country of tolling the bell of some neighboring church, while the funeral procession is moving to and from the place of burial. But in this also we suspect we should find his opinion coinciding with our own against the practice; for how else can the funeral be conducted "simply" and "quietly?" The practice, no doubt, originated in the laudable design not only to show respect to the dead, but also to remind the living of their mortality; but it may be seriously questioned whether it ought to be continued. To our mind it partakes quite too much of show and parade to be agreeable, while the frequency of the occurrence, in every place where the population is considerable, deprives it entirely of any impressiveness it might otherwise have. We would not, however, be understood to object to this method of expressing the public grief on extraordinary occasions, as in the case of the death of some one who has been eminent perhaps for his virtues, and for his services in promoting the public weal, with whom the community is well acquainted, and in whose departure the whole community sympathizes. This, and other means of expressing the public regard for exalted worth, may often be very appropriate, but it can be only in extraordinary cases.* What shall we say then to the practice of sounding the bell on the occasion

* While engaged in preparing this article, we happened, by the purest accident, to take from the shelf the London Evangelical Magazine for the year

of every funeral that happens, provided the friends of the deceased can by any means raise the dollar to pay the bell-ringer's fee? Is it not evident that the original design of the custom is entirely lost sight of, and that it dwindles down into a mere matter of parade?

Within a recent period, considerable has been said against the practice of putting on mourning in case of the death of a relative; and some have even gone so far as to make it a matter of principle to refrain from and oppose it. To us this seems to be giving it too much importance. The chief arguments we have heard urged against it are, that it fosters a love of show, and, in the case of the indigent, often occasions an expense that cannot be well afforded, to both of which it is admitted some importance is to be attached. But are they sufficient to require a total abandonment of the practice? We think not;—but “let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind.” The practice of putting on mourning, or making some change in the dress ordinarily worn, on the occasion of the death of near relatives, is of very ancient origin, it having been common among the Israelites, and other ancient nations. The primitive church, though generally very cautious how they permitted the usages of the heathen nations to spring up among them, seem to have adopted this without controversy; thus showing that they saw nothing in it contrary to the spirit of their religion. From all this it is evident, we think, that the practice finds support in principles too deeply seated in our nature to be easily overthrown; and being liable to so slight objections, it may well be questioned whether it should be seriously interfered with.

The writer's arguments in favor of interment or inhumation, instead of entombment, we commend to the reader's serious consideration.

1820, and opened at the following, connected with a brief memoir of the individual referred to:—

“The Rev. Dr. Henry Kollock is no more! He died last night, and in the departure of *such* a man, a chasm is left in the community of which he has long been a distinguished member, which will not be easily supplied. It is due to his exalted character, that no evidence of respect should be omitted, but on the contrary, that more than common tokens should be offered. I therefore request that the shops be shut up, and all business suspended, that the community may thus evince how sincerely they mourn for a man who was an ornament to society, alike distinguished for talents and for goodness.

“T. U. P. CHARLTON, *Mayor*” (of Savannah, Ga.)

All this, no doubt, was very proper, and accorded well with public sentiment at the time; but it was only the high standing of the individual that made it so.

"In the next place, we must say, though we are aware that opinions differ on the subject, that the *earth* is the proper place for the remains of the dead, and not a tomb or vault above or beneath it. In other words, they should be interred or inhumed, not entombed. There is beauty in the thought of Cicero, that we thus commit them to the protection of a mother.* 'What can be happier,' says Cyrus† to his children, 'than that my body should mingle with that earth which is the common giver of all things good?' We sympathize entirely with Laertes in his direction respecting the remains of his sister Ophelia:

'Lay her in the earth;
And from her fair and unpolluted flesh
May violets spring.'

"Why should we wish to preserve the unsightly and necessarily offensive relics of our departed friends? We can scarcely picture to ourselves a more disgusting scene than that of a cadaver of any kind; that, for example, of the Capuchins near Palermo, which is the most famous in the world, where two thousand dead bodies are set up, habited in their accustomed dress, exhibits a spectacle of diversified hideousness. And yet this is but a mitigated form of the horrid reality as it must exist elsewhere, since desiccation here arrests decay. The corpse of Carlo Borromeo, which lies in a crypt in the cathedral of Milan, decked out in all its ghastliness, with fine clothes and ornaments, is another shocking mode of preservation. The Egyptians had some excuse for their extreme care in preserving the bodies of their dead, in their peculiar notions of metempsychosis, thinking that they might thus retard the departure of the soul on its long series of transmigrations, or keep its pristine body ready for its reception on its return. The Romans cut off a finger from the corpse, partly, as is supposed, that they might have something that once made a portion of the deceased, in the practice of their parentations, or renewed funeral rites at the burial place of their friends. But why men of this day, who have not the poor excuse of such superstitions to plead, should wish to preserve, or even render accessible, the decayed, and debased, and unsightly fragments of what were once their friends, is to us inconceivable. Could we, even by a word, arrest that process of decay, by which the elementary principles of our bodies, loosened from the control of the mysterious principle of life, are allowed to obey their natural affinities, and hasten to dissolution, we would not utter it. Could our departed friends speak to us, would they desire such a disgusting preservation as this? No. When the spirit has gone to God who gave it,—let 'dust go down to dust, earth to earth, ashes to ashes,'—and no matter how soon. Only let it be in a spot in harmony with the recollections of our friends, as they were, and were to us when living. Let it be in retirement, away from the noise and bustle of towns and streets, and all the gairish show of life. Let it be under the open sky and in the free air. Let it be amidst the 'inexpressible beauty of trees' and shrubs. Let it be among the harmonies, and beauties, and sublimities of rural nature. Let it be

* De Legibus, ii.

† Xenophon's Cyropedia, viii, 5.

set apart and inclosed, as our living homes are, from vulgar intrusion. Let it be adorned with the appropriate tributes of taste and feeling, and the spot, the spot is memorial enough for us. The ghastly and loathsome image of what was once beautiful and lovely, would only serve to interrupt the trains of thought which we most wish to cherish when we think of those who were once here.

* * * * *

"We only add to this part of our subject, that, by the establishment of rural cemeteries, the only excuse that has speciousness in it in favor of tombs and vaults, that of gathering into proximity and preserving together the remains of families and friends, is done away, since the 'secure possession' of a lot for a burial place affords every facility for this purpose that can be desired. On the whole, we cannot but think, upon consideration of all the facts, that the comparatively modern, and in many respects objectionable practice of entombment will be done away, and that the ancient, and on all accounts preferable method of inhumation, or interment in graves, will take its place."—Pp. 401–403.

In the Mount Auburn Cemetery many tombs have been constructed, but the further continuance of the practice, we are informed, is prohibited except in certain cases.

Our extracts have, perhaps, already become too lengthy, but we cannot in justice omit introducing a few lines from our author's remarks on the subject of epitaphs. Says he,

"Among the millions of epitaphs that have been devised and carved on solid stone, there are a very few that are barely tolerable, while many are marked with decided silliness and affectation, and many others are so quaint and ridiculous as to find their more appropriate place in jest-books. We have before us a thick folio volume devoted to 'ancient funeral monuments in Great Britain, Ireland, and the islands adjacent,' which is filled with their inscriptions, and we have not seen a single one of the whole that is entitled to any special commendation, while there are not a few which fall under the categories last stated. We remember to have seen, many years ago, five whole volumes full of American epitaphs, collected by a countryman of ours, which is open to a similar remark. Of the multitude of inscriptions of the various cemeteries near Paris, including *Père la Chaise*, there are very few, as it seems to us, that are unexceptionable. They comprise, not unfrequently, touching expressions of human tenderness, love, and disappointed hope; . . . but among many hundreds, there is scarcely a distinct recognition of a Christian's hope, or so much as an allusion to the great verities of a Christian's faith."—Pp. 404, 405.

Next in absurdity to frivolous and inappropriate sentiment in an inscription on a sepulchral monument, is a long prosaic history of the dust which reposes beneath it; and especially is it so if the inscription is put in the Latin language, as is often the case. The pious St.

Pierre expresses himself on this subject with some force as well as quaintness. Speaking of the practice of depositing the remains of the great beneath churches, which he wishes to reform, he says, "The principal obstacle to this reform in our police proceeds from the great and the rich, who, seldom disposed to crowd the church in their life-time, are eager for admission after death, that the people may admire their splendid *mausolea*, and their virtues portrayed in brass and marble. But thanks to the allegorical representations of our artists, and to the Latin inscriptions of our literati, the people know nothing about the matter; and the only reflection which they make at the sight of them is, that all this must have cost an enormous sum of money; and that such a vast quantity of copper might be converted, to advantage, into porridge pots!"*

In general, all that we wish to see inscribed upon a tomb-stone is the name of the person, with the date of his birth and death, to which may often be added a word indicating his profession, or any particular work for which he or she was distinguished. Thus, in the case of a minister of the gospel, or a physician, the profession should be indicated, and the same may be said of an officer of the army or navy. So on Commodore Macdonough's monument it is said, with perfect propriety, that "he was distinguished in the world as the hero of Lake Champlain." In case the person had attained very great distinction, even a reference to such particulars may be omitted. What, for instance, could be more beautiful than the inscription on the tomb-stone of the mother of Washington!

MARY, THE MOTHER OF WASHINGTON.

Here it is evident not a word could be added, nor a date, without injuring the effect; and yet even in this extreme case, most persons on reading the above are spontaneously inclined to look for the dates of her birth and death on another face of the monument.

But it is only on the monuments of persons of very great distinction that an inscription of this kind would be proper. To put such an inscription on the monument of a person seems to be assuming that his history is familiar with the world, and all that is needed is his name merely engraved upon it, to enable the passing stranger to identify it. The inscription, therefore, simply of the name of "Spurzheim," upon his monument in the Mount Auburn Cemetery, we think is not in good taste, as it savors too much of affectation, in assuming for him a fame, which, great as he confessedly was, does not belong to him.

In our view, the addition of a short text of Scripture, expressive

* Studies of Nature, vol. ii, p. 201.

of some of the sublime hopes of Christianity, after the name of the person and date of his birth and his age, is very appropriate; and even a verse of poetry may sometimes, though seldom, be admissible.

We close our remarks on this interesting subject, by expressing our thanks to the writer of this article in the North American Review, for the valuable information he has afforded us, and recommending it to the reader's perusal.

ART. V.—*Oratory.*

MUCH as men admire eloquence, its cultivation is generally neglected. While the art of writing is almost universally studied, for ornament and utility, few pursue with corresponding ardor the art of speaking. So many failures have occurred in the attempt, and so rare have been the instances of eminent success, that men have usually been contented to admire in others what seemed to be denied to them.

False notions have exaggerated the real difficulties to be overcome. Oratory has been styled "the gift of nature," by which is meant, that it is the innate endowment of a favorite order of minds. By others it has been regarded as a fortuity, the product of an occasional concurrence of circumstances. In either case, it is placed beyond the reach of the ordinary aspirant.

It is true, that geniuses have arisen in this, as in all departments, whose extraordinary endowments have given them superior natural advantages; and occasionally they have burst upon the world as though they were the creations of the exigency which called them forth, and required their masterly powers; but such examples are rare, even compared with those who have obtained *a like eminence* under greater embarrassments, and in a less distinguished way. A few such instances of native oratorical gifts should by no means justify the sweeping conclusion that the orator is born—not made.

Most men are known to be at times eloquent, without pretending to be so; and why deny them the cultivation of what they casually attain when their heads are clear, and their hearts warm? Indeed, as we share in common, to some extent, the requisite faculties—as these faculties are found to be susceptible of great improvement—and as the prodigies of eloquence are known, in some cases, to have been prodigious in its study, we may safely infer that the foundation for this attainment is laid in the human

economy, and that from ordinary constitutional elements education can produce the finished orator.

The suggestive mind is already disposed to inquire, What are the requisites to perfection in this art? On this question our further remarks are intended to bear.

I. In attempting to give the constituents of the oratorical character we shall purposely omit the intellectual and moral endowments necessary; confining ourselves to those which relate to the expression of the passions in delivery. The object of all public speaking is to *persuade*, or, which is the same thing, to influence the will. This can never be done but through the medium of the passions. No one, therefore, whatever his theme or purpose—if he does not speak utterly at random—can fail to address them in some form. By exciting these active principles of our nature, he first interests us in his subject, so as to secure our attention; and he utterly fails to induce us to act, until he has aroused and taken them captive by his persuasive powers. It is a *secondary* part of his work, though it may be equally necessary, to convince the judgment that what he recommends will answer the desire he has awakened, and may be wisely and safely pursued in the way he prescribes.

Such is the philosophy of persuasion, and it gives great importance to a good delivery, to the difficulty of attaining which may be chiefly attributed the neglect of the art. Elocution—in which term we comprise all that pertains to delivery—is the chief characteristic of oratory, and the source of its acknowledged influence over the mind. This is seen in the most common-place intercourse between man and man. The voice of an animated speaker in common conversation instantly arrests attention, while that of an ordinary reader is unheeded, or soon wearies us. An earnest harangue will interest and affect a promiscuous audience more than a recited discourse of superior merit. The simple tale of a personal sufferer is far more touching than the embellished relation of the mere spectator. Why this difference? Nature furnishes the answer. She has her own mode of communication, and this is perfect. It follows, that the nearer we approach the natural manner, the more eloquent will be our address, and entire conformity to it would be the perfection of oratory. Hence the importance of elocution as a science. It proposes to detect and rectify, with discrimination and care, every aberration from the original standard—to combine the signs of passion with the signs of ideas—and direct in the cultivation and exercise of the requisite faculties.

In calling attention more directly to the endowments which are essential to the orator, we must first consult the human constitution. Here we shall find that the all-wise Creator has established a natural language, of the simplest construction, but admirably ingenious and useful. It is founded on this well-known law of our nature, that, "from the intimate connection between the soul and the body, every agitation in the former produces a visible effect upon the latter."

These external indications appear in the *countenance, gestures, and voice*. They are strikingly expressive of the passions which produce them, and occur with the strictest uniformity. They are, therefore, instantly understood by the observer, and as readily excite corresponding emotions. "For as in water face answereth to face, so does the heart of man to man."

This language of nature the orator must have at command. It is a rare qualification, but the secret of some of the mightiest achievements which eloquence can boast. And here we acknowledge that much depends on a richly-endowed constitution. All are not equally favored with that concurrence of choice qualities which gives to genius its singular capabilities. A commanding figure, an open and expressive countenance, with a happy accuracy in the formation of the nicer organs, are no mean accompaniments to an exalted and well-furnished mind. For, if the material mechanism is to be the medium of communication to "the inner man," then how great advantage must the perfection of the instrument give to the artist?

How various the expressions which play lightly over the mirror-like face, or repose on its yielding texture? Each feature bears its part in the dramatic representation. The lip must rise with scorn, or shrink with grief—the cheek crimson with shame or anger, the ear turn at the voice of jealousy or fear, and the eye pass through every phase of brilliancy, from the dumb look of mopish melancholy to the vivacity of celestial joy.

The gestures of which the body is capable are equally the promptings of passion, and add largely to the vocabulary of nature. The movements of the head are dignified and characteristic. Veneration is expressed by bowing it: arrogance by throwing it back. It is depressed by humility, elevated by joy, and inclined on one side by languor or despondency. Its more violent motions are exceedingly forcible and commanding. The expressions of the arm and hand are yet more various and common; and even the foot, in its application singly to the purpose of gesturing, or in giving attitude and dignity to the entire figure, is no mean auxi-

liary. It has been said of a living orator that the manner in which he takes or changes his position on the floor is eloquent, and heightens the effect of his thrilling execution.

But it is on the *voice* that the orator must chiefly rely. This grand endowment requires those finely-wrought organs, which give to it volume, force, and modulation. Let it not be supposed that the articulation of words is the only service it is to render. It is the instrument of passion as well as thought. By distinct and significant sounds—corresponding to certain signs—the several passions are betrayed; and when these sounds reach the ear simultaneously with the appeals of the looks and gestures to the eye, the effect is irresistible. There is often heard from the finished and cultivated organs of voice, in harmony with articulated speech, an undertone of emotion, constituting an exquisite accompaniment to the leading measure of eloquence.

The orator must also learn that even silence may be eloquent, more expressive than words, more thrilling than action. The sequestered vale, the pathless wood, the echoless summit, and “old ocean’s gray and melancholy waste,” are more eloquent of God in their speechless grandeur than though they had a thousand voices to ring his name, and proclaim his praise. *Sometimes an impressive reference to a profound or sublime subject may be made with the best effect.* There is a knowledge too high for us, and he was eloquent who said, “I cannot attain unto it.” The apostle heard things in the third heaven unlawful to utter, and the announcement of the secret is more eloquent than an unequal disclosure would have been. The conduct of Job and his three friends who sat down together seven days and seven nights, and none spake a word unto him, is more eloquent of their mutual anguish than all their subsequent complainings. *Intense feeling often paralyzes energy, and refuses any active expression.* The Bible refers to a joy unspeakable, groans which cannot be uttered, and a voiceless praise. Grief has no tongue to proclaim its keenest sorrows. Despair is speechless and torpid. Horror is dumb. Any attempt at expression by motion, sound, or verbal communication, abates the violence of these passions, and diminishes sympathy. The rhetorical pause is therefore founded in nature; and, when properly observed, is like its original—silent eloquence.

II. Having glanced at the natural powers requisite to delivery, we proceed to consider the cultivation they require.

Any cultivation of these native endowments has often been strenuously opposed. It is said, that in attempting to improve we shall but pervert nature; that the speaker will be trammelled by

rules, become *affected* in manner, and lose his native fervor and force, under the training of art. This alarm is founded on a two-fold error. It is assumed that the pupil will be natural without instruction and correction; and that the cultivation proposed is founded on arbitrary principles and rules. Both these assumptions are fallacious.

When we say to the young orator, "Be natural," we give him a lesson which he cannot even comprehend without study, and we task him to a work of long and difficult practice. Who has not marked the tendency, even in our experienced speakers, in a set address, to exchange the natural for an artificial manner; and what an utter sacrifice of its simple and agreeable attributes is generally made by the unpracticed declaimer? Nor does habit and experience avail much toward improving him, for though his growing self-possession may render him less awkward, great defects will remain. He may the less offend, but will hardly better follow nature.

The resemblance which startled the celebrated painter, Benjamin West, when he first saw the Apollo on canvass, between that paragon of the art and a young Mohawk, shows how true genuine art is to nature. Perhaps it was in such an original as the obscure son of the forest that the painter found his Apollo, and transferred him to the canvass. And could an equally perfect orator be found in nature, elocution would acknowledge his perfection, and make him her model. But this is not to be expected. There are causes which are always acting upon the human constitution in respect to both mind and body, which materially affect the oratorical character. This is especially true in civilized life, and more so in modern than in primitive times. The physical and mental powers suffer even in childhood, by the restraints unwisely imposed, the inveterate customs to which we are bound, and the enervating luxuries by which we are reduced to effeminacy and inaction. With such disadvantages the young aspirant undertakes an art which requires the utmost symmetry, vigor, and vivacity.

In addition to this, the want of early elementary culture, and the tendency to servile imitation, militate yet more against the completeness of the oratorical character. The education to which it is subjected is generally too superficial and inconstant to counteract the casual influences by which it suffers and increases the evils which a wiser course would prevent. It is not strange, then, that with the exception of an occasional genius, who, by a systematic and thorough course of training, has overcome the depravities of

manner, and repaired the damages of his injured system, restoring his powers to their original tone and freedom, we have no exemplars of natural eloquence superior to the untutored savage.

But we have yet more convincing and conclusive proof of the importance of cultivation—we have the example of adepts in the art, of both ancient and modern times. It is preposterous, and even unkind, to decry this effort at improvement, when all experience attests its value. What may seem to the moved, but uninitiated multitude the outbursts of inspired feeling, poured forth in the richest diction, attended by the charm and force of a faultless delivery, and carried with singular appropriateness to a definite point, has cost, perhaps, the continuous application of years, and been elaborated by the most prodigious labor.

Demosthenes is considered a perfect orator; yet his first public effort was a mortifying failure. Hissed from the bema by a fastidious audience, he retired in disgrace, but not in despair. He set about repairing the defects which were so offensive to his countrymen. By declaiming on the sea-shore, in the roar of winds and waves, he improved a weak voice until it could be heard amidst the tumult of the populace. He practiced before a mirror, until there was a nice adjustment of his action, and even of his dress, to the most critical taste. He studied under teachers of elocution, disdaining no advantage which his inferiors in intellect might furnish, in addition to those of his own projecting.

The renowned Cicero caught the echoes of expiring eloquence in the schools of Greece, and is regarded the *rival*, if not the superior, of her prince of orators. With unusual native talents and extensive scholarship, he pursued the study and practice of elocution nearly forty years before he assured himself of having acquired its highest accomplishments.

First among modern orators unquestionably stands *Patrick Henry*. He, of all men of the class, seemed least indebted to factitious means, and was regarded so independent of them, as to be styled “nature’s own orator.” But he owed more to study and forethought than his cotemporaries supposed. His early life, which was idle and unpromising, was alone distinguished by the habit of watching the working of the passions, and detecting the motives of human conduct. For this purpose he drew around him groups of the companionable, and engaged them in conversation on excitable topics, which at that time were readily furnished, while he sat a cool and careful observer of their impassioned manner. In this way did this great genius indicate the drift of

his hidden reflections, and lay the foundation for his subsequent feats of eloquence.

That prodigy of the pulpit, the great and good Whitefield, was probably never suspected by his hearers of observing the punctilios of delivery, and subjecting himself to severe and systematic disciplining. Yet his late biographer assures us, that though he always appeared so rapt and artless in the desk, he was, nevertheless, a close student of manner, and could not attain his highest power until he had perfected the address of a sermon, by thirty or forty repetitions, before his large and excitable congregations.

It will have been inferred, from the above examples, that elocution requires both *study and practice* in advancing the pupil. In his studies he must seek an intimate acquaintance with the human passions, then exciting causes, prevailing tendencies, and modes of expression—a familiarity with which is absolutely necessary to him who would sweep these strings of the soul with a master's hand. Something may be learned from those books which treat of them scientifically or sentimentally; and of the latter class the Bible is the undisputed head, a perfect history and epitome of every variety of eloquence.

But the orator must not *depend* on books. He must be a man of observation as well as reflection. He must mingle in society, and

“Catch the living manners as they rise.”

He must read his own heart, which, besides being a world in miniature, is a school, always accessible, and will never fail to furnish novel and instructive lessons.

In connection with this class of studies there must be a well-directed and severe exercise of the corresponding powers of expression.

The voice, which is our main dependence, and the most liable to suffer for the want of caution and culture, has been commonly left unstudied and untrained. Yet, when cultivated, it has been found susceptible of great improvement—of gathering flexibility, sweetness, and strength from appropriate training. If musicians cultivate it with so much care and labor, why should the speaker neglect it? Its capabilities are equally developed, and thrilling in elocution, as in melody. “The voice of song is not sweeter than the voice of eloquence.” The frequent utterance, or explosion of the elementary sounds of the English tongue, is said to be all-powerful in improving the organs of speech, giving a clear and sonorous articulation, and rendering the voice soft and manageable.

Let us not complain of this wonderful instrument until we have tuned and mastered it. We shall then learn its surprising power, and, with the practiced vocalist, be able to apply any note in its mighty scale, from the softest whisper to the full, round thunder tone—without yielding its sweetness or exhausting its energy.

In the expression of passion by the countenance and gesture, practice can only make perfect. The ancients gathered these expressions from observation, and reduced them to an art, which was taught in their schools. The perfection of their pantomime exhibitions shows their remarkable success. These mute representations of the passions were carried to such an extravagant pitch, and produced such an effect upon the eager populace, as ultimately to be prohibited by law. It is notorious that even now a long and tedious apprenticeship is required to fit the actor for the borrowed part he is to execute in the drama, to the satisfaction of the theatre-going community. The unimpassioned gesticulations and grimaces which frequently appear on the rostrum, the stage, and in the desk, have evidently tended to bring this means of expression into disrepute. But he is unfortunate, indeed, who, with high persuasive powers, from ignorance or prejudice, seeks to give his countenance the fixed and single expression, and his figure the stiff and unmeaning frigidity of a statue.

III. We should not perfect our idea of the orator in delivery without suggesting some hints in respect to his diction or style.

Language, though not the gift of nature, is so readily acquired by imitation, that, even in childhood, a mental vocabulary is formed equal to its wants, and highly significant of the various feelings by which it is constantly animated. By almost as easy and rapid a process is the orator furnished with words, though they must be subjected to severer tests, and used in more complicated connections. *His diction, too*, will be governed by the impassioned mind, and will indicate his moral no less than his intellectual strength and culture. The fervor of his spirit will beget a simple, bold, and forcible style, corresponding beautifully with the unsophisticated language of nature.

The speaker's style, even above that of the writer, should be distinguished by *perspicuity* and *energy*. By *perspicuity*—for while the writer allows us to dwell on his pages, or revolve his thoughts, the speaker occupies each moment with new developments, and hurries us on without intermission to the end of his discourse. By *energy*—because, while a feebly-written book may be endured for the sake of its novel or useful details, a dull speech is insufferable, and fails to answer its ostensible purposes.

To perspicuity the orator should give the greater care, for the plain reason, that his first object is to be understood, and it may be equally important that he should be readily understood. As has been beautifully said, "The meaning of his discourse should strike the mind as the light of the sun does the eye, though it may not be intently fixed upon it." He may as well speak without meaning as to speak unintelligibly. Should he treat his hearers as thinking beings, they will allow him, for the time, to think for them, a privilege of which he should studiously avail himself. Perhaps no better rule can be adopted to secure this than to adapt his style to theirs; to express himself in nearly the same style in which they think. I say nearly the same, for it may be more pure and elevated, and be equally perspicuous.

The orator's style should be neither coarse nor florid: not too concise—for amplification, and even the repetition of the same idea in other forms, may assist the apprehension of the listener; nor too diffuse—for this will weary the ear, and dissipate feeling, if it does not break the chain of thought. It will not allow of an array of technical or learned terms, where men have neither dictionaries at hand nor the disposition to use them; nor will it incorporate unusual words, high-sounding epithets, or cant phrases, except for the sake of humor or satire, for these are yet more reprehensible, being both obscure and offensive to good taste.

As perspicuity is essential to a discourse, that it may be understood; energy is equally so, that it may be *felt*. Heartless, indeed, must that speaker be who is satisfied with a feeble expression of his sentiments, and thankless will such spiritless efforts be to his audience. Nor are men pleased with the earnest speaker whose style belies his manner—whose gesticulations promise even to tears, what his language fails to convey. He that *really* feels will show nature to better advantage. His heart will prompt him to the use of terms, not only in themselves proper, but adapted to the sentiments he is uttering. And though he may sometimes miss the mark, his bow will never fail to carry, nor his arrows be found pointless. So much may depend on an energetic style, that a word fitly *spoken* has been known to wither an antagonist, or electrify an audience. The stately period, the striking antithesis, the searching interrogation, cannot fail, when they are found to give a strength to composition, and a vivacity to discourse, which a careless style cannot command.

In securing these important qualities in diction, the speaker must depend on his studies rather than on inspiration, and on his

own judgment rather than on the satisfaction exhibited by an ordinary assembly. For it must be confessed that a large class of hearers, like children, admire that which excites their wonder; and the ostentatious speaker may congratulate himself on his amazing powers of eloquence, because of the gaping astonishment it excites, or the breathless curiosity it awakens. Such a conclusion is much like that of the honest, but unwitty preacher, who thought his weeping congregation for once exceedingly affected under his sermon, not observing himself that the house was horribly full of smoke.

IV. In giving the greatest force and effect to delivery, due regard must be had to *method*.

Every one knows how much depends on arrangement in battle, in music, in argument, and in every systematic effort where successive impressions are to be made, and a powerful effect to be ultimately produced. This twofold purpose is to be consulted in the delivery of a discourse. A continuous interest is to be maintained by each new development, and the heart is to be carried by the concentrated power of the whole address. It is far more difficult to show what method is, than to exhibit its importance. The subject must be laid open in a clear and convincing manner: but this is not all. There must be a correspondence between the different parts of the discourse and the feelings of the hearers. No one would think of addressing an audience in the *exordium* of a speech as he would in its *conclusion*. It would have the effect of mere *rant*. For the same reason an appeal out of place will fall powerless; and any irrelevant matter is sure to disconcert an audience, while, at the same time, it dissipates the feelings of the speaker.

Want of method is sufficient to account for the prolixity and feebleness which often amount to a total failure; which will not occur even in the speaker who is most liable to these faults, when driven into a more natural course by a special interest in his subject, or hurried to a conclusion by limited time. If we would carry a point, we must have a point. Every public address should look to a specific end. To accomplish this should be the stern and ardent purpose of the orator; and such unity of purpose will very much govern and improve his arrangement.

The ancients paid great attention to method. Their assemblies required it, and called the speaker to order who wandered from the subject in hand. In this respect the orations of Demosthenes are faultless, while Cicero sometimes forgot his cause in his love for philosophical excursions, which were

always rich and interesting, but detracted from his effective eloquence. When the scholar appeared, the orator sunk.

V. Although this essay has been already too didactic and technical, I cannot forbear guarding against a habit into which, from his very efforts at self-correction, the young orator is peculiarly liable to fall—I mean constant and anxious attention to himself during delivery.

Aside from the embarrassment which such a morbid self-inspection before an audience will occasion, no diversion of the mind can take place without impairing the character of the address. No one can express a passion in the natural manner without feeling it, and being, for the moment at least, entirely possessed by it. How, then, can the speaker feel the various sentiments he is uttering, and represent them in looks, gestures, and tones; or clothe them in the bold, fervent, and pathetic diction prompted by passion, while studiously absorbed in himself? It is impossible. It is a pitiable artifice, at which nature will not connive. An artificial manner is the sure result of such an effort to be natural.

Will not this account for the affectation so frequently seen, which, if not so palpable and excessive as to disgust, renders the speaker a soulless mimic, or an articulating automaton, rather than "a man of like passions" with his hearers? Such surreptitious eloquence may be admired, but is not felt. It leaves the hearer, at the best, an unmoved spectator of the speaker's personal attractions. So far does genuine eloquence differ from this, that "what really affects our feelings, is not at the time perceived to be eloquent." The mind is so fully occupied with the subject forced upon it, and carried so impetuously toward the proposed end of the speaker, that it no more regards the medium by which it is affected, than the recipient of highly-interesting news divides his attention with the personal appearance of the messenger, and the circumstances attending his journey. It has been asserted, and no doubt justly, that "if there could be an absolutely perfect orator, no one would at the time discover that he was so:" and it may be added, he would not discover it *himself*. His sole object being to persuade his hearers, in laboring for that he would *forget himself*, and in yielding to his persuasive eloquence, his hearers would *forget him*.

With this propensity to recur perpetually to himself, the student of manner must struggle. Arising from the love of admiration, and revived by his ardor in the pursuit of the highest attainments in the art, it must give place to intense devotion to his cause. Better feelings must be awakened by nobler motives. Oratory

has higher ends to accomplish than the gratification of pride, or vanity, or even the cultivation of its richest graces. We must not expect instant perfection. Better make a hundred blunders than excel only in negative propriety. But we shall not sacrifice even that in the execution of *more difficult* parts. Careful application in private will furnish correct notions and habits. The perceptions will be quick and vigorous as the feelings warm with delivery, and nature will prompt with happy exactness. The speaker, thrown upon such resources, will hardly fail to combine the force of right words, the point of finished periods, the melody of natural tones, and the charm of spontaneous gestures, with an air of impassioned sincerity, which will render him no less agreeable than effective ; in a word, he will be eloquent.

VI. We now approach the last requisite embraced in our plan of perfecting the orator. It is a noble enthusiasm, a passionate love for the art, inspired by a conception of its ravishing beauties, and its useful and glorious achievements.

Like the fine arts, in general, eloquence was the enthusiasm of the ancients, and never did it flourish as in the palmy days of the Grecian states and the Roman consulate. The popular elevation and influence it attained, was due no less to the taste of the people, than to the ardor and perseverance of their gifted orators. They had few books, but they were deep in the communion of nature. With them the pleasures of taste exceeded the delight of more intellectual exercises. Action was the charm of discourse, and truth was readily carried to the understanding through the smitten heart. This universal estimation in which the art was held awakened a proportionate desire to possess its highest properties and finished graces, and to secure its ample honors and emoluments. It became an essential branch of common education. It grew into a profession. It was the glory of the Grecian ecclesia and the Roman forum, and was by no means neglected in the grove and the camp. It became the stepping stone to promotion, and the universal scale of greatness and power. No wonder that this prevailing passion was carried out in individual instances to the utmost limit of human zeal and ability, leaving unsurpassed models and specimens of eloquence for our surprise and imitation. Nor was this enthusiasm without an object worthy its intensity and captivating power. But for eloquence, Athens would have been tributary to the kingdom of Macedon, with the other states, and Demosthenes an obscure slave. But it rendered the philippics of the resistless orator *more potent* than the arms of his royal antagonist. But for eloquence the insidious Cataline would have

deluged Rome in blood ; but though he defied her stern senate, the traitor fell before the withering denunciations of Cicero. The history of practical eloquence is full of the wonders of the art. Collect them from the annals of all ages, array before you the illustrious exhibitions of its power, trace its distinctive and widespread influence in all the revolutions which have occurred in the political, scientific, and moral world, and, above all, its connection with the propagation and establishment of Christianity, and you will find it touching the hidden springs of human conduct, holding the keys of wealth, swaying the sceptre of government, subduing the waywardness of folly, and everywhere evincing itself the mightiest instrument by which mind may sway its fellow-mind.

But we must have a better order of speakers as the public taste improves, and the popular standard is carried up to the elevation of the best performances. The people will soon discover *who is the orator* ; and nobody is more fastidious, or less patient under disappointment, than the promiscuous assembly. We are becoming enthusiastic on the subject of learning. Thousands are obtaining an education at any expense. But of what use are stores of knowledge, if we have no equal powers of communication ? that the mind has bold conceptions and melting fervors, if the right hand has forgotten its cunning, and the tongue is held in inglorious silence ? Pent up like the fires of an unvented volcano, they will but consume the heart that feeds them, when they might melt and mold the pliant multitude around. Nor can the press supersede, though it may *rival* the orator. It may render him a less important personage than he was before knowledge was circulated through this rapid engine ; but *it* never can assume the higher powers of expression, or occupy many an enviable vantage ground sacred to living eloquence. Like the Daguerreotype, it may present a perfect counterpart of the writer's mind, but two of the mightiest elements of persuasion are wanting, action and voice. Much of this power of the press would be lost upon the reader were not the person of the orator before him in imagination, and his address associated with the imprint of his thoughts.

Men love *oral* eloquence. They court its attractions—they solicit its touch. "The multitude," says a stirring writer, "are ready to swallow anything that comes to them in the shape of oratory. They are hungering and thirsting for it ; they are lifting up their souls for it—to the pulpit, to the bar, to the senate chamber ; they are ready to be instructed, to be moved, to be aroused ; yea, the most obstinate are willing to be enlightened, the most

obdurate to be melted, the dullest to be charmed, if the power and wisdom come in the form of eloquence."

In this enthusiasm, the aspirant after this fascinating power must yet more largely share. Nothing will awaken and feed it like the *pursuit* and *practice* of the art. The pleasures which they yield are of a mental and moral cast, and are as intense as they are refined and diversified. While his severer studies are rather for use than gratification, his habitual researches will be attended with a glow of satisfaction. His observations will extend his ordinary range of thought, surprise him with rich and rare discoveries in every field of investigation, and lead him forth to communion with all that is beautiful, magnificent, and tender in the works of God. Man will rise in his esteem, and his regard will warm into sympathy. A thousand links, instinct with life, will bind him to the human brotherhood. An unction will pervade his soul, akin to inspiration, and dispose him to employ his eminent abilities in every department of truth, justice, benevolence, and piety. And in executing the parts which tell so effectually upon the hearts of others, how rich and satisfying will be his reward. He will himself luxuriate on the entertainment he affords; his mind will expand with each successive effort; his heart grow rapt as his tongue grows eloquent; and the joy of an approving conscience will swell the bliss of a generous nature. With such a passion for oratory, none need despair. It is one of the most powerful impulses to self-improvement, and a sure pre-sage to success. It draws out the man, and reveals his slumbering powers to his awakened consciousness. "You will hear from me," was the reply of a profligate youth on catching an exclamation of despondency from a passing acquaintance; and the reformed inebriate became one of the most eloquent men of the age. The failure of Sheridan, in his maiden speech, before the British parliament, aroused him to a vigorous preparation for the next attempt. When advised to give up oratory, as a hopeless pursuit in his case, he replied, "I know it is *in me*; and I'm determined it shall come out." And it *did* come out, as his subsequent brilliant career attests. Had not Whitefield been driven from the unequal limits of an edifice to the open field, he had probably never attained that soul-compelling eloquence which gave him the sweep of continents for his parish, and untold thousands as the "seals of his ministry."

Rome, N. Y.

ART. VI.—*A Course of Lectures on the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States. Delivered annually in Columbia College, New-York.* By WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, LL.D., late President of that Institution. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1843.

If the motto which the learned president has prefixed to his Lectures be true to the fullest extent; if it be "necessary that every citizen should understand the commonwealth;" and if by understanding be meant any very minute, or even any general knowledge of its fundamental principles, then very deplorable indeed is the situation of commonwealths, and very precarious their destinies. How few, for example, are there among the millions who exercise the right of suffrage in these United States who have any idea of the true nature of our government! The political acquirements of the body of voters consist of a few watchwords of faction, passing through their lips, and ringing in their ears. Blinded by the arts of partisans, and soothed by the flatteries of demagogues, they receive these watchwords as axioms of government which cannot be denied, and which they will not suffer even to be doubted: they think, as thought the church of the Laodiceans, that "they are rich, and increased with goods, and have need of nothing; and know not that they are wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked." It is fortunate for republics that a universal knowledge of their fundamental constitutions is not necessary. But if it be not necessary that the foundation and constitution of republican governments should be universally known, it is important that a sound knowledge of them should be as widely extended as is practicable; and he who contributes to the propagation of sound constitutional principles in any degree, is in that degree a benefactor of the commonwealth. There are few, indeed, to whom the elevated and pure principles of our government can be minutely communicated; but these few will take with them the precious seed, and sow it throughout the land; and to this dissemination of knowledge among the people, this constant keeping alive of truth, we must trust for the safety of the commonwealth; and in these it will find safety in spite of the haughtiness of democratical pride, the selfish artifices of politicians, the false adulation of demagogues, and the ignorance and arrogance which so largely pervade representative assemblies.

The period at which these sound principles may be most advantageously implanted is undoubtedly the season of youth; and

the learned lecturer, in his high office as president of Columbia College, wisely judged that the education of an American student was singularly incomplete if he went forth from that renowned and venerable seat of learning imbued with all the lore of republican Greece and Rome, and yet ignorant of the principles of republican America; and in applying his own experience and attainments to remedy this evil, he has enabled the graduates of that institution to apply the advantages (and those advantages are not few) of an accomplished classical education to the general benefit of our beloved country. He has not only done this, but he has produced a work which elucidates, in a compact and convenient form, the general provisions of our federal Constitution, with a commentary, sufficiently extensive to be useful in schools and colleges, and not so formidable in bulk as to terrify the general reader; and we hope we do not exhibit the vanity already condemned by us, in saying, that in having conferred this benefit upon our country, he has conferred a benefit upon the world.

It is not our design to go into a critical examination of this work, nor would it be possible to do justice to it in an article of this description. To comment on a commentary would require a volume. Our object is to call attention to this subject; to induce a study of the Constitution, and of the history of the country before the Constitution; and with this view, we will offer some very brief remarks in relation to the objects had in view in adopting the federal Constitution, and the means which have been used to secure its permanent duration.

The struggles of the American colonies, which commenced fairly in 1765, and terminated in 1783 in an entire separation from the parent country, left the then states in a condition of entire exhaustion. The long agony of a conflict which, protracted through nearly twenty years, had comprehended the active energies of an entire generation, and left those old whom it had found young, had greatly endeared to the people the rights and immunities for which they had been so long contending; and their attachment had increased just in proportion to the desperate and deadly character of the strife. They had risked their lives and their fortunes to preserve rights, without which they regarded life as valueless, and which they declared to be inseparable from freedom, and incapable of alienation. The peace of 1783 proclaimed the triumph of their noble efforts. The people of the thirteen states, united by their compact of confederation, by that union alone had been able to struggle against almost hopeless odds: and when, at the conclusion of the contest, they found themselves

a nation become of age, arrived at maturity, in full possession of their birthright, even then, feeble, panting, and exhausted, they lay upon the battle-field, faint and breathless, scarcely able to lay hold of and secure the rights which they had so heroically maintained. One thing they could see, that the union which had been their hope, had likewise been their strength; and when after three or four years the ligaments of the feeble confederation, which had served to keep them together, became untwisted, and decayed, and fell off; they felt, especially the wise, and moderate, and discreet among them, that without a reunion, although they might stagger onward for awhile, yet they soon would fall, and perish amidst the wreck and ruin of establishments, to support which they had endured so many sufferings, and overcome so many difficulties. The state governments being, so far as their domestic concerns were implicated, so many petty sovereignties, might indeed be capable of meeting present exigences, and supporting for awhile their internal police; but they were, as an ingenious writer of the day described them, like a barrel composed of loose staves, without the confinement of a hoop—liable at any moment to fall into ruins. Their liberties they had achieved; their cherished hereditary institutions they had sustained: but how were they to preserve them, and insure their perpetuity? Their Articles of Confederation, which they had fondly declared to be perpetual and indissoluble, except by unanimous consent, had fallen to pieces, and lay a wreck at their feet; and it was only by forming “a more perfect union” that the “people of the United States” could “establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty for themselves and their posterity.” Such were the views and such the words of our wise forefathers: not for *themselves alone*, but for *themselves and their posterity*. It was not enough for them to have assumed the responsibilities, and vindicated the rights of freemen; their work was incomplete until they had devised some effectual means for transmitting those rights and responsibilities (for they cannot be separated) to future and remote ages. Out of this origin arose that magnificent fabric of political wisdom, the Constitution of the United States. We wish that we could communicate to the mind of every citizen of this vast republic the deep and rooted sentiment of admiration, of reverence, of strong attachment, and if the expression could be allowed, we would say, of love, which fills our own bosom, when we contemplate this splendid monument of sound sagacity and statesmanlike patriotism; and we wish that we could transfuse into every heart the

deep indignation that pervades our own, when we see weakness, or wickedness, or faction, or prejudice, presume to raise its feeble weapons against this mighty, and, we hope, enduring bulwark of rational and tested principles of freedom.

The grand object of the union was to secure the blessings of civil liberty to the then existing generation ; to transmit them unimpaired to their posterity, and to provide as far as was practicable for their perpetuity. From time immemorial the people of these states, and their progenitors, had enjoyed those blessings ; and, by comparing their own institutions and customs with other countries, they knew how to value them. True it was, that these institutions had been enjoyed under a form of government possessing a hereditary executive, and a hereditary aristocracy : but since they had been transplanted from their native island to the virgin and vigorous soil of this vast western continent, those same customs and institutions had grown as strongly and had flourished as well here, without the aid of those hereditary forms. The experiment of their capability for existing without those forms had been therefore fully tried, and had been found successful : and when the states threw off the forms of royalty, and of a hereditary council or upper house, they rejected names, not substances ; for they had for many years been governed by temporary executives, and a select council supplying the place of a hereditary aristocracy. They retained those identical forms ; they knew they were sufficient for their purposes, perfectly and entirely sufficient ; and as they never had possessed either a resident king or a resident nobility, they became, as a matter of course, as well as of choice, free and independent republics ; and as circumstances made them republicans, and as they loved the republican form of their government, because they had found in kings and nobles not protectors but oppressors ; and as experience taught them, day by day, that a republican constitution was capable of preserving all their hereditary freedom in full and absolute perfection ; and as nature prompted the conviction, and reason sustained it, that republican institutions alone are worthy of the entire respect and reverence of intelligent men, they resolved to preserve their hereditary customs, their inalienable rights, the vindicated majesty of their insulted, but now rescued laws, in the grand but simple garb of unsophisticated republicanism. With this view, having secured the fabrics of free government which they found in the several states erected ready to their hands, and having sustained them by such means as were needful in their new position, they determined to throw a wall of union around the whole, and invest them with a permanence and strength which would com-

mand respect abroad, while it ensured tranquillity at home. The Constitution was not, therefore, as some have inconsiderately called it, a new experiment in government; it was a means of keeping together old governments; and when we hear ourselves stigmatized by European politicians as experimentalists, a proper feeling of self-respect should make us repel the imputation as an unjust and undeserved calumny. It is well known how great prudence, foresight, and mutual forbearance were displayed by the delegates of the federal convention, and the conventions of the several states which eventually unanimously adopted the system recommended to them; and we will now direct your attention to some considerations which the convention of 1787 had in view in especial reference to the permanence of the articles then adopted.

There is no more difficult problem in practical government than to determine the precise time and circumstances when it is lawful and right to alter the fundamental frame-work of society. The design of all political institutions is to secure mutual protection, and promote the universal welfare. When institutions fail in these designs, they can be no longer tolerated. The doctrine of some political casuists, that all governments being of divine institution, cannot and must not be resisted, however inefficient, or however oppressive they may become, cannot be supported by any fair conclusions from Christian teaching, and leads to practical evils that are utterly intolerable. The other extreme, but more popular theory, that the fabric of society may at any time be demolished, and its foundations torn up at the mere volition or caprice of a temporary and fleeting majority, is equally absurd, and leads directly to the most terrific consequences; and we do not now recollect any people who ever deliberately maintained so wild and foolish a notion, except the French in the most ferocious period of their revolutionary excesses. Both of these extreme opinions were equally repugnant to the sound practical good sense of our predecessors; and we cannot be too thankful to that kind Providence which, in a period of so great danger and excitement, enabled the people of this country to avoid these dangerous errors, and to preserve the middle path of reason, moderation, and wisdom. They foresaw that contingencies might arise which might make alterations, perhaps great alterations, needful; they therefore would not close the door against all change except what mere brutal force might compel; neither would they grant a power of change to the mere wishes of a majority, however great, or however respectable that majority might be. They were willing to allow it only after calm and deliberate reflection had produced a conviction of its

necessity ; and they designed that conviction to be of so palpable a nature as to overspread and be acquiesced in by a vast proportion of the people. With these views, the fifth article of the Constitution, providing for future amendments, was carefully and deliberately framed, and we repeat it in order to call it more distinctly to recollection. It is in these words :—

“ The congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall *propose amendments* to this Constitution ; or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for *proposing amendments*, which in either case shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the congress : *Provided*, that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article : and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate.”

It will be observed that almost unanimity is required to effect a change. Should amendments originate in congress, one-third of either house can at any time repel them, although the other should be unanimous ; and should they be called for by the concurring voice of two-thirds of the states, the single veto of the president may crush the application, unless that veto be silenced by the reiterated voice of two-thirds of both houses. Should, however, the required amendments pass through that first ordeal, they may be stopped by the prohibition, *nolumus leges mutare*, of one-fourth of the smallest states ; by a majority of the people sending eight representatives to congress ; by a population represented by five members of congress ; by a population distributed through six states, less in numbers than the population of the city of New-York, not voters, but by a *population* of men, women, and children, of less than three hundred thousand. This is indeed an extreme supposition ; and yet it is a *possible* occurrence. By the deliberate and premeditated design of our government, unanimously acquiesced in by the states, and heartily approved by the people from its foundation to this present time, it may so happen that three hundred thousand persons may crush and annihilate the wishes of seventeen millions. It is indeed very improbable, so very improbable as to be unworthy of serious weight : but it is very probable that two or three millions may almost at any time prevent an amendment, and with the present numbers of the states, it is fairly pre-

sumable that the acquiescence of thirteen or fourteen millions would be necessary to carry through an amendment to the Constitution. It is true, that an ingenious arrangement can show the possibility of altering the government by even a minority of votes. But taking opinions as they run, intermixed throughout the community, the probability is, that the concurrence of thirteen or fourteen millions would be indispensable. And should it happen, as it may at any time, that the mass of the population should be disappointed in any desired change by a very small minority, such is our opinion of the virtue and intelligence of the people, that we do not doubt that they would submit to their disappointment, at first indeed with murmuring, but soon with cheerfulness ; and that after the tumult produced by partisan presses and partisan politicians had subsided, they would extol the justice and wisdom of that provision which protects the sacred rights of the *whole* people against the wishes of a majority of them.

And now we will ask, Is it not *just* that it should be so? The wise sages who framed those articles found it written in their Holy Book, that "the powers that be are ordained of God;" and that we must be obedient unto "the powers that be." They knew that this meant something, and that whatever it did mean, must be an absolute and controlling law to all mankind. They felt that it could not mean passive obedience and non-resistance to any form of government in which Providence in its wisdom might see fit to place mankind, or in which they might be born. For Providence does not design governments to be either inefficient or tyrannical; and they saw that if it were their duty, under this construction, to submit to a government which ordered them to do right, it was equally their duty to submit to a government which might order them to do wrong, and thus to become actual participators in crime, which is positively absurd. They therefore supposed that it meant that Providence had so ordered and disposed those matters (which we term political) of the human race, as to lead men throughout the world to adopt a certain set of usages, habits, and rules, peculiarly suited to the diversified situation, climates, circumstances, and feelings of mankind. That these usages, habits, and rules, consolidated and observed in certain sections or portions of the globe, were called governments or political powers. They observed that there was a certain instinct implanted in the breast of men, which produced an attachment to the particular system in which persons happened to be born or brought up; and that when this attachment exceeded the usual degree, it became, in the opinion of men, a virtue, and was called patriotism. They further observed that there

was no quality which the human race so extravagantly extolled as patriotism. And as patriotism, according to the universal understanding of mankind, was nothing but attachment to the institutions in the midst of which Providence had placed them; and as all these several institutions were ordained by Providence, and admirably adapted to the wants and welfare of the several nations among which they severally prevailed, they saw that the meaning of those declarations and mandates of Scripture was plain: that the various governments and political institutions which men in their vanity suppose they have established, have been disseminated throughout the world by the silent but irresistible energy of the Almighty—an energy imperceptible to humanity in its action; known only in its results: just as the comet, fearfully rapid as is his career, seems still and motionless to the human eye: that being so established, we were ordered to be obedient to them; not in their formalities, but in their substance, their object, their design: that such obedience was not painful, for attachment to their institutions men had dignified by a noble name: and in the exercise of that Christian obedience, it became us to keep in view the general design of government, the general welfare of the community; and therefore to provide, as we might have it in our power, for such gradual or occasional changes as the changing and varying circumstances of humanity might from time to time require. Thus it was that Christianity, nature, and reason, all concurred in attaching us to a beneficent system, the value of which had been tested by centuries of experience; and hence it was that congress, in providing for such prudent alterations as might tend to perpetuate the system, threw every possible obstruction in the way of any material departure from its design. They considered our old hereditary institutions as among the most blessed gifts of Providence; “powers ordained of God;” the dew of which had fallen upon and refreshed their lands for many years, and which had been preserved to them almost by a miracle; and rashly to invade, or even carelessly to impair them, they regarded as an impious act.

From the view just taken, it follows, that with scarcely an exception, governments are devised, not *by* man, but *for* man; that they are designed not to gratify the wishes of *any portion* of the community, however large, but to promote the welfare of the *whole*. A government which consults the interests of, no matter how large a majority, without regard to the effect of its action upon the remainder; a government which sacrifices the rights of a part, in order to satisfy the clamors, or gratify the will of a

larger part; a government, to state the same idea in different words, which is willing to perpetrate injustice, in order to obey the will, or consult the good of the greater number, loses its paternal character, and sinks into a tyranny. There are maxims of justice, and rules of right, emanating from the divine will, which govern and restrain all human action, whether of individuals or of communities, and which no human authority, no matter with what prerogatives it be invested, can set aside, or disregard, without becoming at once a tyranny. A parent is invested by divine authority and by human law, to a certain extent, with absolute and despotic power over his child. Obedience is the first lesson taught to the child; and the "*sic volo, sic jubeo*," the simple order of the parent must be obeyed without hesitation and without question. But the divine will, speaking from the Book of Life, and acting with silent but irresistible influence, checks and restrains that harsh domination by the strong rein of parental affection; and parental affection renders that restraint salutary, which would otherwise be tyrannical. And what is parental affection? Is it the love we bear to our children for the engaging innocence of infancy; for their grace, their beauty, their playfulness, their attachment to us, or their being the instruments of a sort of perpetuity of our own existence? No, no; all this is not parental affection: all this partakes of selfishness. Parental affection is something higher, purer, far more exalted, more heaven-like than this. Parental affection is an instinct implanted in the breast, which looks everywhere, and at all times, for the *welfare of our children*. This motive it is which sweetens restraint; this which softens severity. This motive alone, under any circumstances, can justify coercion; this alone has a right to demand implicit obedience. The moment a parent exercises his authority for his own interest, or to gratify his own feelings, unmindful of the welfare of his child, or regardless of it, that moment his authority becomes tyranny: how much greater tyranny would it be should he exercise it to promote his own interest in opposition to the interest of his child?

The analogy holds throughout, and perfectly with government. The supreme power is vested, it may be, in a king, or in a select aristocracy, or in the people. The object of all is the same, *the general welfare*, the welfare of the *whole*, in opposition to the welfare of *any part*. Kings are apt to forget this maxim; nobles to overlook it; the people to confound it with the welfare of the majority; and this is *the great evil* to be apprehended from democratical institutions. In democratical governments the *power*

must necessarily be lodged with the majority ; but the *power* of the majority is a very different matter from the *rights* of the majority. A despotic king may do as he thinks fit ; an absolute aristocracy may command and must be obeyed ; and the majority of the people of a republic, speaking in a voice of thunder, may give forth their mighty mandate, and submission must follow : but if, as with the parent and the child, that authority and power be exercised without regard to the welfare of the minority, or in opposition to it, it is as much an act of tyranny as the vilest act of the vilest despot who ever disgraced humanity. It is a forgetfulness of this plain truth which gives rise to, and sustains the ferocity of factions ; it is a forgetfulness of this truth, a truth the very basis of our institutions, which cripples their energies, and impairs their usefulness ; it is a forgetfulness of this truth that is more likely to produce their ruin than any other cause ; and it was a thorough conviction of this truth, and of the great dangers likely to result from a disregard of it, which, among other reasons, induced the framers of the articles of our Constitution to make, as the outwork and guard-tower of the Constitution, a provision, which, to hasty observers or superficial reasoners, seems repugnant to the spirit of a democracy, but which in fact lies at its very foundation ; a provision which deprives a majority of a controlling voice in its fundamental laws, and requires all but unanimity for their alteration ; because the object of the republic is not to promote the welfare of *any part*, however large, but the welfare of the *whole*, the *common weal*.

The space which we have already occupied, admonishes us of the propriety of bringing these observations to a close. It might have been well to illustrate the position opened before the reader, by extracts from various parts of the federal Constitution, and of the Constitutions of the several states, and by such comments on them as might tend to show that stability was one of their leading objects, and that the people did not fear to place very severe restrictions, both on their own power, and on the authority delegated to their representatives. It would be easy to produce some of the debates and proceedings of the federal convention, and of the several state conventions, held for the purpose of forming and discussing the Constitution, to show that the whole subject was fairly and fully before the minds of the people, and that the restrictions so very generally imposed on the omnipotence of the will of the majority were adopted after very careful deliberation, with a thorough understanding of their effect, and with a strong conviction of their necessity. But it is obvious that it would be idle to enter upon so ample a field without thoroughly exploring it ; and although

satisfied that the treasures to be found there would well repay the labor of the search, we cannot reasonably extend these remarks. If attention be directed to a study of the principles of government, something will be gained. There will be found in our own historical archives those lofty Christian principles of political dominion which are elevated far above all human inventions, and which display much that will humble the vanity of the politician, while it exalts the dignity of the man; there will be found the vast, fundamental, radical difference between a government of the people and a government of a party; and there will be found the true republican distinction between the *power* of a majority and the *right* of a majority.

And indeed, when unmoved by prejudice, and uninflamed by discussion, we sit down calmly and reflect, what reasonable consideration can there be found for placing in the control of the temporary majority of an hour the political welfare of successive generations? The individuals who form a population are changing every moment. Death is constantly mowing down by thousands the hardy, the vigorous, the intelligent, whose places are supplied by the feeble, the helpless, the unconscious. The individual majority of yesterday was wholly different from the individual majority of to-day; and to-morrow, and each succeeding day, will still present another and another. Individuals live a few years and die; their characteristic is change. The very essence of political government is stability. Political governments are like the towering and everlasting hills; the people like the leaves on the trees upon their sides, which are renewed each successive spring, and are blighted, and fall and perish each successive autumn. No temporary and fleeting generation has *the right* to annul the wisdom and destroy the labors of past ages, and to frustrate the hopes of the future. Why then should it have *the power*? And have not the people done rightly in restricting that power? And in volunteering to restrict their own power, and for the welfare of themselves and future generations, in placing shackles on their own arms, to restrain their tremendous strength, which in a moment of excitement or thoughtlessness might be directed to irreparable mischief, have they not given an example of reasonableness and self-restraint, creditable to their wisdom and moderation, and which should silence the traducers of unbiased popular feeling?

The political institutions, in the midst of which it has pleased Providence to place us, are the result of the wisdom, the experience, and the sufferings of many preceding generations. The materials brought together age after age, erected into a goodly edi-

fice, enriched with appurtenances and embellishments, and adornments of great extent and inestimable price, the whole inheritance has descended to us a most precious patrimony; and, we will not say in destroying, but in altering or modifying any part of it, the voice of those of past ages who are slumbering in their graves should be heard and should be as potential as our own, and the voice and wishes of those of future times should be anticipated, and the same weight allowed as if they were present to enforce them. Considerations at variance with these are repugnant to genuine notions of freedom. Considerations varying from these may define the powers of a tyrant, but not the privileges of a freeman. Considerations differing from these would reject governments, as a divine ordinance. They would substitute the poor contrivance of man for the noble gift of God. Destructive considerations have not formed our principles, nor will they influence our practice, unless brutal force shall usurp the place of calm and deliberate reason; and if the experience of the past be any test in determining the action of the future, we may confidently predict, that the American people will continue more and more deeply to love, more and more devotedly to cherish, the institutions which have shed and are shedding upon them so many benefits and blessings. And we need feel no fear for the stability, we may say the perpetuity, of our free establishments, if the people will only keep themselves informed of the true grounds and principles of their government; if they will reject the treacherous flatteries of demagogues; if they will persevere in distinguishing between power and right; if they will recognize an overruling Providence as their rightful and beneficent Governor, and cease from an overweening trust in their own wisdom or in a feeble arm of flesh.

ART. VII.—*The Double Witness of the Church.* By the Rev. WILLIAM INGRAHAM KIP, M. A., author of "The Lenten Fast." 12mo., pp. 415. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1843.

THE character of the work before us is intended to be indicated by the motto in the title-page, which we prefer inserting here. It is as follows:—

"It may be as well, then, old and trite as the subject is, to say a few words on some of those features of our Church which bear at once a DOUBLE WITNESS against Rome on the one hand, or mere Protestant denominations on the other."—*Rev. G. W. Faber.*

"The Double Witness" arrays itself "against Rome on the one hand," and "mere Protestant congregations on the other." "Rome," however, receives but a comparatively small share of attention. The "mere Protestant congregations" are the prisoners at the bar; and in the great controversy between Rome and Protestants our "Double Witness" is all on one side. Here he justifies Rome and condemns the Protestants. If in this case he is a double witness, he certainly is not an impartial one. But we must proceed to notice the history of the book.

Not unfrequently the circumstances which call forth a book add much to its importance, and to the interest taken in it by the great public. Our author being fully apprised of this, first informs us of the events which called him into the perilous field of controversy. These are as follows:—

"The circumstances under which this volume was written are briefly these. The last winter, it is well known, was a season of strange excitement among the different denominations throughout our land. At such a time—as the best safeguard against this injurious influence—the writer thought it well to deliver to the people of his charge a course of lectures, plainly setting forth the distinctive principles of the Church. They were continued through ten successive Sunday evenings; and he had reason to believe that the effect produced was beneficial.

"The lectures were originally prepared without the most distant idea of publication. Having, however, been requested by the vestry, as well as by others in whose judgment he is accustomed to rely, to furnish the series for the press, the writer did not feel himself at liberty to decline."—*Preface*.

In all this our author may have come to very just conclusions, both as to the expediency of delivering his lectures, and then of publishing them; but certain it is, that he is entitled to no great credit on the score of discovery. For delivering lectures and writing books upon "the Church," "apostolical succession," and kindred subjects, have long been deemed by Churchmen the sovereign remedy for the "strange excitement" which often occurs "among the different denominations." Why it becomes necessary to apply the remedy to "the Church," when the evil only exists among "the denominations," might afford matter of curious speculation; but we have no time to indulge in mere curiosity. A principle is here brought out of much greater interest than the mere *modus operandi*, and that is, that presenting the high and exclusive claims of the Church is the grand remedy for those mischievous excitements called revivals!

It is doubtless well for "the Church" that the true remedy has

been discovered, for beyond all question her friends think she has suffered more from this cause than from all the numerous assaults of infidelity and Romanism which were ever made upon her.

We have not the means of judging how effectual Mr. Kip's book has been in quieting the troublesome agitations among "the different denominations" in Albany, the place of his pastoral labors, nor can we judge with infallible certainty what will ultimately be its effects "throughout our land" at large. Time will probably tell the whole story, and for its development we must wait with patience. But we doubt not that if such a book as this of Mr. Kip's, with all its well-attested facts, beautiful poetry, and *instructive pictures*—its saints, and angels, and crosses, and candles, and other objects of pious veneration—fail to prevent these evils, the Church may well tremble for her fate. If, after all this, "the various denominations" ever raise another religious turmoil, especially in Mr. Kip's neighborhood, it will exhibit strange temerity on their part. Or should they hazard the effort, and by some strange fatality chance to succeed in setting the whole community in commotion—making "the whole multitude cry out, Men and brethren, what shall we do?"—it is difficult to predict what remedy will next be tried.

But we must proceed to the body of the work under review. This we shall do in sober earnest—candidly considering the great leading principles and arguments of the author in their true light, and in all their force.

The first lecture is upon "the necessity for knowing the reasons why we are Churchmen." With the general argument of our author upon this head we find no particular fault. It is certainly important, for many reasons, that those who are "Churchmen," in the technical sense of that term, should "know the reasons" why they are so. Whether the author presents the strongest of those reasons we will not at present inquire. But it will readily occur to the intelligent portion of the "different denominations," that there are at least as many and as weighty reasons for their knowing "why" they are *not* "Churchmen." It hence becomes them narrowly to inspect the true principles of Churchmanship—the foundation upon which they rest, and their practical tendency. If upon examination we should find that in becoming Churchmen we should build upon the sand, set up an unauthorized exclusiveness, and make war upon the best portions of the church of Christ, there will doubtless appear sufficient reasons why we are not, and ought not to be, Churchmen.

The importance of this investigation will appear upon a brief notice of the practical workings of the theory of the Church main-

tained by our author, and by, we fear, a numerous class of Churchmen. That theory calls in question the right of "the different denominations throughout our land" to expect from "the Church" the courtesies and Christian correspondence due from one branch of the catholic church to another. Here the question of the true *unity* of the church and the great practical principle of *charity* are concerned. Again: This theory denies the authority of the ministry of these denominations. And yet again, it denies their right to teach and to govern, according to what they conceive to be the true Scriptural discipline, those who are associated in their respective communions. And finally, it denies the validity of the ordinances as administered among them.

Surely, with all these grave consequences of the system before us, and in view of the fact that they are adopted and avowed by very many Church writers of the present day, there are good reasons why the subject should be carefully investigated on both sides—as strong reasons for our endeavoring to know why we are not Churchmen as for Churchmen's knowing why they are so. We consequently shall make no opposition to the general argument of this lecture, but shall merely invite attention to a few particulars which are to be found in the progress of the investigation.

After an eloquent view of the state of the original church, in which the author finds but "one Lord, one faith, and one baptism," he tells us that

"There was, therefore, nothing else to which the penitent could turn, but to one catholic, apostolic church."—P. 16.

Where, pray, was the *great Head* of the church in the days of her primitive glory? "Could" not "the penitent turn" to him? It would seem not. Even then, it seems, Christ was left in the back ground! The Church was thrown between the penitent and his Saviour, and he had no access to *Him* but through her intervention! When the trembling sinner said in his heart, "Who shall ascend into heaven to bring Christ down from above, or who shall descend into the deep to bring him up again from the dead?" he was not permitted to hear Paul say, "The word is nigh thee, even in thy heart and in thy mouth, that is, the word of faith which we preach:" but the answer was, *The Church will do this for you*. You may not come into immediate contact with Christ, for there is nothing else to which the penitent can turn but to the one catholic, apostolic Church! Now is there anything like this in the writings of the holy apostles? If so, we have yet to learn where it may be found. We call special attention to this point, because it is one of the radical principles of the Church system. It is not a mere slip of

the pen, nor an incidental remark which means little or nothing. The doctrine is, that men can only have access to Christ through the Church: or, at least, that this is God's ordinary method of dispensing salvation. "Ministerial intervention for the forgiveness of sins," and "efficacious sacraments," and not "faith alone," constitute the way of salvation according to our Churchmen. This system will not answer for us. "Man," says the admirable D'Aubigné, "always seeks to return, in some way, to a human salvation; this is the source of the innovations of Rome and of Oxford. The substitution of the Church for Jesus Christ is that which essentially characterizes these opinions. It is no longer Christ who enlightens, Christ who saves, Christ who forgives, Christ who commands, Christ who judges; it is the Church, and always the Church, that is to say, an assembly of sinful men, as weak and prone to err as ourselves. 'They have taken away the Lord, and we know not where they have laid him,' John xx, 2."*

No one, certainly, will dispute the position of our author, that "*our divine Master when on earth certainly founded and established a church.*" But his amplification is not quite so clear. He proceeds:—

"Had he not done so—had he merely inculcated the general principles of his faith, and left each body of believers to regulate their own ecclesiastical government—the case would have been widely different."—P. 25.

In this case, we suppose he intends to say, our divine Master would have founded no church at all: that is, if he had not founded what I conceive to be a church, he would have founded *no* church. Admirable reasoning this! The statement is not as accurately worded as is usual with Churchmen, the author seeming to confound "principles of faith" with "ecclesiastical government," whereas a broad distinction between these two things is generally kept up by the best writers of that school.† But supposing him to refer only to "ecclesiastical government," then he ought to be aware that the best and most learned of the English divines admit that there is no specific form of ecclesiastical polity drawn out in the New Testament.‡

* Puseyism Examined, p. 67.

† See Hooker's Eccl. Pol., book iii, chap. 3.

‡ The famous Dodwell, an exceedingly *high* Churchman, says,—“All the reasoning from which men conclude that the whole model of ecclesiastical discipline may be extracted from the writings of the New Testament, is very precarious. There is,” says he, “no passage of any sacred writer which openly professes this design. Indeed, there is not one which so treats of ecclesiastical government, as if the author, or the writer's author, the Holy Spirit,

"The judicious Hooker," as he is often called by Churchmen by way of eminence, in the third book of his Ecclesiastical Polity, goes into a long argument to prove that "it is not necessary that some particular form of church polity be set down in Scripture." This argument he maintained in opposition to Cartwright, the great leader of Nonconformity, who maintained precisely what our high-Churchmen do in these days, namely, that "matters of discipline and kind of government were matters necessary to salvation and of faith." Now all we need do in this case is to hand over our author to the great defender of the English Church, who is quoted for an oracle by every writer of the English school since his day. And if he will but put himself, where he really belongs, into the shoes of the notorious Puritan, Cartwright, he will then see what it is to be ground to powder by the great champion, and the boast of the English Church. But our author undertakes to sustain his position.

"If at any particular time—take that of the Reformation in the sixteenth century for example—a body of men, for some reason which seemed sufficient to themselves, had a right to abandon that ministry which was derived in uninterrupted succession from the apostles, and, without any new commission from our Lord, to constitute another ministry of their own, then any individuals have at any time the right to do the same."—P. 26.

This argument we suppose is designed to apply to Luther and his coadjutors. And we understand the author to deny that these men had a right to leave the Church of Rome. Now upon the principles here maintained, no person, however corrupt the ministry of a church might become, would have a right—except under the direction of bishops having independent jurisdiction—according to the gospel, to retire from it. If the bishops should all become

had intended to describe any one form of church government as being to remain everywhere as for ever inviolate. The sacred penmen have nowhere declared, with sufficient clearness, how great a change must take place in church government when the churches should first withdraw from the communion of the synagogues. They nowhere clearly show how much was allowed to the personal gifts of the Holy Ghost, and how much to places and offices. They nowhere, with decided clearness, distinguish the extraordinary officers, who were not to outlive that age, from the ordinary ministers who were not to cease till the second coming of Christ. Indeed, all things of this nature were then so generally known, and they so suppose this knowledge in what they say, that they never for the sake of posterity explain them; concerning themselves only with present things, and leaving the future. They nowhere professedly explain the offices or ministries themselves, as to their nature or extent; which surely they would have done if any particular form had been prescribed for perpetual duration."—*De Nupero Schismate*, sec. 14.

atheists or heathen, the inferior clergy would have no right to institute a pure form of discipline and government, and provide for the future and perpetual administration of the word and sacraments. For "if they should do so, then any other persons have a right to do the same." Not indeed unless the circumstances were the same, or equally urgent. His conclusion, that all government and order must necessarily fail upon every theory except that of the apostolic succession, is against the clearest facts, and indeed is not sanctioned by the best writers of his own party. But we turn from this *argumentum ad absurdum* to one which we scarcely know how to characterize. The reader shall have it, and then he may give it a name to suit himself.

"The general belief has been that, during the forty days which intervened between our Lord's resurrection and ascension, while he instructed his disciples in 'the things pertaining to the kingdom of God,' he also inculcated the organization of the church he had founded."—P. 28.

Well now, will this Rev. gentleman be so good as to tell us what that instruction was? Upon what is this *general belief* founded? and where is the *tradition* of the plan of *church organization* which our Lord then inculcated? However "general" the "belief" is among Churchmen we cannot tell, or what this belief is founded upon, but certainly we must wait for a little more light upon the subject before we can fall in with it.

In urging the great practical importance of his system, our author, with high-Churchmen generally, puts all "dissenters" upon very dubious ground as to their future salvation. He asks,—

"If a Church has been established, and that Church is the body of Christ, unless we are members of her fold, how can we be members of Christ?"—P. 30.

Now this would be a sound argument if the author's views of the church which Christ established were sound. Cranmer, Jewel, Hooker, Field, and other defenders of the Church of England, acknowledge the legitimacy of the distinction made, by the continental reformers, between the *visible* and the *invisible* church.*

* Hooker asks,—“Is it then possible, that the self-same men should belong both to the synagogue of Satan and to the church of Jesus Christ?” and proceeds to answer:—“Unto that church which is his mystical body, not possible; because that body consisteth of none but only true Israelites, true sons of Abraham, true servants and saints of God. Howbeit of the visible body and church of Jesus Christ, those may be, and oftentimes are, in respect of the main parts of their outward profession, who in regard of their inward disposition of

And these great authors maintain that the *promises of salvation* are only predicable of the latter. But high-Churchmen apply these promises to the visible church, and so make membership in what they call "the Church" in all ordinary cases a condition of salvation. This is to subvert the whole economy of grace, to annihilate moral distinctions, and to open the floodgate of corruption and irreligion.

Still our author in the goodness of his heart tries hard to find out a way of salvation even for *schismatics* and *heretics*, though they are not "members of Christ." He trusts that "those mighty spirits who now display so much intellectual power, while they have 'fallen out by the way,' will meet in peace before their Father's throne."—P. 34.

This charitable conclusion he arrives at by the help of the good bishop of Vermont, Dr. Milner, the great Romanist, and Mr. Palmer. His quotations from the two latter are worthy of remark :

"Dr. Milner says,—'Catholic divines and the holy fathers, at the same time that they strictly insist on the necessity of adhering to the doctrine and communion of the Catholic Church, make an express exception in favor of what is termed *invincible ignorance*; which occurs when persons out of the true church are sincerely and firmly resolved, in spite of all worldly allurements on one hand, and all opposition to the contrary on the other, to enter into it, if they could find it out, and when they use their best endeavors for this purpose. This exception in favor of the *invincibly ignorant* is made by the same St. Augustine who so strictly insists on the general rule our great controvertist, Bellarmine, asserts, that such Christians, "in virtue of the disposition of their hearts, belong to the Catholic Church."—*End of Controversy. Letter xxi*, p. 137, Lond., 1841.

"Again—in another place, in his letter on 'the Qualities of Catholicity,' he says, when speaking of the Church of England, and other bodies of Christians not in union with the Romish Church, 'All the young children who have been baptized in them, and all *invincibly ignorant Christians*, who exteriorly adhere to them, really belong to the Catholic Church, as I have shown above.'—*Letter xxix*, p. 190.

"The same view of this doctrine as held by the Church of Rome is given by Palmer in his *Treatise on the Church*, vol. i, p. 240. When therefore they assert—'There is no salvation without the pale of the Catholic Church,'—the question is, What do they mean by 'the Catholic Church?'—Pp. 35, 36.

Now here is a way of salvation provided for those who are under the power of "invincible ignorance," and for baptized children who mind, yea, of external conversation, yea, even of some parts of their very profession, are most worthily both hateful in the sight of God himself, and in the eyes of the sounder part of the visible church most execrable."—*Eccles. Pol.*, book iii, chap 1, p. 288.

are not in the Church ; but what will become of those who do not come under either of these categories ? We see not but they are still left to perish without hope. Some there are who are not *children*, nor can it be fairly plead for them that they are *invincibly* ignorant, nor have they a "sincere desire" to belong to what Romanists and high-Churchmen call "the Catholic Church." For such we see no hope left—even Mr. Kip's charity does not reach them. All these, however pious they may be, are beyond the reach of God's covenanted mercies.

The second lecture is headed, "Episcopacy proved from Scripture." The following is a statement of the doctrine of "episcopacy," which our author proposes to prove :—

"The first thing is—to set plainly before you what we believe to be the truth on this subject, and in what respects we differ from the various denominations around us. We contend, then, that, in accordance with directions given by our Lord, his apostles, acting under the direct influence of the Holy Spirit, established a Church, having a ministry of three orders, and which ministry has been continued by their successors down to the present time. These three orders were, 1st, the apostles—called, in the following age, the bishops ; 2d, the presbyters, or elders ; and 3d, the deacons."—Pp. 53, 54.

It will be seen that upon the theory here presented, it is necessary to prove that those now called bishops succeeded to the office of the apostles, or that the powers of the apostles were transmitted to *successors* who constituted an *order* distinct from, and independent of, the order of presbyters, who only had the right to ordain ; and that the men of this order were, after the death of the original apostles, called *ἐπίσκοποι*, *episcopoï*, or bishops.

The first argument by which our author attempts to sustain this hypothesis is founded upon "the analogy to be drawn from the nature of the ministry in the Jewish church."

"We find," he says, "that, in the Jewish church, God himself instituted a priesthood, consisting of three orders, namely, the high priest, the ordinary priests, and the Levites."—P. 57.

In making out the analogy between the Jewish priesthood and the Christian ministry, our author recites the usual and oft-refuted arguments, all of which rest upon a mere assumption. How conclusively, how logically he reasons !—

"Should we not then naturally expect, that when the Christian ministry took the place of this priesthood, it would be, like everything else, conformed in some degree to the ancient model ?"—P. 57.

But the very thing to be proved is, that "the Christian ministry took the place of this model." With equal force the gentleman

goes on to speak of the strictness with which "the priesthood was guarded from the intrusion of those who could not enter it by regular descent from the family of Aaron;" and to quote St. Paul's words, namely, "No man taketh this honor unto himself, but he that is called of God, as was Aaron;"—and, as usual, to refer us to the dreadful fate of "Korah and his company," and of "Uzziah," as examples of the fearful hazard those run who enter the priests' office without episcopal ordination! Surely if "dissenters" are not *convinced* by all this, they must be terribly *scared*. Who will dare "enter the sanctuary an unaccredited priest" hereafter!

We do not deny but that the Christian church was grafted upon the Jewish stock. St. Paul teaches this doctrine, as the gentleman urges, in the eleventh of Romans. Nor do we deny that there is a priesthood, and a High Priest, over the Christian church. This the same apostle teaches in the fifth of Hebrews. But that the Jewish priesthood is retained in the Christian church, or that one was instituted by its great Head so perfectly analogous to it as Churchmen and Romanists maintain, we do deny; and moreover, we challenge our opponents to present the least particle of evidence of it from the New Testament. "We have," indeed, "a great High Priest, that is passed into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God," Heb. iv, 14. But as for such high priests as our *diocesan bishops*, we acknowledge not the legitimacy of their *succession*. If they are *Jewish* high priests, let them go among the Jews; but if they aspire to be "high priests over the house of God," that is, over the church, let them know that there is but ONE such, and if there is, under the Christian dispensation, any danger of meeting the fate of Korah and of Uzziah, for sacrilegiously intruding upon the prerogatives of God, such pseudo high priests have reason to be alarmed.*

Next our author proceeds "to the direct Scripture evidence." Let us hear:—

"The first proof we advance is—that there is a recognition in the *Acts and the Epistles* of the existence of three orders in the early church. A confusion is indeed sometimes created in the minds of readers, in consequence of the indiscriminate use of the title *bishop*. A few sentences, however, of explanation will remove this difficulty. As we already remarked—the three orders of ministers were, 1st, Apostles; 2d, Bishops or elders; 3d, Deacons. After, however, the death of the apostles, who were the first bishops, those who succeeded to the

* For a more full discussion of this subject, see the first article in the preceding number of this Review, (No. for Oct. 1843.) See also Dr. A. Clarke's note upon Heb. v, 4.

episcopal office, out of respect to them, as having stood nearest to our Lord, would not assume the *name* of apostles, although they inherited their *authority*. They therefore took the name of bishops, leaving those in the second rank of the ministry to be called, as before, elders or presbyters—and the third to retain the title of deacons.”—Pp. 61, 62.

Now where is “the direct Scripture evidence,” that “after the death of the apostles those who succeeded to the episcopal office inherited their *authority*?” High as is the consideration to which Mr. Kip may be entitled, we are not yet quite prepared to acknowledge his lucubrations to amount to “direct Scripture evidence.” But if Mr. Kip’s words have not the authority of Scripture, perhaps he will find the words of some other which have. He proceeds:—

“Thus it is that the early historian, Theodoret, gives the history of this change of name. ‘The same persons were anciently called promiscuously both bishops and presbyters, while those who are now called bishops were called apostles. But shortly after, the name of apostles was appropriated to such only as were apostles indeed, and then the name bishop was given to those who before were called apostles.’”—P. 62.

Our author then gives us a similar passage from “the ancient author under the name of St. Ambrose,” and very complacently adds:—

“Here, you perceive, is a full explanation of the change. The name however is a matter of no importance. It is the office and the authority for which we contend. We only wish to prove, that there was a grade of ministers higher in rank than the elders or presbyters.”—P. 63.

These authorities are copied from Bingham,* and by consulting him, we see that he takes the latter authority, second hand, from Amalarius. Perhaps this “ancient writer under the name of Ambrose,” after passing through so many hands, has really become “St. Ambrose” himself (!) and then we must, forsooth, admit his writings to be canonical !† But as to the testimony of Theodoret,

* Antiquities of the Christian Church, book ii, chap. ii, sec. 1.

† But, admitting the passage to be from Ambrose, it is not in point. For, as Powell contends.—“He does not say that bishops *exclusively* were called apostles. He knew better. ‘Many were called apostles *by way of imitation*,’ says Eusebius, (Eccl. Hist. lib. i, c. 12,) an earlier and better authority on such subjects than Theodoret or Ambrose. So he calls ‘Thaddeus, one of the *seventy*,’ an apostle. The learned Valesius’s note on the place is as follows:—‘*Apostle* here is to be taken in a *large sense*. After the same manner every nation and *city* termed them *apostles*, from whom they first received the truth of the gospel. *This name* was not only given to the twelve, but *ALL* their DISCIPLES, COMPANIONS, and ASSISTANTS, were GENERALLY called APOSTLES.’”—*Apos. Suc.*, p. 45.

notwithstanding Bishop Onderdonk, of the diocese of Pennsylvania, calls him "one of the fathers,"* and quotes him as ultimate authority upon the same point, he lived in the *fifth* century, and, of course, could know nothing personally of the matter he writes about.† And this same Theodoret, it seems, is the earliest witness Bingham, or Bishop Onderdonk, or even Mr. Kip (!) can find of the change of the name *apostle* for *bishop*. And is this his "direct Scripture evidence?" But perhaps the reader will secretly suspect that we are hardly honest in intimating that our author presents his own assertions, and those of "Theodoret," and "the ancient writer under the name of St. Ambrose," for "direct Scripture evidence." But we must candidly say, we know not how else to construe his argument. He does, indeed, proceed from the "full explanation of the change" given by his fathers to refer to the Scriptures, but in a way which does not meet the case. We will, however, let him speak for himself:—

"Now turn to the Acts, and you will find everywhere recognized the three orders, apostles, elders, and deacons."—P. 64.

Again,—

"And so it is in the Epistles. Take a single instance, in which all the orders of the ministry are mentioned together. We refer to that salutation with which the Epistle to the Philippians opens—'Paul and Timotheus, the servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus, which are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons.' Here are certainly three orders of ministers—the two apostles, Paul and Timothy, sending their salutations to the bishops and deacons. Now, change the titles to those which we have shown you the same orders bore in the next age, and it will read thus—'Paul and Timotheus, *bishops*, to all the saints (*laity*) at Philippi, with the *elders or presbyters*, and *deacons*.'"—P. 65.

But what is all he finds in the Acts and Epistles about "the three orders, apostles, elders, and deacons," to the point really at issue? The existence of these "three orders" in the apostolic age has never been disputed. The point to be proved is *the perpetuity of the apostolic office* under the name of *episcopacy*—that the original *apostolate* is now the *episcopate*. And this point, the only point in question between us, he proves (?) by his own affirmation and his two "fathers;" and this, too, when he professes to give "the direct Scripture evidence."

That all the evidence from the Scriptures, presented by our

* See *Episcopacy tested by Scripture*, p. 12.

† For further light upon the passage from Theodoret, see Powell's *Apos. Suc.*, pp. 44, 45.

author, and by Bishop H. U. Onderdonk, whom he follows, is entirely nugatory, is fully conceded by the great high-Churchman, Dr. Hammond, who depends entirely upon "the Greek and Latin fathers" for the proof of this point.*

But even the authority of the fathers is exceedingly weak and inconclusive. From these our successionists pretend to nothing earlier than Ambrose and Theodoret, and what their testimony amounts to we have already seen. But while our opponents find no earlier evidence in the writings of the fathers for their supposed transfer of the apostolic office to bishops, several of the fathers, earlier and of higher authority than those to whom they refer, apply the term apostle to ministers and preachers of the gospel generally.† IGNATIUS, indeed, makes the *presbyters*, and not the *bishops*, to have *succeeded* the *apostles*.‡ Of the amount of confidence which ought to be placed in the Epistles which bear the name of this father, we will not now speak; it is enough for our purpose that our opponents maintain them to be fully authentic, and entirely uncorrupted.

We cannot follow the gentleman through his argument drawn from the Epistles of St. Paul to Timothy and Titus, and what St. John says *to the angels* of the churches of Asia Minor. He will find his proof from these sources abundantly refuted by Mr. Powell in his able and unanswerable work upon the "Apostolical Succession." We must not, however, omit to notice his final argument. He proceeds:—

"There is but one more fact which we will briefly notice. It is, as we have already mentioned, a favourite declaration of our opponents, that the thirteen apostles were the only ones holding that office, and

* Dr. Hammond says,—“Who were the apostles’ successors in that power which concerned the governing of the churches which they planted? And first, I answer, that it being a matter of fact, or story, *later* than the *Scripture* can universally reach to, it cannot be fully satisfied or answered from thence—but will in the full latitude, through the universal church in these times be made clear, from the recent evidences that we have, namely, from the consent of the Greek and Latin *fathers*, who generally resolve that bishops are those successors.”—*Apos. Suc.*, p. 26.

† Mr. Powell gives ample authorities for this statement. See *Apos. Suc.*, pp. 45, 46.

‡ “I exhort you that ye study to do all things in a divine concord: your bishop presiding in the place of God, your presbyters in the place of the council of the apostles; and your deacons most dear to me, being intrusted with the ministry of Jesus Christ.”—*Ep. Mag.*, sec. 6.

“See that ye all follow your bishop, as Jesus Christ the Father; and the presbytery, as the apostles.”—*Ep. Smyr.*, sec. 8.

that they left no successors. And yet, we find St. Paul referring to 'false apostles,' (*ψευδαποστολοι*.) There were, therefore, some even in his day, who assumed that office, and pretended they were called to the highest rank in the ministry. Now, as we cannot suppose that they endeavored to pass themselves off for any of the thirteen who were first called, it is evident that the office itself must have been widely known in the church, and their pretence was, that they had received it. Still stronger is the inference which may be drawn from that warning which St. John gives, against 'them which say they are apostles, and are not.'—Pp. 75, 76.

This argument he strengthens in a note taken from Bishop H. U. Onderdonk's tract "on False Apostles," or rather he shows in this note whence he derived this strong case.

Now the whole force of this argument depends upon two presumptions, both of which are utterly false. The *first* is, that those who deny the succession, as held by Churchmen and Romanists, also deny that there were any but the twelve, together with St. Paul, who were called apostles. This is totally false. It is admitted, as far as we know, by all anti-successionists, that in several cases other than these "thirteen" are called *αποστολοι*, messengers or apostles.* The *second* assumption is, that upon our hypothesis, these *ψευδαποστολοι*, *false apostles*, must have pretended to pass for some of the individuals who were really acknowledged to be true apostles—or, as Bishop H. U. Onderdonk says, "counterfeited the persons" of some of them.† This is equally false with the former assumption. Bishop Onderdonk's "four ways in which the persons alluded to can only have pretended to be 'apostles,'" do not cover the whole ground. What is there against the supposition that these men "pretended to be apostles" *extraordinary*, by special revelation, or a special call from Heaven, as St. Paul certainly was? There is nothing either impossible or improbable in this supposition. It is, indeed, in our view, a more probable theory than any of those which the bishop examines, though his reasons against them are far from being conclusive.

Thus much in answer to the arguments of our author in favor of the succession of his bishops to the *apostleship*. This point, it will be seen, is absolutely necessary to the support of the theory of "apostolical succession." Were it necessary in this case to prove a negative, and had we the space, we could easily give conclusive reasons against the hypothesis maintained by our successionists. This, however, under the circumstances, we must waive. We can add but a word, and merely refer to a few authorities.

* See 2 Cor. viii, 23; Phil. ii, 25.

† See *Episcopacy Examined and Re-examined*, p. 275. *Ibid.*, p. 268.

As a class of officers in the church, distinct from the primitive bishops or presbyters, we deny that the apostles had any *successors*. As apostles, their office and work were peculiar, and expired with them; but as presbyters and pastors, all true ministers of Jesus Christ are their successors. HOOKER says,—“Such as deny apostles to have any successors at all in the office of their apostleship, may hold that opinion without contradiction to this of ours, if they will explain themselves what truly and properly apostleship is. In some things every presbyter, in some things only bishops, in some things neither one nor the other are the apostles’ successors.”* So far this learned writer is doubtless correct. But as he proceeds he makes “bishops the apostles’ successors,” in some things which we think they originally shared with presbyters.

Dr. BARROW, a Churchman of no mean rank, presents us with an unanswerable argument in proof that “the apostolic office, as such, was personal and temporary; and therefore, according to its nature and design, not successive or communicable to others in perpetual descendance from them.”†

The famous nonjuror and high-Churchman, DODWELL, says,—“The office of the apostles perished with the apostles; in which office there never was any succession to any of them, except to Judas the traitor.”‡

Now if it is the succession which Dodwell admits for which our author pleads, namely, the succession from “Judas the traitor,” we will not contend with him, though in that case we could not admit the *divine authority* of such successors.

Thus stands the question of *apostolic succession*. And is it not a little marvelous that its supporters put on so grave a countenance, and such an air of confidence, when they undertake to maintain it? That they boast of “direct Scripture evidence,” and of the “unanimous consent of the fathers,” in favor of a dogma which is not sustained by *one clear proof from either Scripture or antiquity*?

In these reflections it must be understood that we refer to the point in question, namely, *that the apostolic office and character were transferred to bishops, and that they were constituted apostles de facto—to remain permanently by succession an order independent of the presbytery*. Upon this point now the whole question of episcopacy *jure divino* is made to turn.

This is not the old ground taken by English Episcopalians. Formerly those passages in the Acts and Epistles which speak of *bishops* were brought as proof texts. Of this any one may be

* Eccl. Pol., book vii, chap. 4. † See Treat. on the Pope’s Sup., sup. ii, sec. 4.

‡ De Nupero Schismate, pp. 55, 68.

convinced by "the form of ordaining or consecrating a bishop," in the Common Prayer. But it being urged that the same persons were called *ἐπισκοποι* *episcopoi*, *bishops*, and *πρεσβυτεροι* *presbyteroi*, *presbyters*, the supporters of prelacy finally fell upon the expedient of making *bishops* successors of the *apostles*, and then they could admit, what they saw was undeniable, that the *episcopoi* and the *presbyteroi* of the New Testament were identical. But we must proceed, having already exhausted more time upon this point than we intended when we took it in hand.

From his "direct Scripture evidence," our author proceeds to answer objections. The first objection he anticipates is, "that Paul and Barnabas received an ordination only from presbyters," and quotes at length Acts xiii, 1-3.*

"This," he says, "we are told, was their ordination. We reply—This could not be, for they were 'prophets and teachers' before, and employed in 'ministering to the Lord.' They are placed on an exact footing with the other three. If the three, therefore, were in orders, so were Paul and Barnabas."—P. 77.

Now we cannot go into a long discussion upon this matter, but will simply propose a few queries for Mr. Kip's solution. 1. What is ordination according to the New Testament, and what forms are essential to its validity? Is it anything more than the solemn designation of a person to the ministerial work? If so, where is your proof? 2. If this case was not a case of ordination, what was it? Why, Mr. Kip says, "These two brethren were in truth in this way merely commended to a special missionary work." Why then is this plan made use of in the ordination of a bishop?† And

* "Now there were in the church that was at Antioch certain prophets and teachers; as Barnabas, and Simeon that was called Niger, and Lucius of Cyrene, and Manaen, which had been brought up with Herod the tetrarch, and Saul. As they ministered to the Lord, and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them. And when they had fasted and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away."

† See Ordinal. Here, in the ordination of a bishop, it is said,—“Then the archbishop shall move the congregation present to pray, saying thus to them: Brethren, it is written in the Gospel of Saint Luke, That our Saviour Christ continued the whole night in prayer, before he did choose and send forth his twelve apostles. It is written also in the Acts of the Apostles, That the disciples who were at Antioch, did fast and pray, before they laid hands on Paul and Barnabas, and sent them forth. Let us therefore, following the example of our Saviour Christ, and his apostles, first fall to prayer, before we admit, and send forth this person presented unto us, to the work whereunto we trust the Holy Ghost hath called him.”—*English Prayer Book*.

do laymen or presbyters ever lay on hands, in any case, in "the church," in these days? Do they *separate* men to the "missionary work" by imposition of hands and prayer? 3. If this transaction had been wholly under the management of the apostles—if the story had read, "Now as the twelve apostles fasted and prayed, the Holy Ghost said," &c., would not this same passage have been regarded as the most complete account of an apostolical ordination to be found in the New Testament?—would it not have been a perfect extinguisher upon all such innovations as ordinations by mere presbyters? 4. What language can more appropriately express designation to a high ministerial function than this ἀφορίσατε εἰς τὸ ἔργον, *set apart to the work*.*

The next objection our author anticipates is founded upon 1 Tim. iv, 14, "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." Upon this passage he says,—“Timothy, therefore, we are told, was ordained to his office in the ministry by the hands of a body

* Dr. HAMMOND, good high-Church authority, paraphrases the second and third verses thus:—"And as they were upon a day of fast performing their office of prayer to God, the Holy Spirit of God, by some afflatus or revelation, commanded them to *ordain* or *consecrate* Barnabas and Saul to the *apostleship* to which God had already designed them. And accordingly they observed a solemn day of fasting and prayer, and so by imposition of hands, (see note on 1 Tim. 5, f.) ordained them and sent them away about the work designed them by God."—*Par. in loc.*

The learned doctor, in admitting this instance of the laying on of hands to be a true *ordination*, can only save his doctrine of the exclusive validity of episcopal ordination, by calling those prophets and teachers "bishops of the churches."—*Par. ver. 1.* That is, according to the theory we here oppose, *apostles*. Now as Barnabas and Saul are among those whom Dr. Hammond calls "bishops of the churches," they must have been ordained to the episcopate or apostolate before. Where then the necessity of ordaining them over again? Into what absurdities do our prelatists run to sustain their system! Rom. i, 1, is a parallel place with the one under consideration, and here the word ἀφορίζω is used for the *separating* or *setting apart* of St. Paul to the *apostolic office*—ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγέλιον—*set apart to the gospel*. Upon this passage Dr. BLOOMFIELD says,—“The words — are explanatory of the preceding, and refer to Paul’s being set apart for the work of the gospel, not only by the Holy Spirit, (Acts xiii, 2,) but also by Christ himself. Gal. i, 15.”—*Gr. Test.*

And Dr. HAMMOND paraphrases the passage thus:—"One that hath received this special singular mercy from him to be an apostle, authorized and set apart (Acts xiii, 2) to that office of preaching the gospel (which God hath promised by the prophets that it should now be revealed, to the Gentiles as well as the Jews, to all the world, by the ministry of the apostles.)"—*Paraph. in loc.*

of elders." To this argument he gives us two replies, so that if one does not answer the purpose the other may. We ought not to complain of this, as he might very easily have given us the trouble of meeting half a dozen without even then having exhausted the resources upon which he draws for these two. He proceeds:—

"We reply—First, it is not clear, by any means, that the word here translated *presbytery* does not refer to the *office* conferred, and not to the *persons* who conferred it. In that case it would read thus—'With the laying on hands to confer the presbyterate or presbytership.' Such was the opinion of Jerome, Ambrose, Eusebius, and Socrates, among the ancients, and Grotius, Calvin, and many of the leading Presbyterian writers among the moderns."—Pp. 78, 79.

We have read with attention what Bishop H. U. Onderdonk has written in defence of this hypothesis, but are not a convert. The object of the argument seems to be to throw doubt over the ordinary, and, as we must still suppose, the most natural construction. Now if the bishop has succeeded in his object, he has gained but a trifle. Maintaining as he does the exclusive right of bishops to impose hands, *jure divino*, he must perceive that a passage in the New Testament which probably, or even possibly, teaches the validity of ordination by presbyters, is fatal to his system. He must show that it *can* mean no such thing, or he does nothing to the purpose. But this he does not pretend to have done by the aid of his criticism. The bishop says,—“The Presbyterian construction has only the merest chance of being the true one.”* Now though this, in our humble judgment, is taking quite too strong ground, yet, admitting it, then there is at least “the merest chance” that the whole prelatial theory is wrong—there is doubt hanging over it. And would God leave a positive institution doubtful, upon which he had made the validity of the ordinances and the very existence of the church to depend?

But let it be especially considered, that according to the theory of the bishop, Timothy was, at the time this epistle was directed to him, a bishop or an apostle, and of course had received episcopal ordination—the main evidence which our prelatists present to prove this being derived from St. Paul's Epistles to him. Is it then at all probable that the apostle would dwell with such emphasis upon his having received “the presbyterate!” The *episcopate* which he had received was a much more elevated *gift*. When our diocesans are about to set apart a person to the order of a bishop, do they dwell upon the dignity of the *presbytership*? And if a newly-ordained bishop were to receive a charge from a

* Episcopacy Examined and Re-examined, p. 196.

senior bishop, would the argument run upon the presbytership, which he had long since received, and which would now be lost in the dignity of the higher order? Would there not be a manifest impropriety in this? But into this impropriety do our prelatists run the great apostle by the construction in question.

Again: let the natural meaning of the language be considered. Would any man, who had not a theory to support, ever suppose that the word *presbytery* here means the *office* imparted, and not the agency employed in its communication? Is there any tolerable sense in the passage according to this construction? Look at it. If this construction is the right one, St. Paul says, "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by the laying on of the hands of the gift." Who could tell what *the hands of the gift, or the hands of the office of the presbytership*, might mean? But it seems the apostle must be made to speak enigmatically—to talk without sense—or even to utter nonsense, rather than he should seem to favor ordination by presbyters. Bishop Onderdonk and Mr. Kip do indeed make the apostle speak good sense upon their hypothesis, but then they do this by supposing an ellipsis which, in this case, may not be taken for granted—they supply the sense by putting words into the apostle's mouth which he did not see proper to utter. In this way what may not the Scriptures be made to prove?

But we must give some attention to the authorities adduced in support of this interpretation. Mr. Kip here reiterates what Bishop H. U. Onderdonk asserts, and we maintain that they have both presented a most partial, and, upon the whole, a most erroneous statement of the case. As to the opinion of the "ancients," the bishop seems to derive his information from Poole's Synopsis; and upon examination it will appear that Poole takes the report of Scultetus for that. The following is the authority: "Ita vocem hanc accipiunt Hieron. Amb. Græci in Conc. Nicen., can. 2, Ancyran., can. 18, Euseb. et Soc."—*Epis. Ex., &c.*, p. 190, note. This, the bishop tells us, "Poole says in his Synopsis." He should rather have said, this is the report of Scultetus as given in Poole's Synopsis; but Poole himself explicitly dissents from the construction. For after presenting this exposition, with the authority upon which it is based, he adds, "*non placet*," and then proceeds to give three reasons against it. The following is the passage:—

"It is not satisfactory: 1. *With the imposition of the hands of the dignity of presbyterate*, is a forced rendering. 2. *Πρεσβυτέριον* often occurs in the New Testament, but never signifies an office, (which is *πρεσβυτερεῖον*), but a college, as in Luc. xxii, 66; Acts

xxii, 5. 3. The authority of Timothy was greater than can possibly be affirmed of *πρεσβυτέριον*, because he possessed authority over the presbyters, (chap. v, 19,) or secondly, over the assembly or college of presbyters, to wit, of the elders, that is, bishops."

In proof of this construction he gives us Cameron, Estius, Munsterus, Tirinus, Calvin, Vatablus, Zegerius, Schlegelius, (or Schmidius,) Beza, and Menochius. This is more properly what "Poole says in his Synopsis," for he takes this side of the question himself, and gives far more ample authorities for it than for the other construction.

The bishop is equally partial in quoting "the *Critica Sacra* of Sir Edward Leigh." He says from Lampriere that Sir Edward "was a member of the long parliament, and of the assembly of divines, and also a parliamentary general." We shall now quote all that is necessary to show with how little reason the learned bishop makes such a flourish with the name of Sir Edward Leigh, who he says was "surely an unexceptionable witness," for "he was learned," and besides all the rest, "a violent Presbyterian!" Well, what says this "learned violent Presbyterian?" Hear him.

"*Πρεσβυτέριον*, *Seniorum ordo*, *Presbyterium*. It signifieth a company of elders. *Presbyterium* in Latin is used by Cyprian, lib. 3, epist. 11, and l. 2, epist. 8 and 10, for a consistory of elders. 1 Tim. iv, 14. [Vide Beza.] It doth signify (saith one) not only a company of presbyters, but also the *office* and *function* of a presbyter."

In connection with each opinion he gives his authorities, the whole of which for the second the bishop gives, and only a portion of that which is adduced for the first.

Now let the reader attentively examine what the bishop quotes from Leigh. The first sense he gives of *πρεσβυτέριον*, is "*Seniorum ordo*,"* *Presbyterium*.—It signifieth a company of elders." He then quotes Cyprian as authority. Then he proceeds to the other opinion in this remarkable language, which the bishop quotes accurately, "It doth signify (saith one) not only a company of pres-

* The bishop understands by *Seniorum ordo*, "the *degree* or order of elders." If this were not the grave comment of a *bishop* upon a *Latin phrase*, we should be disposed to doubt its correctness. We were so stupid as to suppose that Leigh, by *Seniorum ordo*, meant the *class* of elders, and that if he had meant by the word "*ordo*," *degree*, or office, he would not have used the genitive plural, *Seniorum*. "The order of elders," [*elders*, in the plural] for "the degree" of an *elder*, is scarcely warranted by good use. Besides, it is evident that Leigh by *Seniorum ordo* did mean the *class of elders*, from the fact that he puts the words in apposition with *Presbyterium*, which he shows from Cyprian means "a consistory of elders."

byters, but also the *office* and *function* of a *presbyter*." Who this "ONE" is, who "*saith*" this, Leigh does not tell us, but it would be absurd enough to suppose he meant himself. His own opinion he had given in his first definition. Such then is the ground upon which the bishop claims the authority of this "violent Presbyterian" in support of the construction under consideration.

But let us return to the authorities adduced from Poole. Here he quotes from Scultetus the second canon of the Council of Nice, and the eighteenth of the Council of Ancyra, adduced in proof of the construction for which he contends. We have before us "the Canons of the six Œcumenical Councils, translated by Rev. Wm. A. Hammond, of Christ's Church, Oxford, 1843." And upon examination we find in the canons referred to, not the word "presbyterate, or presbytership," but "presbytery." This rendering turns those ancient councils directly against the bishop. How he will reconcile the matter with the Oxford translator, we, for the present, are not able to determine.

The bishop, and his copyist, Mr. Kip, are equally unfortunate, or unfair, in other cases. They claim CALVIN as a patron of the construction under consideration. Now the fact is, that though Calvin gives this construction in his *Institutes*, in his *Commentary* upon the place he goes wholly for the other view. These are his words: "*Presbyterium*—qui hic collectium nomen esse putant pro calligio presbyterarum postium, recte sentiunt *meos judicion*: that is, they who understand the word *presbytery*, in this place, to be a collective noun, put to signify the *college of presbyters*, are, in my judgment, right in their interpretation."

GROTIUS, another of their authorities, is in the same predicament. The bishop borrows from Dr. Cook a passage from this author which goes for construing the word *presbytery* for the office of presbyter, quoting in its support Jerome, Calvin, and others. But in his *Annotations* he, like Calvin, takes the other side, interpreting the word as a collective noun, for the college of presbyters. The following is his note upon the place:—

"That is, a serious invocation of divine aid accompanied the prophecy at the time when hands were placed upon thee. Paul himself had placed his hands upon Timothy, (2 Tim. i, 6,) but the custom was, for those presbyters who were present to impose their hands at the same time with the president of their assembly.—*Clemens Constitutionum*, viii, 16. Africa retained this custom for a long time; for we read in the acts of the Carthaginian synod, that when a presbyter was ordained, the bishop pronounced a benediction, and held his hand upon his head, and also, all the presbyters

present held their hands above his head next to the hand of the bishop. When the apostles, or assistants of the apostles, were not present, the ordination was performed by the president of the assembly, with the consent of the presbytery. But when the apostles or their assistants were present, this honor, as well as the right of presiding, belonged to them. But, notwithstanding, they did these and similar things in concert with the presbytery, as we see in this case. Thus, among the Jews, the president of the sanhedrim placed his hands upon judges who were chosen in behalf of the sanhedrim."

Now admitting, what seems to be the fact, that these learned commentators have given one construction in one place, and a different one in another place, the most that can be said is, that they have neutralized themselves, and are not good authority on either side. All we ask, then—and this we have clearly shown is our right—is, that these authors should not be adduced as authority on the other side. It is not fair, or consistent with truth, to urge that they go for interpreting the word *πρεσβυτερίον* as a term of office, when, in their notes upon the very passage in question, they make it a collective noun, standing for the college of presbyters. The most, as above urged, that can be plead on the opposite side is, that they have given their sanction to both interpretations, and so have said nothing to the purpose.

We have dwelt longer upon this point principally because there is such a display made of authorities. And after a tolerably extensive examination, we have come to the conclusion that all the authorities that can in justice be plead are of no weight at all. In the only places in the New Testament where the word *πρεσβυτερίον*, *presbuterion*, occurs, (Luke xxii, 66; Acts xxii, 5,) it must certainly be taken as a collective noun, for the *council of elders*. This being all the light we have upon the New Testament use of the word, there is no contrary evidence to be derived from that source. All the lexicographers we have access to interpret the word for a council of elders—a college of presbyters—an assembly of aged men—senate—or a presbytery. The commentators and critics run in the same channel. In this the best authorities—Romish, Episcopal, and Presbyterian—seem all to agree. We have consulted Erasmus, Cardinal Hugo, Hammond, Benson, Whitby, Bloomfield, Hewlett, Westminster Assembly, Diodati, Poole, Continuator of Henry, Macknight, Doddridge, Coppius, Rosenmuller, Wesley, Coke, A. Clarke, J. Benson, &c., &c., all of whom refer the word to the college of elders, and not to the office.

The construction here opposed was long since rejected by *Bax-*

ter, and fully refuted by *Gillispie*, by the Westminster Assembly, and by "the provincial synod of London."* And we venture to doubt whether Mr. Kip's "many of the most leading Presbyterian writers," who, he says, have given this construction, will not, upon due examination, dwindle down to two or three individuals, among whom must be reckoned Calvin and Grotius, and how far they are to be relied upon we have already seen.

Bishop Onderdonk himself, after all he urges in favor of this construction, does not adopt it, but rather concludes, that the apostle refers, in the passage in question, to an extraordinary commission, like that in Acts xiii, 1-3.

The same author also questions whether *χαρισματος*, *gift*, refers at all to the powers of the ministry. By this course he is obliged to give up 2 Tim. i, 6, and so to conclude that there is no allusion made in the Acts or Epistles to Timothy's ordination. Mr. Kip, however, does not venture out quite so far at sea, but admits *ordination proper* to be referred to in both passages. And then he disposes of the difficulty by supposing that Paul was the real *ordainer*, and that the presbyters laid on hands with him, "in token of their concurrence." In this he assumes what ought to be proved.

If the two passages refer to the same transaction, then Paul constituted a part of the presbytery, and his act is to be regarded not in the abstract, but in the concrete. This seems evident from the fact that, (in 1 Tim. iv, 14,) he mentions, in connection with the communication of the *gift*, the "laying on of the hands of the presbytery," as the instrumental cause of that which was imparted. Now if there were any such difference between the objects and purposes for which the hands of Paul, and those of the presbytery, were laid upon Timothy, as our prelatists pretend, why is it that the apostle gives no intimation of it? How can it be accounted for, that in the first place where he notices the transaction he leaves himself, who, according to them, was the *sole ordainer*, entirely out of the question? If the presbyters merely *gave consent*, while Paul did the work, how comes the apostle to lay the stress in this case upon *their* act? Was it not giving undue importance to an immaterial circumstance?

Our author, following his great leader, makes a shift to get rid of this difficulty. He proceeds:—

"If we critically examine these two passages, we shall find that the

* See Baxter's "Five Disputations on Church Government," p. 244—1659; Gillispie's "Treatise of Miscellaneous Questions," p. 89—1649; Annotations of the Westminster Assembly, in loc.; and "Jus Divinum Evangelici," pp. 181, 182—1654.

words selected clearly point out the different shares of the ordaining apostle and the consenting presbyters. He was ordained, St. Paul tells us, 'by (*δια*) the putting on of *my* hands,' 'with (*μετα*) the laying on of the hands of the presbytery.'"

Now this learned criticism, so far as the real question at issue is concerned, really amounts to nothing at all. There is no evidence that the *μετα*, *with*, refers to the act of Paul referred to 2 Tim. i, 6. Indeed, the most rational conclusion is, that it refers to *προφητείας*, *prophecy*. The construction upon this supposition is perfectly clear. We paraphrase the passage thus: Neglect not the gift which was given thee *δια*, through, or according to a well-known prophecy concerning thee, *μετὰ*, also, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery. "The words selected" are so far from clearly pointing out "the different shares of the *ordaining* apostle and the *consenting* presbyters," that if there were, in fact, any such "different shares," they make no allusion to it whatever.

The fourth lecture is headed, "Episcopacy proved from History." To the examination of this section we can give but a small amount of space, and we have no cause of regret on this account, because *very little* is called for.

The author's evidence from Clement and Polycarp is not at all to his purpose, as neither of these fathers makes the slightest allusion to the "three orders" of ministers. Nor do they anywhere intimate that the *episcopate* was the original *apostolate*. But he must make a show of authority from the earliest age, whether it possesses the least pertinency or not. The epistles we have from these two fathers are probably more free from corruption than any records of the church we have from the first age. And here the figment of apostolical succession finds no countenance.

As to the Epistles of Ignatius, upon which he draws so heavily, there is, to our mind, the clearest *prima facie* evidence that they have been sadly corrupted. His making the presbyters to fill the place of the council of the apostles, as we have already noticed, is wholly against the prelatical theory, and his putting the bishops in the place of God and Christ, and making obedience to them the condition of salvation, and a sure passport to heaven, is entirely *Popish*. The soundest Episcopalians have conceded that the language of the Epistles of Ignatius is far better suited to the fourth or fifth, than to the first age of the church. With these general remarks, we must pass on.

In this lecture our author turns aside, in a note, to inform his readers that "there is a body of Christians, called 'Methodist Episcopal,' which" he had "not included in" his "list" of "*Episcopal*"

churches, "because, although they have the office of bishop, yet it is in name only, and without any legitimate authority."—P. 137. Very well—say his high-Church readers—but all this we knew before—we could but know there was such "a body of Christians," for they have insinuated themselves into almost every nook and corner in the wide world, and that their bishops "are without any legitimate authority" we have seen in print, and heard asserted a thousand times. But, good sirs, wait with patience, for Mr. Kip has something more to tell you. Of Mr. Wesley he says,—

"After professing, through his whole life, that he did not intend to abandon the Church, or create a schism, when eighty-two years old he was induced to lay hands on Dr. Coke, and thus pretend to consecrate him a bishop for America."—P. 138.

Yes, indeed! and he did still worse things, for he ordained several of his preachers *presbyters* for *England*! And still he "did not intend to *abandon* the Church"—not at all—nor did he do so to the last. John Wesley's position was simply this: By an extraordinary system of efforts—efforts not contemplated in the economy of the Church of England—he had, under God, been the means of raising up a numerous Christian communion, who looked to him for pastors and discipline. Finding it impossible, in this exigency, to attend to their wants without departing in some measure from canonical order, he determined to provide for them upon Scriptural principles, and if the bishops would permit him to do so, still to remain in connection with the national Church. He went on, and they did not disturb him. Now where is the responsibility? If the English bishops were too kindly disposed toward Mr. Wesley, or too indifferent to discipline to bring it to bear upon so flagrant an offender, with what grace do Churchmen now fall upon him as an arch schismatic? Every such effort is an assault upon the Church of England. It shows clearly that there was no discipline in that Church—that it was a dead carcass, whose very bowels might be devoured without the least resistance.

Our author next proceeds to the evidence. And first he has a part of Charles Wesley's letter to Dr. Chandler. Charles Wesley was a most excellent man, and a zealous coadjutor of his brother in the great reformation in which he was engaged; but was a better poet than he was a philosopher. Indeed, he was rather an inconsistent Churchman, and hardly a consistent Methodist; while John, though not a very good Churchman, was a good Methodist—and consistent reformer. In this letter Charles finds fault with John's ordinations upon Church principles, when those principles were, by himself, equally disregarded in other matters. He charges his

"brother" with violating "the principles and practices of his whole life," when he had only carried out those principles to their legitimate results. After all, it appears from a "P. S." to his letter, which, by the way, Mr. Kip does not give, that the great distress of Charles arose from an apprehension that the "poor Methodists" in America had not the men among them whose disinterestedness and wisdom would carry them safe through the crisis. "After my brother's death," says he, "which is now so very near, what will be their end? They will lose all their influence and importance; they will turn aside to vain janglings; they will settle down upon their lees, and, like other sects of dissenters, come to nothing." We need scarcely say that these fears were wholly groundless.

Another point in the letter is the confidence he expresses in the success of Bishop Seabury in his plan to import "the succession" from the nonjurors of Scotland. This part of the letter is always referred to by Churchmen with emphasis. They must put the sentences, "*his ordination would indeed be genuine, valid, and episcopal,*" and "A REAL PRIMITIVE BISHOP," in italics and capitals. In this Mr. Kip follows the fashion; just as though the world did not know that in all this Mr. Charles Wesley was wholly misled. Bishop Seabury was not even permitted to constitute the third man in establishing "the succession." When they had the canonical number without him, they did, indeed, permit him to lay on hands in the ordination of bishops, perhaps merely by way of "*consent.*" But this letter must be kept stirring. We doubt if there is a file of Church papers in the land of any considerable extent that does not contain it, and some there are in which, if we are not mistaken, it can be found more than once.

The next important fact he presents is, that "Dr. Coke himself felt his ordination to be invalid, and often by his acts admitted it." This we roundly deny. But let us attend to the proof adduced. He proposed to Bishops White and Seabury, for their consideration, the union of the Protestant Episcopal and the Methodist Episcopal Churches, and offered to submit to a reimposition of hands. And just before he left England for India, he proposed to Mr. Wilberforce to receive episcopal consecration from his grace of Canterbury, and go upon that mission under the auspices of the Church of England. Now the facts are not denied, but we contend that they do not prove the position. Dr. Coke did not consider ordination "an indelible imprint upon the soul," nor a commission from Jesus Christ: but a mere recognition of his divine call and solemn designation to the work, by a branch of the Church, whose authority is merely human, and only extends to those within its

own pale. And consequently he did not suppose that submitting to a reimposition of hands was conceding that his former ordination was "invalid." This he fully and explicitly declared with regard to his proposition to Bishop White, and the same must be presumed to have been his view in the proposition he made to Mr. Wilberforce.

But the doctor mistook his course, and it is now quite obvious that he mistook his men. He was simple-hearted and confiding; but his ardor often led him into errors which he found it necessary afterward to retract. But what should be thought of the man's head or heart who can exhibit these instances of inconsistency in a good but sometimes mistaken man, as evidence of base hypocrisy? Mr. Kip closes the account in these remarkable words:—

"Failing in this, he was obliged to settle down for life with the conviction that his office was a pretence, and his *episcopal* shield deformed by the *bend sinister*."—P. 139.

It would be well for the Church and the world if no man's "episcopal shield" had ever been more "deformed by the *bend sinister*" than that of Dr. Coke. But we must forbear. We have no pleasure in animadverting upon such hasty, mistaken, uncatholic, and unjust censures as this, especially upon the dead. After all, we are willing to leave the question for a candid world to determine, which is presented in the most advantageous position before posterity, the good but mistaken Dr. Coke, or those who have abused his confidence by publishing to the world his *confidential* communications, contrary to his expectations and requests.*

We marvel not at all, after all this array of *proof*, that our author makes up this grave conclusion: "Such, then, is Methodism in this country—*without a Church or a ministry*." Here then we are, and here I suppose we shall continue to be, "without a Church or a ministry," until we can be won over by the *reasoning, courtesy, and kindness* of such high-Church teachers as the author of "the Double Witness."

The fourth lecture is upon the "Antiquity of the Forms of Prayer." The gentleman's authorities do not serve his purpose. Bingham, upon whom he relies for proof of his main positions, admits that "every bishop," originally, "had liberty to frame the liturgy of his own church,"—and that "in after ages—about the year 506—

*The reader will find this whole matter fully discussed and explained in Bishop Emory's Defence of our Fathers, Dr. Bangs' History of the Methodist E. Church, and Mr. Jackson's Letter to Dr. Pusey—all of which are on sale at the Methodist Book Room, 200 Mulberry-street.

efforts were made to reduce the liturgies to uniformity." And that "those liturgies which were certainly compiled in books in the earlier ages, are now in a great measure lost by the injuries of time." And of "the old Gallican, Spanish, African, and Roman liturgies," this learned Churchman says "there is nothing but fragments and dismembered parcels now remaining."* Still Mr. Kip, following Mr. Palmer, tries to prove that these "primitive liturgies" now remain in all their integrity, and that "it is difficult to assign their origin to a lower period than the apostolic age." All this Du Pin proves most conclusively to be totally groundless.† Against such authorities Mr. Kip, and even his friend Mr. Palmer, are of but little weight.

The want of space forbids our following the author through in regular order. We had marked many passages, good, bad, and indifferent, which we intended to notice. We also designed to sketch out *the Church system*, and give our objections to it, but this we must waive until another opportunity shall occur. A few gleanings is all we can now add.

We might give several specimens of the horror with which the author regards the Reformation. One must suffice:—

"The reformers indeed have given a mournful illustration of that declaration made by Irenæus, with regard to the heretics of his time—'No correction can be made by them so great, as is the mischief of schism.'"—P. 128.

So the blasphemies of Leo X., the licentiousness of the monks, the impudent sale of indulgences by Tetzels, the acknowledged heresies of the Council of Trent, the gross idolatry of the Romish worship, and the shameless wickedness of the great body of the clergy, all together constituted a *less evil* than the simple separation of the reformers from the communion of the Romish Church! Such is the Protestantism of the author of "the Double Witness!" A minister, indeed, he is, in "the Protestant Episcopal Church;" and though he doubtless loves her much, there is no slight indication here that he "loves Rome more."

It is quite amusing to find our author so deluded with the notion that "her wonderful increase" is the cause of concerted opposition to "the Church"—that for this reason "now there is on every side a rallying to stop her progress!" Such has been this "wonderful increase," that at this moment, if we are correctly advised, the whole number of her communicants do not amount to more than

* Origines Ecclesiasticæ, book xiii, chap. v, sec. 1, 2, 3.

† See Eccl. Hist., vol. i, pp. 8, 9.

one half the number of the *net increase* of the Methodist Episcopal Church during *the last year*!

Our author talks about "carping;" "ignorance and fanaticism;" and "renouncing for a time all dependence on reason, and suffering the imagination to be awakened to a perfect delirium," and of "'a mixed multitude,' which encircle the camp of the true Israel as it journeys through the wilderness." All this is so connected as to show his great self-complacency, and utter contempt for "the different denominations."

But we find in a note a passage from the quaint old writer, Thomas Fuller, which affected us quite pleasantly. Small as our space is, we must give the passage:—

"What may be the cause why so much cloth so soon changeth color? It is because it was never wet wadded, which giveth the fixation to a color, and setteth it in the cloth. What may be the reason why so many, now-a-days, are carried about with every wind of doctrine, even to scour every point in the compass round about? Surely it is because they were never well catechised in the principles of religion."—P. 284.

There is a world of good sense here, which Mr. Kip did not fail to perceive. He had undoubtedly often noticed that many of those who come into "the Church" from "the denominations" give sad proof that they were never "wet wadded." And it is generally only by delivering lectures upon "Church principles," and publishing books, pamphlets, &c., that they can give the requisite proof of that "fixation" which is absolutely necessary to a Churchman. Hence it comes to pass that some of the most violent assaults which "the different denominations" receive from Churchmen, in these days, come from those who were baptized within their pale, and whose fathers, mothers, and friends still live in their communion. Much good may these "*never wet wadded*" children do their *step-mothers*! "the different denominations" can do without them.

We have now done with "the Double Witness." Notwithstanding the criticisms which we have thought called for, we would say, there are some clever passages in the work. There is, indeed, little that may be properly called evangelical truth. Still there is displayed, in many portions of the work, no little effort at representing religion in a lovely and winning form. In all this, however, there is too much Oxford *sentimentality*. A beautiful drapery will never remedy the radical defects of a false system.

We must in justice to the publishers finally say, that this book, whatever we think of the matter, is a beautiful specimen of the art.

ART. VIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *A Treatise on Infant Baptism.* By REV. F. G. HIBBARD, of the Genesee Conference. 12mo., pp. 328. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1843.

THE work now before us is designed as the second part of a complete work on the subject of baptism; the part upon the *mode* having been previously published. The whole, in our opinion, constitutes the best work upon the subject extant. The author has brought into requisition an amount of learning, judgment, and perseverance not very common in these times. His research into the *historical* evidence has been thorough, and the results, especially to those who have not access to Dr. Wall, and other authorities, to which he refers, are peculiarly important. The author has gone upon the principle that the argument is *cumulative*, and consequently that a great variety of facts and considerations which abstractly would have but little weight, in connection with each other, and as parts of a whole, are really important. He has not only discussed the subject with reference to the system of our Baptist brethren, but also as it is affected by the views of high-Churchmen. We commend this instructive work to all who wish to enter into a thorough investigation of the subject. The two parts, bound together, make a book of respectable size, and should be found in the library of every Methodist preacher.

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2. *History of the Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church.* By REV. ROBERT EMORY. 12mo., pp. 350. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1844.

WE have here what has for years been a desideratum. Our Discipline is an anomaly. It has come into existence piecemeal, and every four years it undergoes a revision, and the preceding edition is superseded. The history of the book is now personally known to but few. And as the history of many of the regulations of the Discipline sheds much light upon their meaning and design, that history has been increasing in importance with the multiplication of questions with regard to them, and of changes proposed to be effected in their provisions. The author has certainly been exceedingly fortunate in obtaining his materials, and has arranged and adjusted them most happily. His industry and zeal in perfecting a work of so much difficulty and delicacy are truly commendable. Though from the nature of the work it cannot be what is sometimes called a *readable book*, and furnishes the author little opportunity for speaking or being seen himself, yet he, merely to serve the interests of the church, and especially to meet a pressing emergency, has delved through the whole course of investigation with a patience and perseverance by no means common. We heartily thank our learned and worthy brother Emory for this timely and necessary production. We hope it will be carefully studied, especially by those whose situation will require all the light upon the past history of

every part of the Discipline which can possibly be obtained. It will, we trust, guide our General Conference in some salutary changes, and serve to prevent any wrong action. We make this suggestion with the utmost respect for that body. We have often felt the need of such a work, and we doubt not but many of our venerated seniors have felt the same.

3. *Appeal from Tradition to Scripture and Common Sense, or an Answer to the Question, What constitutes the Divine Rule of Faith and Practice.* By GEORGE PECK. 12mo., pp. 472. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1844.

WE place the title-page of this work among those issued during the past quarter from the Book Room press, for the information of the public, and advantage of the Concern. We were led into the investigation from a conviction of its real importance, and an impression that a small work upon the subject would meet an urgent demand. Nothing of the sort has ever been issued from our press, while great interest is taken by all classes of Christians in the controversy occasioned by the publication of the Oxford Tracts. The great principles in question, and the development of the origin and tendency of the heresy which we oppose, now eminently call for the attention of all enlightened Protestants. The Methodist Episcopal Church has as much at stake in the great question of *the rule of faith* as any other branch of the great Protestant family. And certainly she ought to take her appropriate part in the great battle now in progress. Supposing we had availed ourselves of the means of presenting the subject clearly and fully, and fearing that no one possessed of like facilities, and better qualified to improve them, would engage in the work, we have made an attempt to meet the exigency. We have done our best, and shall hope for a measure of the success which alone can compensate us for the toil and anxiety which the execution of the work has cost us. Our object is the good of the church at large, but especially of that branch of it with which we are immediately connected. That the argument may, by those who are best qualified to judge, be considered conclusive, whatever becomes of the author, is the principal object of our solicitude.

4. *History of Europe from the Commencement of the French Revolution in 1789, to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815.* 4 vols., 8vo. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1843.

THE character of Alison's Europe is already too well established to stand in need of commendation, or to fear criticism; but if it were not, we should not presume to discuss a question of such moment, within the compass to which we are here restricted: we have therefore, in this notice of it, only to express our entire concurrence with the public voice, in regard to its value as an historical work, and con-

fine our present remarks to the American edition just issued from the press of Harper and Brothers.

It was rather a hazardous undertaking at this time, when the public craving is so strong for light and frivolous literature, to venture upon a reprint of ten thick octavo volumes of history, and it is to be hoped, for the encouragement of the publishers, that they will derive a profit from it proportionate to the moral and pecuniary benefit they have conferred upon the community. The work has received the stamp of a standard history, and of course may claim a place in every public and private library. The period which it embraces is one of unequaled interest in the annals of the world, and it will never be treated with more ability, correctness, and impartiality by any English writer, until the deep-rooted national prejudices of the English are eradicated. In the American edition we have this history in a very convenient form, on good paper, in a fair, well-defined type, for one-tenth of the cost of an English copy. We have so far compared it with the third Edinburgh and London editions, as to be able to say that it is Alison's whole history; and we may add, that it is quite as correct, typographically, as the original. Its merits, therefore, may be briefly summed up as follows:—It gives us, for a very small price, a work of great intrinsic value to every reader, and of indispensable necessity to the historical inquirer, equally complete and correct, and every way as good for general purposes as the very costly, and, to most persons, inaccessible original; in other words, it puts into circulation among us thousands of copies for every single one that there would otherwise have been. But there is one consideration which gives to the edition of the Harpers a value superior to that of the English; the seventy-sixth chapter, which relates wholly to this country, as here printed, has passed the author's revision, and the many flagrant errors by which it was disgraced are either corrected by him in the text, or are pointed out and refuted in the accompanying notes. As it now stands, it must satisfy our most sensitive national pride; the bane carries with it its antidote: in fact, it is even better to have an opportunity of circulating such triumphant refutations of erroneous charges and misrepresentations than that they should never have been made. In justice, however, to Mr. Alison, it should here be said, that in his remarks upon America he has evidently been guided more by his political principles than by his personal feelings—every disorder, defect, and inferiority which he thinks he discovers in our institutions, or in our social, moral, and intellectual condition, he attributes to his great first cause of all evil—democracy; apart from this, he, with some exceptions, shows a kind spirit toward us, and justly appreciates our country and character.

We observe that the American publishers have added an index to their edition, which is a great convenience in using it as a book of reference, and without which no book of any extent can be considered perfect. This alone is of sufficient importance to make it preferable to the English edition as a library book.

5. *History of the Conquest of Mexico, with a Preliminary View of the Ancient Mexican Civilization, and the Life of the Conqueror, Hernando Cortés.* By WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT. 3 vols., 8vo. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS is the long anxiously expected work from Mr. Prescott, the announcement of which excited the highest anticipations of interest, as well from the romantic nature of the subject, which has all the excitement of a novel, as from the general admiration of the high historical qualities of the author's *Ferdinand and Isabella*. This expectation will not be disappointed. The work is unaffected and simple in style; historical difficulties are calmly weighed; the incidental illustrations in the notes are happily introduced; the political and social remarks are in a vein of good sense and enlarged humanity. The liberal and scholarlike tributes to the labors and good fame of the original historians form one of the most attractive portions of the work, and prepare the reader to welcome warmly the merits of the historian himself, who pursues his task under difficulties scarcely inferior to those endured by the most persecuted of his predecessors, though of a different kind. Mr. Prescott tells us, in his preface, that he has written this work (by the help of a writing-case made for the blind) without being able himself to read or correct his original draft. It would require a learned reader to detect this from the book itself, which is especially free from all repetitions and redundancies, and particularly furnished with those illustrative comments which require peculiar care and diligence, and seemingly great nicety of eye as well as discipline of mind. The circumstances under which Mr. Prescott's books are produced will be as memorable in literary history as the books themselves will be lasting. The present work embraces, in addition to the History proper, a view of the ancient Mexican civilization, in which Mr. Prescott reverses the order of Robertson, who gives us this portion of his work last. Either method has its advantages. With Robertson, we pursue the natural order of discovery, and first notice the natural features of the country, the productions of the soil, the manners and habits of the natives, their altars and superstitions, as they successively come into the view of the first invaders; and at the close, when the brilliant drama of Cortés is finished, we sit down and review the resources of the land, its pomp and grandeur, and the fatal elements of its weakness. Mr. Prescott admits us at once behind the scenes, anticipates the discoveries of the conquerors, but makes us at home in the country, so that we may weigh impartially the difficulties, dangers, and prowess of the little army of Cortés. The introductory portion of his work, Mr. Prescott tells us, has cost him as much labor and time as the remainder of the History. It is admirably prepared. Learning never appeared more amiable than in these well-informed, picturesque pages. Let the reader, who would note the advancement of historical science, compare the details of these chapters with the similar portion of Robertson's History, (which all value and honor who can appreciate an eloquent, harmonious style, and a refined spirit of observation,) and observe the new and important illustrations Mr. Prescott has added.

This work is of a still more popular character than the History of Ferdinand and Isabella, and we anticipate for it a still wider circulation. It is admirably printed, and furnished with maps and portraits. The engravings are very spirited.

We shall probably take occasion again to speak of this elegant and valuable work.

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6. *The Æneid of Virgil, with English Notes, Critical and Explanatory, a Metrical Clavis, and an Historical, Geographical, and Mythological Index.* By CHARLES ANTHON, LL.D. 12mo., pp. 942. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1843.

THE laborious diligence of Professor Anthon has just produced a new volume of his series of illustrations of the classics, in a full and completely annotated edition of the Æneid. The Georgics and Eclogues are reserved for a separate volume. And a rare couple of volumes they will prove, enriched by the labors of the best European scholarship, and acceptable alike to young and old. Verily the children of this generation should be wiser than their forefathers with such "appliances and means to boot." Here, in addition to the storehouse of learning—the essence of no small library—are the most literal pictorial illustrations of former medals, coins, vases, antique sculpture, of the dress, manners, public monuments and mythology of the ancients, executed in the finest outline, and introduced among the notes just where they are most needed to aid and give life to the text. In this respect the present work is beautiful and unique. If such incentives, with such a book of poetry appealing to the eye, the ear, and the imagination, do not create scholars by inspiring a taste for liberal learning, there is no charm in literature. Such a book is a Virgilian library in itself. How it would have been treasured, the pillow-companion by night, the bosom friend in many a solitary walk and quiet hour by day, if such a book could have been produced at the revival of classic literature in Europe! These Roman vases which now adorn the page were then buried in Herculaneum and Pompeii; no zealous antiquarian had removed the tangled bushes and way-side dust which covered the monuments and inscriptions of Rome; no German students had solved the mysteries of prosody. Where, indeed, was the German language—which now echoes the nicest distinctions of the classic literature in the most varied metres—at that time? Charles V. said it was the language for horses. It is something after all to be a modern—to stand on the shoulders of the old giants. Even now we fear we live an age too soon. Here, in Professor Anthon's notes to the text, perplexities are solved, elegantly and intellectually, which in our earlier day were indoctrinated by the birch and ferula. There is something about the books which deserves to be noticed. They make teachers as well as scholars! There is mental capital enough for the stock in trade of a whole academy.

This is not only the best library edition, but the very cheapest school-boy edition of the Æneid that has been published. The same

information contained in this volume is not accessible to the young student in any other shape, for much of it is otherwise locked up in foreign languages, and that portion of it which may be obtained in English would cost tenfold the price of this book. In fine, this is a volume of nearly *a thousand pages*, of which the text in large open type forms about one-fourth, and the notes, in very compact small type, occupy the remaining *three-fourths*. The reader can judge better from this fact than from any other statement that could be made in a brief literary notice, of the learned industry of the author.

Professor Anthon's series of school and college classics now comprises fifteen volumes, including the necessary elementary works—editions of Sallust, Cesar, Cicero, Horace, and the Greek Reader, the Classical Dictionary, and the Dictionary of Antiquities. The whole are printed and bound uniformly.

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7. *Mesopotamia and Assyria, from the Earliest Ages to the Present Time; with Illustrations of their Natural History.* By J. BAILLIE FRASER, Esq., author of "An Historical and Descriptive Account of Persia," &c. With a map and engravings. 18mo., pp. 336. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THE land of Abraham, of Nineveh and Babylon, of the conquerors of the apostate kingdoms of Judah and Israel, must possess peculiar interest to the mind of the Christian; and the qualifications of the author of the present account are such as to warrant the confidence of the public in him as a faithful and exact writer. He has sought his materials, in addition to the sacred Scriptures, throughout the works of ancient and modern travellers and historians: and in his personal observations of the country he has found much to throw light upon the subject. The drawings which illustrate the volume were made by himself on the spot; and everything about the volume bears the evidence of truth and accuracy.

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8. *American Biography.* By JEREMY BELKNAP, D. D. *With Additions and Notes.* By F. M. HUBBARD. 3 vols., 18mo., pp. 370, 333, and 315. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

DR. BELKNAP'S work has, for the last forty years, been referred to as a standard authority by more recent writers on American history; and it is a worthy monument of the fidelity, correct judgment, candor, elegance of style, and industry of the author. The present edition has been enlarged by copious and valuable notes, comprising the results of a close comparison of the original work with the authorities used by Dr. Belknap, and a careful examination of documents and works not accessible to him. These notes add greatly to the value of the work. Among the more prominent of the persons noticed are Columbus, De Soto, Raleigh, Gilbert, De Fuca, Champlain, Lord Delaware, Gosnold, Robinson, Gilbert, Carver, Winslow, Standish, Winthrop, Lord Baltimore, Penn, &c.

9. *Natural History: The Elephant as he exists in a wild State, and as he has been made subservient, in Peace and War, to the Purposes of Man.* 18mo., pp. 300. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THE elephant is one of the most remarkable creations of the divine skill. His size, strength, and sagacity, his docility and acuteness, demand our reverent admiration of his Creator; while the reflection that man, by the faculties with which he has been endowed, has been able to tame and render subservient to himself this formidable animal, should tend to increase our wonder and awe in view of the Mind which framed all things. The present volume comprises a very full and particular account of the elephant, his habits and characteristics; and it is filled with entertainment and instruction. The anecdotes related are of the most amusing cast; and the volume is embellished by thirty-seven well-executed engravings.

10. *Polynesia; or, an Historical Account of the Principal Islands in the South Sea, including New-Zealand; the Introduction of Christianity; and the Actual Condition of the Inhabitants in regard to Civilization, Commerce, and the Arts of Social Life.* By the Right Rev. M. RUSSELL, LL. D. and D. C. L., (of St. John's College, Oxford,) author of "View of Ancient and Modern Egypt," "Palestine, or the Holy Land," "Nubia and Abyssinia," "History and Present Condition of the Barbary States," &c. With a map and vignette. 18mo., pp. 362. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

DR. RUSSELL's contributions to popular literature have been of the most attractive and valuable character; and his present subject is full of interest, both on account of recent political movements in the South Sea Islands, and of the wonderful spread of Christianity there since its first promulgation by missionaries in 1795. In one or two instances, the author being a clergyman of the Church of England, has permitted his peculiar views of church ordinances to be prominent; but not sufficiently to impair in the least the value of the book. The groups described in this volume are the Georgian, Society, Marquesas, Low, Austral, Hervey, Tonga, Feejee, Navigators, New-Hebrides, Louisiade, Solomon, Ladrone, Sandwich, and New-Zealand; and the field which it occupies, with the able manner in which it is cultivated, cannot fail to render the work extensively popular.

11. *Perilous Adventures; or, Remarkable Instances of Courage, Perseverance, and Suffering.* By R. A. DAVENPORT. 18mo., pp. 335. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS volume comprises historical notices of remarkable personal adventures, and is designed, aside from its intrinsic interest, to show the power of the human mind to overcome difficulties and dangers, when exerted with self-possession and perseverance. The various accounts contained in the work describe the adventures of Prince

Charles Edward, the first Pretender; J. J. Cazanov, a Venetian state prisoner; Charles II., in his attempt to recover the throne; the earl of Nithsdale, one of the Jacobin rebels of 1715; Stanislaus Leczinski, the good but unfortunate king of Poland; and Cortés, in his expulsion from and reconquest of Mexico.

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12. *Hand-book for Readers and Students, intended as a Help to Individuals, Associations, School Districts, and Seminaries of Learning, in the Selection of Works for Reading, Investigation, or Professional Study.* By A. POTTER, D. D. In three parts:—I. Courses of Study. II. Standard Authors. III. Books for Popular and Miscellaneous Libraries. 18mo., pp. 330. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS work supplies an important desideratum. The difficulty experienced by young associations in furnishing themselves with suitable libraries is very great; and private individuals, whether of limited or ample means, have found it not an easy task to dispose of their money to proper advantage, or to make a well-assorted and useful selection of books. Dr. Potter having been requested by the Young Men's Association of the State of New-York to prepare a work which should obviate the want thus created, has given the present volume to the public; and for the intended purpose it is extremely valuable. It is interspersed with very useful suggestions in reference to the selection of books, and contains, wherever practicable and necessary, short notes on the scope, design, and value of the works indicated.

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13. *Woman in America; being an Examination into the Moral and Intellectual Condition of American Female Society.* By MRS. A. J. GRAVES. 18mo., pp. 262. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS is a book eminently worthy of the attention of all females. It is intended to awaken them to a sense of their true duties, and to stimulate them to take their proper position in society. It examines the various classes of American females, as domestic, fashionable, religious, intellectual, and morally great women; and abounds in the most instructive lessons, and in the purest inculcations. There is a spirit of earnest piety running through the work, which cannot fail to enforce the truths set forth.

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14. *Vegetable Substances used for the Food of Man.* 18mo., pp. 271. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS volume is devoted to an interesting and instructive subject. It is intended to give every information in reference to our daily food, showing the original locality of the plants producing the various substances, their subsequent diffusion, the modifications they have undergone, their different properties, the methods adopted for their cultivation, their commercial importance, &c. It forms a very curious and entertaining work; and teaches, if we will but heed them, lessons of

the divine goodness and wisdom. The principal items treated of are wheat, rye, oats, rice, maize, buckwheat, potatoes, arrow-root, sweet potatoes, yams, bananas, sago, peas, beans, turnips, carrots, parsnips, beets, cabbages, spinach, asparagus, onions, lettuce, mustard, cresses, celery, radishes, pie-plant, parsley, mint, thyme, sage, marjoram, balm, mushrooms, cinnamon, cloves, nutmegs, ginger, pepper, allspice, coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar, &c. The volume is illustrated by 45 engravings.

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15. *Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political.* By FRANCIS BACON, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, and Lord High Chancellor of England. And *The Conduct of the Understanding.* By JOHN LOCKE, Esq. With an *Introductory Essay*, by A. POTTER, D. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Union College. 18mo., pp. 299. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

A FAVOR is conferred upon the youth of our land in the publication of these excellent and popular portions of the works of the great philosophers, Bacon and Locke. There is so much of the flippant and trifling in modern education, so much of the superficial and trivial in the works now issued for popular use, that the appearance of works of such solid stamp and sound sense as this is extremely gratifying to the true friend of the people. We trust its circulation will be commensurate with its value.

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16. *Memoir of the Life, Labors, and Extensive Usefulness of the Rev. Christmas Evans: a distinguished Minister of the Baptist Denomination in Wales. Extracted from the Welsh Memoir.* By DAVID PHILLIPS. 12mo., pp. 258. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1843.

THE subject of this Memoir was an extraordinary man. We cannot give a better idea of him, and of the book in which his history is sketched, than will be gathered from the following *recommendation* of the Rev. Dr. Williams:—

“The name of Christmas Evans is already widely known. The extract from one of his sermons, generally published under the title of the ‘*Specimen of Welsh Preaching*,’ has been sufficient, among Christians speaking the English language, to establish his character as a preacher of sublime genius, and of lofty powers of imagination. For his genius and power in the pulpit, Robert Hall is well known to have had him in high admiration. It is not perhaps as generally known among American Christians that he was equally eminent for piety and ministerial usefulness. The Memoir prepared for the use of English readers by his countryman, the Rev. D. Phillips, as exhibiting his unremitted labors, and the blessing of God that accompanied them, and the simplicity, devotedness, and disinterestedness of his character, will be found, in the judgment of the subscriber, one of interest and value.

“To the Baptists of the United States it may have also still another recommendation, as bringing to their view the character and habits of the numerous and flourishing churches of their denomination in the principality of Wales.”

17. *The History of the Church of England to the Revolution, 1688.*

By THOMAS VOWLER SHORT, D. D., Bishop of Sodor and Man. First American, from the third English edition. 8vo., pp. 352. Philadelphia: James M. Campbell & Co. New-York: Saxton & Miles. 1843.

THE History of the Church of England is a portion of ecclesiastical history which has been variously drawn out. By the admirers of the Establishment its faults have been concealed or extenuated, and by its enemies the elements of true Christianity which it contains have been purposely veiled or sadly misunderstood. A few writers like Bishops Burnet and Short, though members of the English Church, have nevertheless written with a good degree of impartiality. They have not hesitated to acknowledge that there are some things wanting to make that Church strictly conformable to the primitive pattern. They confess and mourn her want of discipline. They feel the trammels of the state, and sigh for some melioration of her cumbrous ceremonies. And they are willing to allow to "dissenters" some share in the covenanted mercies of God. The writings of such Churchmen we peruse with pleasure, and are happy to see them reissued from the American press. The publishers of Bishop Short's History have rendered a valuable service to American Christians, by giving them an edition of this well-written and generally impartial history of the English hierarchy in a convenient form and at a small price. To all students of the ecclesiastical affairs of Great Britain we most cordially recommend Bishop Short's History.

18. *Ecclesiastes Angelicanus: being a Treatise on Preaching, as adapted to a Church of England Congregation: in a Series of Letters to a Young Clergyman.* By Rev. W. GRESLEY, M. A., late Student in Christ Church. First American from the second London edition. With Supplementary Notes, collected and arranged by Rev. BENJAMIN J. HAIGHT, M. A. 12mo., pp. 340. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: G. S. Appleton. 1843.

THOUGH, as might be expected, from the title of the book before us, it contains canons on sermonizing not precisely suited to a Methodist preacher, yet it is, upon the whole, a work of great merit, and well worth the study of all young ministers. The author suits his advices to the plan of "writing sermons" and "preaching" them from the paper. And upon his plan few in this country will doubt the propriety of his advice: "Always write your own sermons." For if men will "preach" written sermons, surely they ought to write them themselves.

Many of the principles presented by the author are equally applicable to written and oral discourses—to preaching with and without notes; and hence the work may be profitably read by extemporaneous preachers. We might take several slight exceptions to this book, but we readily waive them for the sake of the sound philosophical, rhetorical, and Christian maxims which it contains. The minister who follows out its leading principles will not fail to be a successful ambassador of Christ.

19. *Modern History*, from the French of M. MITCHELET. *With an Introduction.* By A. POTTER, D. D. 18mo., pp. 433. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS volume is designed as a text-book in modern history for seminaries of learning, as well as a work for general reading. It is free from the general fault of such concise sketches, and invested with a considerable degree of spirit and interest. It occupies the period from 1453 to 1789, and is written with much candor and judgment. Dr. Potter's Introduction sets forth the merits of the History in a clear and advantageous light.

20. *The Writings of Jane Taylor.* In three volumes. New-York: Saxon & Miles. Boston: Saxon & Pierce.

THESE volumes embrace the memoirs and correspondence, and the miscellaneous productions—in prose and verse—of a most pious and gifted lady. There is much here calculated to improve the understanding, to rectify the life, and to please the imagination. The vices and follies of youth are graphically painted and strongly rebuked, and parents are presented with a variety of examples and facts, which, if well considered, will not fail to help them in the important and highly-responsible business of directing their offspring in the way they should go. The volumes are neatly got up, and will constitute a pleasing and useful appendage to the family store of books with which every household should be provided.

21. *The Christian Student.—Memoir of Isaac Jennison, Jun., late a Student of the Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.* Containing his Biography, Diary, and Letters. By EDWARD OTHEMAN. 18mo., pp. 271. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1843.


THIS is emphatically a *good* book. The subject of this Memoir was an ardently-pious and highly-promising young man. He was cut down in the morning of life—at the opening of a career of extensive usefulness. But he has left upon record a portrait of his pious breathings and struggles, from which, we trust, many of our youth will derive profitable instruction. How sublime a spectacle have we here! A youth diving into the very depths of perfect love! May the spirit of this manual be diffused through our schools and colleges!

22. *Memoir of Miss Catharine Reynolds, of Poughkeepsie, N. Y. With Selections from her Diary and Letters.* Edited by REV. GEORGE COLES. 12mo., pp. 212. New-York: Published for the proprietors, at the Methodist Book Room, 200 Mulberry-street. 1844.

THIS is an admirable volume. The subject was a most gifted and devoted young lady. Her pious reflections while under God's chastening hand, present most edifying specimens of the sovereignty of grace. The triumphant joy with which she gradually approached the grave, and the courage with which she met her last foe, exhibit the most lucid proof that she had followed no "cunningly-devised fable." How advantageously does such a mind contrast with the class of vain, novel-reading young ladies of the present age! Our friend, the editor, has arranged and presented the matter in fine taste, and his own contributions are, as might be expected, in perfect keeping with the chaste and beautiful productions of his subject. We most heartily recommend this work to all, but especially to the female portion of our readers.

23. *The Christian's Inheritance: or a Collection of the Promises of Scripture.* By SAMUEL CLARKE, D. D. 18mo., pp. 192. New-York: Saxon & Miles. Boston: Saxon, Price & Co. 1843.

AN excellent pocket companion. The promises of Scripture are here arranged under appropriate heads. A Christian will scarcely be brought into a state of mind, in which by the aid of this manual he will not be conducted to a rich store of blessed promises in God's word, which will be applicable to his condition, and afford him support.



Painted by J. H. Hill

Engraved by H. M. Chapman

REV. WILLIAM A. GILLET.

Of the New York Congress

J. P. Smith, Printer

